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INTRODUCTION:

The Question of Death

One of the most predominant readings of Heidegger's
Being and Time (1927} has come to be known as the
"existential" reading.

The existential analytic of Dasein,

undertaken in the name of fundamental ontology, is delimited
by a series of crucial

distinctions~ontic/ontological,

existentiell/existential, inauthentic/authentic, etc.

The

"existential" reading of Being and Time reads these
distinctions, I would suggest, as distinctions, that is, as
two separate, distinguishable ways of being.

This reading

reads the task of the existential analytic and, therefore,
fundamental ontology, as merely a step beyond the first pole
of each distinction into the second pole.

The analysis of

death that opens the second division of Being and Time
affirms, according to the "existential" reading, the
possibility of the existential analytic by affirming the
possibility of completing this step, that is, by bringing to
light Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.
"By pointing out that Dasein has an authentic potentialityfor-Being-a-whole, the existential analytic acquires
assurance as to the constitution of Dasein's primordial

1
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Being." 1

But this reading-a reading that reads death

merely as possibility-repeats, as Levinas and Blanchet
point out, the most familiar and traditional of steps.
Levinas consistently reads death in Being and Time as
merely possibility.

In Time and the Other (1947) Levinas

writes:
Being toward death, in Heidegger's authentic existence,
is a supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility. It
is Dasein's assumption of the uttermost possibility of
existence, which precisely makes possible all other
possibilities, and consequently makes possible the very
feat of possibility-that is, it makes possible activity
and freedom. 2
Being toward death, in Heidegger's authentic existence, is
not, therefore, a supreme vulnerability, but rather,
according to Levinas, a supreme virility, "the virility of
grasping the possible, the power to be able ["pouvoir de
pouvoir"]" (TA 73/TO 82).

Or, said otherwise in a footnote

to the passage cited at the beginning of this paragraph,
"[d]eath in Heidegger is not, as Jean Wahl says 'the
impossibility of possibility,' but 'the possibility of
impossibility.'

This apparently Byzantine distinction has a

fundamental importance" (TA 92 n.5/TO 70 n.43).

Levinas

1

Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tilbingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1957), 234, hereafter cited in the text as sz. /
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 277, hereafter cited in the
text as BT.
2

Emmanuel Levinas, Le temps et l'autre (Paris: PUF,
1985), 57, hereafter cited in the text as TA. /Time and the
Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1987), 70, hereafter cited in the text as
TO.
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refers, in several of his works, to Heidegger's own
description of death in Being and Time as "the possibility
of impossibility" to describe his reading of death in
Heidegger's Being and Time.

For instance, in a discussion

published in Wahl's book A Short History of Existentialism
{1947) Levinas writes:
Existence produces itself in such a manner that
each being is already hurling himself towards death, and
this manner of hurling himself towards death is, for
him, a possibility par excellence, because all other
possibilities fulfill themselves and become acts,
whereas death becomes non-reality, non-being. That is
the sense in which Heidegger says that death is the
possibility of impossibility. 3
Levinas does not concede-at least in those passages where
Heidegger is explicitly named-the possibility that death in
Heidegger's Being and Time is to be read as both "the
possibility of impossibility" and "the impossibility of
possibility."

The later phrase-"the impossibility of

possibility"-articulates, according to Levinas, the fact
that death is the "limit of the subject's virility" {TA
62/TO 74), the "impossibility of having a project" {TA 6263/TO 74), of "grasping a possibility" (TA 64/TO 76).
What is important about the approach of death is that at
a certain moment we are no longer able to be able [nous
ne'pouvons plus pouvoir']. It is exactly thus that the
subject loses its very mastery as a subject {TA 62/TO
74) •
The step beyond inauthenticity into authenticity that would

3Jean

Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, trans.
Forrest Williams and Stanley Maron {New York: Philosophical
Library, 1949), 53.
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ensure the virility of the subject and complete fundamental
ontology is interrupted.

At the very moment the subject

would gain complete mastery, he or she is impotent.

The

production or performance of this necessary yet impossible
step beyond articulates the trace of death as that which
merely approaches.

This approach of death indicates,

according to Levinas, that one is in relation with something
that is absolutely other (TA 63/TO 74).
Blanchot's reading of death in Heidegger's Being and
Time is not unlike Levinas'.

In a passage from The Space of

Literature (1955) that is obviously a reading of Heidegger,
Blanchot explicitly refers to Levinas' reading of Heidegger
in Time and the Other.
When a contemporary philosopher names death as man's
extreme possibility, the possibility absolutely proper
to him, he shows that the origin of possibility is
linked in man to the fact that he can die, that for him
death is yet one possibility more, that the event by
which man departs from the possible and belongs to the
impossible is nevertheless within his mastery, that it
is the extreme moment of his possibility.
(And this the
philosopher expresses precisely by saying of death that
it is "the possibility of impossibility.")
[A footnote
here reads: "Emmanuel Levinas is the first to have
brought out what was at stake in this expression (Time
and the Other • ) " ] • 4
The passage continues with Blanchot establishing the
proximity of this reading of Heidegger to Hegel.
Hegel had already seen action, language, liberty, and
death to be aspects of one and the same movement; he had
"Maurice Blanchot, L'espace litt6raire (Paris: Gallimard,
1955), 325-326, hereafter cited in the text as EL./ The Space
of Literature, trans. Ann smock (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1982), 240, hereafter cited in the text as SL.
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shown that only man's constant and resolute proximity to
death allows him to become active nothingness capable of
negating and transforming natural reality~of combating,
of laboring, of knowing, and of being historical. This
is a magical force: it is the absolute power of the
negative which becomes the action of truth in the world.
It brings negation to reality, form to the formless,
definition to the indefinite. We want to draw these
limits, mark these ends, come to the finish. That is
the principle behind civilization's demands, the essence
of the purposeful will which seeks achievement, which
demands accomplishment and attains universal mastery.
Existence is authentic when it is capable of enduring
possibility right up to its extreme point, able to
stride toward death as toward possibility par
excellence. It is to this movement that the essence of
man in Western history owes its having become action,
value, future, labor and truth. The affirmation that in
man all is possibility requires that death itself be
possible: death itself, without which man would not be
able to form the notion of an "all" or to exist in view
of a totality, must be what makes all~what makes
totality~possible (EL 326/SL 240) .
For Hegel, death is productive.

It is the effectuation of

the appearance of the next shape of the dialectic.

It is

the possibility of each step of the dialectic that
progresses ever so diligently to the notion of an "all," to
absolute knowing.

In another passage from The Space of

Literature, Blanchet extends this reading of death as
possibility to encompass not only Heidegger and Hegel, but
also Nietzsche.
Death, in the human perspective, is not a given, it must
be achieved. It is a task, one which we take up
actively, one which becomes the source of our activity
and mastery. Man dies, that is nothing. But man is,
starting from death. He ties himself tight to his death
with a tie of which he is the judge. He makes his
death, he makes himself mortal and in this way give
himself the power of a maker and gives to what he makes
its meaning and its truth. The decision to be without
being is possibility itself: the possibility of death.
Three systems of thought~Hegel's, Nietzsche's, ·
Heidegger's~which attempt to account for this decision
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and which therefore seem, however much they may oppose
each other, to shed the greatest light on the destiny of
modern man, are all attempts at making death possible
(EL 115/SL 96).
While it is not particularly unusual to characterize Hegel's
work as a "system" of thought, the characterization seems
wholly inappropriate when applied to the work of Nietzsche
and Heidegger.

I would suggest that Blanchet applies this

characterization to one specific reading of the work of
these three

thinkers~a

reading which reads death as merely

possibility.
Blanchet, however, like Levinas, thinks that such a
reading of death overlooks the profoundly disturbing
questionableness at the heart of this

phenomenon~the

question of death as "the possibility of impossibility"
turning into death as "the impossibility of possibility,"
death as possibility turning into death as impossibility,
that is, turning into death as an absolute alterity that
infinitely approaches (or withdraws), the "is not yet" or
"dead time"

(~temps

mort).

This question is what

Blanchet, in The Space of Literature, calls "double death"
(la double mort).

This irreducible question of death will

be explored throughout this dissertation with respect to the
"work" of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchet.

The

question of death not only opens up new and provocative
readings of the "work" of these thinkers, but also raises
the question of their proximity to one another, oftentimes
despite their expressed intentions.

It should also be noted

7

at the outset that the question of death will call the ideas
of "work" and "production" into question-hence, the
quotation marks around the term "work" both in this
paragraph and in the title of the dissertation.

The first chapter of the dissertation will be
concerned with Levinas' reading of "dead time" in what is
otherwise one of the most familiar and traditional of
texts-Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy.

Levinas'

reading of Descartes' Meditations appears in several of
Levinas' works.

The most significant readings occur in

"Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (1957), Totality and
Infinity (1961), Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence
(1974), and "God and Philosophy" (1975).

For Levinas, the

profundity of the Meditations lies in "[t]he ambiguity of
Descartes' first evidence, revealing the I and God in turn
without merging them, revealing them as two distinct moments
of evidence mutually founding one another." 5

This ambiguous

or enigmatic "double origin" of the cogito and the infinite
is "produced" in a reading that progresses through the
Meditations.

One of the most significant aspects of

Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is his use of the

5Emmanuel

Levinas, Totalite et Infini. Essai sur
l'exteriorite (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 19,
hereafter cited in the text as Tel / Totality and Infinity:
An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 48, hereafter cited in the
text as TaI.
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term "production."

Production, for Levinas, is an

essentially ambiguous term that designates both the
effectuation and the appearance of something.

What is

produced by a reader who effectuates a reading of Descartes'
Meditations is not, however, the unequivocal appearance of
something in itself, as is usually the case in production,
but rather an ambiguous or enigmatic "double origin" of the
coqito and the infinite.

What is produced in .th!.§

effectuation is not something that appears, but rather that
which withdraws from (or approaches) revelation and merely
leaves a trace of itself in this irreducible ambiguity or
enigma.

This production, as one which does not effectuate

the unequivocal appearance of something in itself, is
perhaps more aptly ref erred to as a productionless
production.

This productionless production, this

"productionlessness" (compare with Blanchot's desoeuvrement
or "worklessness") characteristic of Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations is marked by what Levinas calls "dead
time," the interval of the "is not yet."

"Dead time" marks

the "relation without relation" (relation sans relation or
rapport sans rapport) (Te! 52, 271/TaI
coqito and the infinite.

so, 295) of the

The phrase rapport sans rapport

articulates the fact that one "term" of the "relation"-the
infinite-absolves itself from the "relation," withdraws
from (or approaches) the "relation," or said otherwise,
merely leaves a trace of itself in the production of· a
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"double origin" in which it, momentarily appearing as an
origin, is interminably vulnerable to being reappropriated
by the cogito.

"Dead time," which marks the rapport sans

rapport of the cogito and the infinite, also marks the
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius/il.._y

Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations raises the
question of language in Levinas' work.

The radicality of

everything said by Levinas risks being domesticated.
Levinas is aware of this when in the Preface to Totality and
Infinity he writes:
The word by way of preface [preface] which seeks to
break through the screen stretched between the author
and the reader by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the
very essence of language, which consists in continually
undoing its phrase by the foreword [l'avant-propos) or
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to
restate without ceremonies what has already been ill
understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the
said delights (Tel XVIII/Ta! 30).
This prefatory word (or fore-word) serves as an inaugural
reminder that a reading of what is said in the book must
always already be accompanied by an unsaying.

Thirteen

years later in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, this
prefatory word (or fore-word) is not only formally
thematized but, at the same time, written into the very
argument and exposition of the text.

This was almost

certainly in response to readers such as Blanchot and
Derrida who point out numerous ways Totality and Infinity
can too easily be read.

This response is called for.because
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in most cases the once only prefatory word has to do all the
work of unsaying what is merely programmatically said in
Totality and Infinity.

One notable exception, however, is

Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations.

Here there is

an intratextual production of what is merely announced
extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-word).

In

fact, the reading of Descartes' Meditations produced by
Levinas in Totality and Infinity is perhaps an anticipation
of what he will later formalize and write into the very
production of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, for
this

reading~which,

as will become apparent in chapter III,

plays both a decisive and a pervasive role in Totality and
Inf inity~is heavily drawn upon in Levinas' formal
thematization of skepticism and the saying of the otherwise
than being in Otherwise than Being.
One of the enduring questions asked by readers of
Levinas' works is whether, and to what extent, Levinas is a
reader of Hegel.

Coming in the wake of Bataille's and

Blanchot's readings of Hegel, Levinas' use of the term
"production" certainly raises the question of Levinas'
proximity to Hegel.

Levinas, however, never explicitly ties

his reading of production to a reading of Hegel.

This task

seems to have been left to his readers.
Blanchet, on the other hand, explicitly reads a notion
of production or work alongside Hegel.

The second chapter

of the dissertation will be concerned with Blanchot's

11
equivocal reading of production in the work of Hegel.

In

·"Literature and the Right to Death"-which appears in I&
fart du feu (1949)-Blanchot reads production alongside
death understood as possibility.
productive.

For Hegel, death is

It is the effectuation of the appearance of the

next shape of the dialectic.

It is the possibility of the

step beyond one shape into another.

Blanchot takes up the

questionableness of this reading of death in Hegel.
I will limit my remarks on "Literature and the Right
to Death" to a reading of two of what Blanchot calls a
writer's temptations.

One temptation-"revolution" or

"revolutionary action"-marks the first instance of
Blanchot's irreducibly ambiguous reading of the following
passage from the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
"[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures [death]
and maintains itself in it. 116

Literature begins at the

moment when it becomes a question, that is, at the moment
when an initial reading of this line, which reads death as
possibility, turns into a reading of this line which reads
death as impossibility.

Death, as this turning itself,

leaves a trace of itself, I would suggest, in the production
or performance of an interminable step/not beyond (I.§ pas
au-delA), an eternal step beyond that eternally returns.
This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary action" will
6

G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 19, ·
hereafter cited in the text as PS.
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raise the question of the proximity of this temptation and
Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the
work of Nietzsche.

Nihilism is another temptation of a

writer named by Blanchot in "Literature and the Right to
Death."

A reading that raises the question of the proximity

of "revolution" and nihilism will, therefore, raise several
questions:

What is the relationship of nihilism (or

scepticism), named as a writer's temptation by Blanchet in
"Literature and the Right to Death," and the nihilism of
Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche in L'entretien
infini?

What is the relationship of Blanchot's reading of

Hegel in "Literature and the Right to Death" and his reading
of Nietzsche in L'entretien infini?

Is the nihilism of

Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche inscribed in his
reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit?
The third chapter of the dissertation will again be
concerned with Levinas' Totality and Infinity.

Totality and

Infinity calls. for being read in a multiplicity of ways.
Alphonso Lingis, the principle translator of Levinas into
English, .suggests that Totality and Infinity is "structured,
classically, as a phenomenology in different strata, related
as founding and founded. " 7

Granted, the structure, and

often the vocabulary, of Totality and Infinity lends itself
7Emmanuel

Levinas, Autrement gu'~tre ou au-dela de
l'essence (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), hereafter
cited in the text as AE. / Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus·
Nijhoff, 1981), xv, hereafter cited in the text as OB.
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to such a reading.

But such a reading risks domesticating

the interruptions of Totality and Infinity.

It risks the

possibility of Totality and Infinity being too easily read
and appropriated by, for example, ethics or theology.
Furthermore, such a reading can only be undertaken if one
does not heed the extratextual prefatory word cited
previously.

But this once only prefatory word (or fore-

word) which, in most cases, has to do all of the work of
unsaying what is merely said in Totality and Infinity,
obviously leaves the work vulnerable to be too easily read
and appropriated.

It was suggested earlier, however, that

Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is a notable
exception to the lack of an intratextual production of what
is announced extratextually by the prefatory word (or foreword).

With this in mind it may perhaps be instructive to

remain attentive to the way this reading plays both a
decisive and a pervasive role, on innumerable levels, in the
very structure of Totality and Infinity.
In Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations "dead
time" or the interval of the "is not yet" names the rapport
sans rapport of the cogito and the infinite as well as the
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius or il
y_g.

The reading of "dead time" in Levinas' reading of

Descartes' Meditations undertaken in chapter I of this
dissertation requires, however, a deformalization or
concretization.

This is undertaken especially in sections

14

II and III of Totality and Infinity where, I would suggest,
"dead time" gets renamed at each successive stratum.

The

following passage from Derrida's "Violence and Metaphysics:
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" is, with

certain qualifications, a provisional characterization of
the structure of Totality and Infinity.
In Totality and Infinity the thematic development is
neither purely descriptive nor purely deductive. It
proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a
beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave
against the same shore, in which, however, as each
return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews
and enriches itself • 8
A reading of Totality and Infinity which begins with "dead
time" will call into question a simple linear reading of
sections II and III of Totality and Infinity and raise the
question of the proximity of Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being.

"Dead time" also names the "site" of

a certain "relationship" of the infinite and the il y a.
The interval of death, therefore, perhaps names what in
Otherwise than Being is referred to as "a fine risk."
The fourth chapter of the dissertation will be
concerned with the question of the proximity of Nietzsche
and Levinas.

In chapter III I suggest that a reading of

Levinas that is not attentive to "dead time"-which is
marked by or leaves a trace of itself in the performance or

8

Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of.Chicago
Press, 1978), 312 n.7.
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production of a "double origin"-risks domesticating the
interruptions located within his work.

It risks the

possibility of being too easily read and appropriated.

For

example, a close reading of justice and responsibility in
the work of Levinas-that is, the step beyond justice into
responsibility-reveals that Levinas' idea of responsibility
cannot be easily appropriated by ethics or politics.
Responsibility exceeds the order of measure and reason.

It

merely leaves an enigmatic or ambiguous trace of itself in
this order of just boundaries.

Levinas' reading of

responsibility moves at the limit of the ethical language of
justice.
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound in
The Birth of Tragedy likewise moves at the limit of the
ethical language of justice.

Reading justice in Nietzsche

alongside justice in Levinas will, I would suggest,
raise-seemingly despite Levinas' intentions-the question
of the proximity of Nietzsche and Levinas.

This is a

question that would not even be considered in a too easy
reading of Levinas that sometimes seeks to appropriate his
work for a post-Nietzschean ethics or politics.
The final chapter of the dissertation will.be
concerned with a brief re-reading of Heidegger's Being and
Time with respect to the question of death articulated
throughout chapters 1-4 of this dissertation.

I would

suggest that Being and Time decisively turns upon the

16

doubling of death--death as possibility turning into death
as impossibility.

Recall that Levinas and Blanchot

consistently read death in Being and Time as merely
possibility.

The doubling of death calls, therefore, for

re-reading these readings of Being and Time.
suggest that this

doubling~which

I would

delimits the project of

fundamental ontology, that is, both limits it and makes it
possible 9~not

only opens the space/time of the clearing

(Lichtung), but also raises the question of the proximity of
the clearing and the "dead time" of Levinas and Blanchot.

9

See John Sallis, Delimitations~Phenomenology and the
End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1986) •

CHAPTER 1
THE EVIL GENIUS, DEAD TIME, AND THE INFINITE:
Reading Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy
He found the Archimedean point, but he used
it against himself; it seems he was permitted
to find it only under this condition.
~Franz Kafka
In the second Meditation of his Meditations on First
Philosophy Descartes compares that thing for which he is
searching, that is, that thing about which he can be
absolutely certain, to the Archimedean point.
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable
point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can
hope for great things if I manage to find just one
thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable. 1
After reconsidering the pathway of doubt undertaken in the
first Meditation, Descartes writes:
So after considering everything very thoroughly, I
must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I
exist, is true whenever it is put forward by me or
conceived in my mind.
But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding
of what this 'I' is, that now necessarily exists (M 17).
After going back and meditating on what he originally
thought himself to be, and then subtracting from that
1

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy,
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald
Murdoch, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 16, hereafter
cited in the text as M.
17

18
anything which is doubtful, he finally concludes:

"I am,

then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" (M 18).
Descartes' Archimedean point is the coqito.
Levinas traces a shift of the Archimedean point from
the coqito to the infinite.

The production of this shift

doubles the Archimedean point-that is the coqito and the
infinite are revealed as two distinct points mutually
founding one another.

Levinas discovers in this ambiguous

and enigmatic doubling a trace of the infinite, a trace of
that which is both the condition and the uncondition of the
coqito.

The discovery of this Archimedean point-an

excessive Archimedean point that leaves a trace of itself in
an ambiguous and enigmatic doubling-transforms the
traditional understanding of the Archimedean point.

This

Archimedean point is perhaps aptly expressed by the
following passage from Kafka's "He:"

"He found the

Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it seems
he was permitted to find it only under this condition."
Levinas likewise traces a shift of the Archimedean
point from the coqito to the evil genius.
In both cases the production of this shift-which is a
productionless production-is marked by "dead time."

"Dead

time" marks the rapport sans rapport of the coqito and the
infinite, and the rapport sans rapport of the coqito and the
evil genius or il y a.

19

Levinas frequently characterizes his reading of
Descartes' Meditations in terms of two distinct movements.
If, in a first movement, Descartes takes consciousness
to be indubitable of itself by itself, in a second
movement~the reflection on reflection~he recognizes
conditions for this certitude (Tel 186/TaI 210).
Before undertaking a close textual reading of Levinas'
reading of Descartes' Meditations it is necessary (and
helpful) to situate these two movements within the context
of the distinction Levinas makes between comprehension and
critique.
In the opening sections of Totality and Infinity
Levinas makes a distinction between knowledge or theory
understood as comprehension [intelligence] and the critical
essence of knowing.

In its comprehension of being (or

ontology) knowledge or theory is concerned with critique.
It discovers the dogmatism and naive arbitrariness of
its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of
the exercise of ontology; it then seeks to exercise this
freedom in such a way as to turn back at every moment to
the origin of the arbitrary dogmatism of this free
exercise. This would lead to an infinite regression if
this return itself remained an ontological movement, an
exercise of freedom, a theory. Its critical intention
then leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique does
not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but
calls into question the exercise of the same (Te! 13/TaI
43) •

Knowledge or theory seems, therefore, to be characterized by
an ambiguity or

enigma~two

distinct movements.

Critique or philosophy is the essence of knowing. But
what is proper to knowing is not its possibility of
going unto an object, a movement by which it is akin to
other acts; its prerogative consists in being able to
put itself in question, in penetrating beneath its own
condition. It is not drawn back from the world as its
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object; it can have the world as its theme, .make of it
an object, because its exercise consists, as it were, in
taking charge of the very condition that supports it and
that supports even this very act of taking charge (Te!
57/TaI 85).
These two movements are not, however, merely opposed to one
another.

Although oriented in inverse directions, and

therefore opposed, they seem, nevertheless, to call for
being thought "at the same time."

The movement of

comprehension, "working on straight ahead" (Te! 61/TaI 89)
is, as was pointed out in the passage cited above, inverted
"at every moment [!tout moment]" (Te! 13/TaI 43, emphasis
added) by the movement of critique.

In another passage

alluding to the temporal relationship of comprehension and
critique, Levinas writes:

"The search for the intelligible

and the manifestation of the critical essence of knowing,
the movement of a being back to what precedes its condition,
begin together [commence

du~

coup]" (Te! 56/TaI 84,

emphasis added), and yet they are oriented in inverse
directions.

It seems that these two movements necessarily

yet impossibly call for being thought "at the same time."
Levinas discovers in Descartes' Meditations a work that
responds to this call.
The critical essence of knowing
Levinas' reading of Descartes'

leads~according

Meditations~beyond

knowledge of the cogito (Te! 58/TaI 85).

to

the

It penetrates

beneath knowledge understood as comprehension, beneath
knowledge which takes itself to be indubitable of itself by
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itself.
If, in a first movement, Descartes takes consciousness
to be indubitable of itself by itself, in a second
movement~the reflection on ref lection~he recognizes
conditions for this certitude (Tel 186/TaI 210).
In a second

movement~that

is, the critical reflection on

the reflection characteristic of

comprehension~Descartes

recognizes conditions for the certitude of comprehension.
This certitude, Levinas provisionally states, is due to the
clarity and distinctness of the cogito.

This move is

provisional because it remains "an ontological movement, an
exercise of freedom, a theory" (Tel 13/TaI 43).
a move of comprehension.

It remains

Were this inquiry to remain on the

level of comprehension this move would be no more than the
first step of what would inevitably be an infinite
regression (Tel 13, 57/TaI 43, 85).

This move, however, is

subtended by the second movement, formally characterized by
the critique.

Levinas points out that while certitude is

indeed due to the clarity and distinctness of the cogito,
certitude itself is sought because of "the presence of
infinity in this finite thought, which without this presence
would be ignorant of its own finitude" (Tel 186/TaI 210).
That is, without this presence consciousness would be unable
to posit and conceive its own finitude, its own doubt (Tel
185/TaI 210).

It would be unable to be certain of its own

doubt, unable to actualize the first movement.

Levinas is

ref erring here the following famous passage from the third
Meditation.
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I clearly understand that there is more reality in an
infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that
my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some
way prior to my perception of the finite, that is
myself. For how could I understand that I doubted or
desired-that is, lacked something-and that I was not
wholly perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a
more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own
defects by comparison (M 31)?
How could I understand that I doubted back in the second
Meditation, how could I have posited and conceived my doubt,
my f initude, my imperfection-which, in the second
Meditation, established the certitude of the cogito (that
is, I understood, I was certain, I had no doubt, that I
doubted)-unless there were always already in me some idea
of a more perfect being which enabled me to recognize my own
defects by comparison?

Descartes here discovers in a second

movement-that is, "after the fact" or in the critical
reflection on the reflection characteristic of
comprehension-the "condition" of the certitude
characteristic of the first movement, of what was otherwise
taken to be "indubitable of itself by itself," an absolute
origin.

Descartes discovers in the third Meditation a pre-

originary origin-the infinite.
The infinite, discovered in a second movement, is
discovered to be necessarily yet impossibly in the finite.
It is necessarily in the finite insofar as it is the
condition of the certitude of the cogito.

"For," as

Descartes writes, "how could I understand that I doubted or
desired-that is, lacked something-and that I am not wholly

23

perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect
being which enabled me to recognize my own defects by
comparison (M 31, emphasis added)?

However, the infinite

is, at the same time, impossibly in the finite insofar as it
is an in-comprehensible exteriority that is the uncondition
of the certitude of the cogito.

The in-comprehensible

interrupts the comprehension characteristic of the first
movement.

The following passage from "God and Philosophy,"

which cites the sentence in Descartes' third Meditation
immediately preceding the sentence cited above, articulates
the fact that the infinite is in me insofar as it interrupts
a "me" that would comprehend or include it (that is, have it
in me).

That is, in some way I have received an idea, I

have it in me, before there is an "I" that is capable of
receiving it.
The actuality of the cogito is [ ••• ] interrupted by the
unincludable, not thought but undergone in the form of
the idea of the Infinite, bearing in a second moment of
consciousness what in a first moment claimed to bear it.
After the certainty of the cogito, present to itself in
the second Meditation, after the "halt" which the last
lines of this Meditation mark, the third Meditation
announces that "in some way I have in me the notion of
the infinite earlier than the f inite~to wit, the notion
of God before that of myself ." 2 The idea of the
Infinite, Infinity in me, can only be a passivity of
consciousness. Is it still consciousness? There is
here a passivity which cannot be likened to receptivity.
Receptivity is a collecting that takes place in a
2The

English translators of "God and Philosophy" use
the Haldane and Ross translation of Descartes' philosophical
works. The Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translation
of this sentence reads: "··· my perception of the infinite,
that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the
finite, that is myself" (M 31).
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welcome, an assuming that takes place under the force of
the blow received. The breakup of the actuality of
thought in the "idea of God" is a passivity more passive
still than any passivity, like the passivity of a trauma
through which the idea of God would have been put in
us. 3
This necessary yet impossible presence of the infinite in
the finite is reflected in the prefix "in-" of the word
"infinite."
is [ ••• ] as

In "God and Philosophy" Levinas writes:
though~without

wanting to play on

"[I]t

words~the

in

of the Infinite were to signify both the non and the within
(DP 106/GP 160).

This prefix signifies inclusion in the

sense of immanence, insofar as the infinite's immanence is
the necessary condition of comprehension, and negation in
the sense of transcendence or exteriority, insofar as the
infinite's in-comprehensible exteriority interrupts or is
the uncondition of comprehension. 4

"The idea of God is God

3

Emmanuel Levinas, "Dieu et la philosophie," in De dieu
qui vient a l'id~e (Paris: Vrin, 1982), 106, hereafter cited
in the text as DP. / "God and Philosophy," in Emmanuel
Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 160-1, hereafter
cited in the text as GP.
4Descartes

explicitly states that the infinite is not
the result of the formal structure of a negative judgment.
And I must not think that, just as my conceptions of
rest and darkness are arrived at by negating movement
and light, so my perception of the infinite is arrived
at not by means of a true idea but merely by negating
the finite (M 31).
Levinas recognizes this when he writes: "[I]t is as though
the negation of the finite included in In-f inity did not
signify any sort of negation resulting from the formal
structure of negative judgment" (DP 105-106/GP 160). In a
footnote Levinas adds:
The latent birth of negation occurs not in subjectivity,
but in the idea of the Infinite. Or, if one prefers, it
is in subjectivity qua idea of the Infinite. It is in
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in me, but God already breaking up the consciousness that
aims at ideas" (DP 105/GP 160, emphasis added).
The

~

in which the inf inite--necessarily yet

impossibly in the finite, that is, both the condition and
the uncondition of the

finite~is

articulated in the finite

devolves from the two distinct movements outlined above.
Levinas not only clarifies this issue of the articulation of
the infinite, but also establishes the proximity of his
reading of Descartes Meditations to his own analyses of
death, in that section of Totality and Infinity entitled
"Atheism or the Will."

The reading undertaken in this

section, like the reading cited above, characterizes the
Meditations in terms of two distinct movements.

But here

the two movements are given temporal designations.

The

first movement is called the chronological order and the
second movement is called the "logical" order.

These two

distinct times are likewise formally articulated by the
distinction between comprehension and critique.
The being infinitely surpassing its own idea in us--God
in the Cartesian terminology~subtends the evidence of
the coqito, according to the third Meditation. But the
discovery of this metaphysical relation in the coqito
constitutes chronologically only the second move of the
philosopher. That there could be a chronological order
this sense that the idea of the Infinite, as Descartes
affirms, is a "genuine idea" and not merely what I
conceive "by negation of what is finite" (DP 106 n.5/GP
160 n.6).
The English translators of "God and Philosophy" use the
Haldane and Ross translation of Descartes' philosophical
works rather than the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch
translation cited above.
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distinct from the "logical" order, that there could be
several moments in the progression, that there is a
progression~here is separation.
For by virtue of time
this being is not yet [n'est pas encore]~which does not
make it the same as nothingness, but maintains it at a
distance Ci distance] from itself. It is not all at
once [n'est RA§~~ £.Qlll2] (Tel 24-5/TaI 54).
rt is important to keep in mind that the passages describing
the cogito as "not yet" and "not all at once" are
descriptions characteristic of knowledge as comprehension
written from the perspective of a reader/writer who has
already progressed through the two movements of the
Meditations.

It is from this perspective, that is, after

the discovery in the third Meditation of the metaphysical
relation in the cogito, that Levinas describes the cogito
during the chronological order.

He writes:

By virtue of

time, that is, by virtue of the chronological order, the
cogito "is not yet," it "is not all at once."
of the actualization of the

cogit~which

The condition

is, from the

perspective of the chronological order, already assumed to
be an actual entity, indubitable of itself by
to come.

itself~is

yet

This does not, however, make it the same as

nothingness, or, the same as potency.

It is, on the

contrary, maintained at a distance from itself in the
interval between being and nothingness, between act and
potency.

It is maintained in the interval of the "is not

yet" (or, the "is not all at once").
interval~an

It is this

interval that marks the production of a trace

of separation or

alterity~that,

I will suggest in a·moment,
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Levinas proposes to call "dead time"

(~temps

mort).

Levinas elaborates on the description of the coqito as
"not yet" or "not all at once" in the following passage:
Even its [i.e., the coqito's] cause, older than itself,
is still to come [~encore! venir]. The cause of
being is thought or known by its effect as thpuqh it
were posterior to its effect (TeI 25/TaI 54).
The cause of being (God) is thought or known by its effect
(the coqito) as though the cause were posterior to its
effect.

Again, it is important to keep in mind that these

passages are descriptions characteristic of knowledge as
comprehension written from the perspective of a
reader/writer who has already progressed through the two
movements of the Meditations.
Referring to these passages, Levinas writes:

"Thus

already theoretical thought [ ••• ] articulates separation"
(TeI 25/TaI 54).

"Theoretical thought" here refers to

knowledge understood as comprehension which articulates,
after the fact, not merely the reflection, but the
production of separation.

For "separation," Levinas writes,

"is not reflected in thought, but produced by it" (TeI
25/TaI 54, emphasis added).

To fully appreciate this

passage it will be necessary to clarify what Levinas means
by "production."

5If

the description of the coqito as "not yet" or "not
all at once" follow from the fact that its cause is yet to
come, then Levinas risks confusing his readers by beginning
this passage with the word "even," which seems to imply that
he is introducing new material.
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Levinas introduces the term "production" in the
Preface to Totality aru;l Infinity.
The term "production [production]" designates both the
effectuation [l'effectuation] of being (the event "is
produced [U produit]", an automobile "is produced [ll
produit]"} and its being brought to light or its
exposition (an argument "is produced [se produit]", an
actor "is produced [se produit]"}. The ambiguity of
this verb conveys the essential ambiguity of the
operation by which the being of an entity simultaneously
is brought about [s'6vertue] and is revealed (TeI
XIV/Ta! 26}.
The essentially ambiguous operation of the term "production"
is crucial for a proper understanding of the following
passage which, as will become apparent below, is likewise
crucial for a proper understanding of Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations.
The I is not a contingent formation by which the same
and the other, as logical determinations of being, can
in addition be reflected [se refltter] within A thought.
It is in order that alterity be produced [se produise]
in being that a "thought" is needed and that an I is
needed (TeI 9-10/TaI 39).
The alterity of the same and the other is not merely
reflected within the thought of an "I. 11

This passage, which

alludes to Levinas' discussion of the cogito (I think},
suggests that a cogito is needed in order that alterity be
produced in being.

The passage continues:

The irreversibility of the relation can be produced [se
produire] only if the relation is effected [accompli] by
one of the terms as the very movement of transcendence,
as the traversing of this distance, and not as a
recording of, or the psychological invention of this
movement. "Thought" and "interiority" are the very
break-up of being and the production [la production]
(not the reflection [le reflet]} of transcendence. We
know this relation only in the measure that we effect
[effectuons] it; this is what is distinctive about it.
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Alterity is possible only starting from me (Tel 10/TaI
39-40).
we know the relation, we can reflect upon it, only in the
measure that we effect it (that is, bring it about).

But

what is known or reflected upon in this effectuation is not
the appearance of something, as is usually the case in
production (which ambiguously conveys both effectuation and
being brought to light or appearing).

For what is produced

in this effectuation is not something that appears, but
rather what withdraws from revelation and merely leaves a
trace of itself in an ambiguity or enigma.

Therefore, what

is "known" or "reflected upon" is an irreducible ambiguity
or

enigma~a

trace of what withdraws from revelation.

It is now possible to properly appreciate what Levinas
means when he writes:

"Separation is not reflected in

thought, but produced by it" (Tel 25/TaI 54, emphasis
added).

Separation is produced by thought in that one

effects a progression through the two movements of the
Meditations, in the measure that one effects a performance
of a reading of the Meditations.

But what is reflected upon

in this effectuation is not the appearance of something, as
is usually the case in production (which ambiguously conveys
both effectuation and being brought to light or appearing).
For what is produced in this effectuation is an inversion of
order with respect to the chronological order and the
"logical" order.

What is produced in this effectuation is

the equiprimordiality of the cogito and God.
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The ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence, revealing
the I and God in turn without merging them, revealing
them as two distinct moments of evidence mutually
founding one another, characterizes the very meaning of
separation. The separation of the I is thus affirmed to
be non-contingent, non-provisional. The distance
between me and God, radical and necessary, is produced
(se produit] in being itself (TeI 19/TaI 48).
What is produced in this effectuation is not something that
appears, but rather an irreducible ambiguity or enigma.
What is produced in :thi.§. effectuation is not something that
appears, but rather what withdraws from revelation and
merely leaves a trace of itself in this ambiguity or enigma.
Therefore, what is "reflected upon" is an irreducible
ambiguity or

enigma~a

trace of what withdraws from

revelation.
The effectuation of this "double origin" makes
possible those descriptions of the cogito during the
chronological order pointed out

above~those

descriptions

which must have been written from the perspective of a
reader/writer who has already effected a progression through
the two movements of the Meditations.

For example: the

cogito "is not yet," or "is not all at once."

Another

example pointed out above is the following phrase:

"The

cause of being is thought or known by its effect !U! though
it were posterior to its effect."

The effectuation of an

inversion of order, of a "double origin," makes possible the
production of this logically absurd inversion of the
"posteriority of the anterior" (TeI 25/TaI 54) by thought.
"Thus already theoretical thought," on the basis of the
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effectuation of an inversion of order, "articulates
separation" (TeI 25/TaI 54).
question:

Returning to the sentence in

"Separation is not reflected in thought, but

produced by it.

For in it," Levinas writes, reiterating the

logically absurd inversion of the "posteriority of the
anterior," "the After or the Effect conditions the Before or
the cause:
25/TaI 54).

the Before appears and is only welcomed" (TeI
It "appears," however, only as the irreducible

ambiguity or enigma of the equiprimordiality of the
chronological and "logical" orders. Therefore, what is
reflected upon in this effectuation is not the appearance of
something, as is usually the case in production, but the
ambiguous or enigmatic trace of what withdraws from
revelation.
This productionless production or
"productionlessness" 6 characteristic of Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations is marked by "dead time."
The interval of discretion or of death is a third
notion between being and nothingness.
The interval is not to life what potency is to
act. Its originality consists in being between two
times. We propose to call this dimension dead time [le
temps mort]. The rupture of historical and totalized
duration, which dead time [le temps mort] marks, is the
very rupture that creation operates in being (TeI 29/TaI
58).

"Dead time" marks the "relation without relation" (relation
sans relation or rapport sans rapport) (Te! 52, 271/TaI 80,

6

Compare with Blanchot's desoeuyrement or
"worklessness."
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295) of the coqito and the infinite. 7

The phrase rapport

Bil§ rapport articulates the fact that one "term" of the

"relation"-the infinite-absolves itself from the
"relation," withdraws from (or approaches) the "relation,"
or said otherwise, merely leaves a trace of itself in the
production of a "double origin" in which it, momentarily
appearing as an origin, is interminably vulnerable to being

7Levinas

also refers to "dead time" in that section of
Totality and Infinity entitled "The Infinity of Time."
Being is not produced [.§..@ produit] at one blow,
irremissibly present. Reality is what it is, but will
be once again, another time freely resumed and pardoned.
Infinite being is produced [se produit] as times, that
is, in several times across the dead time (~ temps
mort] that separates the father from the son. It is not
the f initude of being that constitutes the essence of
time, as Heidegger thinks, but its infinity. The death
sentence [l'arret de ,lj& InQ!:t] does not approach as an
end of being, but as an unknown, which as such suspends
power. The constitution of the interval that liberates
being from the limitation of fate calls for death. The
nothingness of the interval-a dead time (Yn temps
~]-is the production (production) of infinity (Tel
260/TaI 284).
Levinas also refers to "dead time" in that section of
chapter IV ("Substitution") of Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence entitled "Recurrence."
The expression "in one's skin" is not a metaphor
for the in-itself; it refers to a recurrence in the dead
time [le temps mort] or the meanwhile which separates
inspiration and expiration, the diastole and systole of
the heart beating dully against the walls of one's skin
(AE 138/0B 109).
Other notable references to "dead time" occur in:.
1) Maurice Blanchot's The Space of Literature. The
reference to "dead time" occurs in that section of
chapter I ("The Essential Solitude") entitled "The
Fascination of Time's Absence."
2) Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatoloqy. The reference to
"dead time" occurs in that section of part I
("Writing before the Letter"), chapter 2
("Linguistics and Grammatology") entitled "The
Hinge."
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reappropriated by the coqito.
The reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations undertaken thus far has focused on the
relationship of the coqito and the infinite.

This should

come as no surprise since it is to this relationship that
Levinas continually returns when he reads the Meditations.
But "dead time" not only marks the rapport sans rapport of
the coqito and the infinite, but also the rapport

§.All.§.

rapport of the coqito and the evil genius.
At the beginning of that section of Totality and
Infinity entitled "Truth Presupposes Justice" Levinas points
out that taking the cogito as the "first certitude"-which
I

is characteristic of the first movement-constitutes "an
arbitrary halt not justified of itself" (Te! 65/TaI 92-3) . 8
For in the coqito the thinking subject
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation,
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we
elsewhere have called there i.§ [il ya], beyond
affirmation and negation (Te! 65-6/TaI 93).
8

In "God and Philosophy" Levinas likewise uses the term
"halt" to describe what in Totality and Infinity he called
the "first movement." But here he uses it in the context of
the relationship of the coqito and the infinite.
After the certainty of the coqito, present to itself in
the second Meditation, after the "halt" which the last
lines of the Meditation mark, the third Meditation
announces that "in some way I have in me the notion of
the infinite earlier than the finite--to wit, the notion
of God before that of myself" (GP 160).
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It is as if the certitude of the cogito--which is
characteristic of the first movement-were "not yet," as if
every attempt to actualize it were interrupted in the very
attempt.
With this passage Levinas joins Descartes' description
of the evil genius in the Meditations with his own account
of the il y a, the "there is," that he had himself offered
in Existence and Existents and in Time and the Other.

The

evil genius was introduced by Descartes to extend the range
of issues which might be put into doubt.

But the doubt

arising from the evil genius is not only more extensive but
also more potent than any doubt arising from a personal
reflection on the fallibility of our senses.

This doubt, by

tearing one out of the world, thrusts one into a world that
is not a world-an absolutely silent world, "an-archic,
without principle, without a beginning."

It thrusts one

into a world where "thought would strike nothing
substantial," where "on first contact the phenomena would
degrade into appearance and in this sense would remain in
equivocation" (TeI 63/TaI 90).

It is this equivocation

which constitutes the potency of the doubt arising from the
evil genius.
The equivocation here is not due to the confusion of two
notions, two substances, or two properties. It is not
to be counted among the confusions produced within a
world that has already appeared. Nor is it the
confusion of being and nothingness. What appears is not
degraded into a nothing. But the appearance, which is
not a nothing, is not a being either-not even an
interior being, for it is nowise in itself (TeI 63/TaI
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91).

The equivocal appearance of the phenomena is neither pure
nothingness nor a straightforward appearance

in itself

which, as such, would bear the signs enabling one to dismiss
it and save one from being misled by it.

Appearance is

frightening precisely because of this equivocality,
precisely because it only might deceive one.

And because

thought strikes nothing substantial, the I in the equivocal
spiralling movement of negation and implicit affirmation
does not find in the cogito itself a stopping place.

It

enters into a vertiginous "movement of descent [ .•• ]beyond
affirmation and negation," where, like the subject
interrupted by the infinite, it dwells in the equivocal
interval between being and nothingness.

In that section of

Existence and Existents entitled "Existence Without
Existents" Levinas writes:
When the forms of things are dissolved in the night, the
darkness of the night, which is neither an object nor
the quality of an object, invades like a presence. In
the night, where we are riven to it, we are not dealing
with anything. But this nothing is not that of pure
nothing-ness. There is no longer this or .th.gt; there is
not "something." But this universal absence is in its
turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence. It
is not the dialectical counterpart of absence, and we do
not grasp it through a thought. It is immediately
there. There is no discourse. Nothing responds to us,
but this silence; the voice of this silence is
understood and frightens like the silence of those
infinite spaces Pascal speaks of. There is [il ya], in
general, without it mattering what there is, without our
being able to fix a substantive to this term. There is
[il y a) is an impersonal form, like in it rains, or it
is warm. Its anonymity is essential. The mind does not
find itself faced with an apprehended exterior. ·The
exterior~if one insists on this term~remains
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uncorrelated with an interior. It is no longer given.
It is no longer a world. What we call the I is itself
submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled
by it. The disappearance of all things and of the I
leaves what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of being in
which one participates, whether one wants to or not,
without having taken the initiative, anonymously. Being
remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere
belonging to no one, universal, returning in the midst
of the negation which put it aside, and in all the
powers to which that negation may be multiplied. 9
This reference to negation brings us back to Levinas'
reading of doubt in Descartes' Meditations.
It was pointed out above that taking the coqito as the
"first certitude"-which is characteristic of the first
movement-constitutes "an arbitrary halt not justified of
itself" (TeI 65/TaI 92-3).

For in. the coqito the thinking

subject
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation,
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we
elsewhere have called there is [il ya), beyond
affirmation and negation (TeI 65-6/TaI 93).
Levinas outlines here, I would suggest, two movements not
wholly unlike those outlined with regard to the coqito and
the infinite.
This reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations is disruptive on several different levels.

Emmanuel Levinas, De !'existence a l'existant (Paris:
Vrin, 1984), 94-95. /Existence and Existents, trans~
Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 58.
9
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First, doubling the "double origin" disrupts any linear
reading of the Meditations that would easily step from the
evil genius to the certitude of the cogito, and then to the
cogito's relationship with the infinite.

That is, it

disrupts any reading that would leave the evil genius
behind, that would treat it as merely a step on the way to
the cogito's relationship with the infinite.

Second,

doubling the "double origin" likewise disrupts any linear
reading of Levinas' work.

One can locate such a disruption

in the relationship of silence and language delimited by
Levinas in the context of his reading of Descartes'
Meditations.

Briefly, the "ever renewed equivocation

(equivogue toujours renouvelae)" (TeI 63/TaI 91)
characteristic of the silence of the evil genius/il y a
cannot simply be opposed (as Levinas sometimes leads one to
believe) to the "total frankness ever renewed [franchise
totale, toujours renouvelee]" (TeI 71/TaI 98) characteristic
of language.

By the same token, this silence cannot easily

be inscribed in a linear reading that would situate it as a
step on the way to the frankness of language.

The "ever

renewed frankness" is always already accompanied (haunted?)
by the "ever renewed equivocation."

In fact, the "ever

renewed equivocation" is the "inverse of language" (TeI
64/TaI 91), the inverse of the "ever renewed frankness"
characteristic of language.

Perhaps one should read

"inverse" here as inverse sides of the same coin.

This puts
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any simple step into the "frankness" of language, into the
"frankness" of the "ethical" relation, into question.

The reading of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations undertaken above has already begun to address,
though not explicitly, the question of language in Levinas'
work.

Language, for Levinas, is itself the relation to

infinity and the il y a, the rapport sans rapport.

In a

passage typical of several programmatic statements on
language in Totality and Infinity Levinas writes that
language is
an attitude of the same with regard to the Other,
irreducible to the representation of the Other,
irreducible to an intention of thought, irreducible to a
consciousness of ••• , since relating to what no
consciousness can contain, relating to the infinity of
the Other. Language is not enacted within a
consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and
reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question
(TeI 179/TaI 204).
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas addresses
the relationship between language as this rapport sans
rapport and the exposition of this relation in the book.
The word by way of preface [pr~face) which seeks to
break through the screen stretched between the author
and the reader by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the
very essence of language, which consists in continually
undoing its phrase by the foreword [l'avant-propos) or
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to
restate without ceremonies what has already been ill
understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the
said delights (TeI XVIII/Ta! 30).
This prefatory word (or fore-word) serves as an inaugural
reminder that a reading of what is said in the book must
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always already be accompanied by an unsaying.

It announces

that the language of Totality and Infinity is not exempt
from the responsibility which language as rapport sans
rapport exposes one--the unsaying of what is said.

Totality

and Infinity is a book that, by way of this prefatory word
(or fore-word), interrupts itself.
Thirteen years later in Otherwise than Being this
prefatory word (or fore-word) is not only formally
thematized but, at the same time, written into the very
argument and exposition of the text.

This was almost

certainly in response to readers such as Blanchet and
Derrida who point out numerous ways Totality and Infinity
can too easily be read.

This response is called for because

in most cases the once only prefatory word has to do all the
work of unsaying what is merely programmatically said in
Totality and Infinity.

One notable exception, however, is

Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations.

Here there is

an intratextual performance of what is merely announced
extratextually by the prefatory word (or fore-word).

Here

there is the production of a work (Descartes', as well as
Levinas') that is unproductive, that responds to the
productionlessness of the work.

In fact, the reading of

Descartes' Meditations produced by Levinas in Totality and
Infinity is, perhaps, not merely an anticipation of what he
will later formalize and write into the very production of
Otherwise than Being, but moreover, that which teaches him
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the way to produce a work that responds to its own
productionlessness.

For this

reading~~hich,

as will become

apparent in chapter III of this dissertation, plays both a
decisive and a pervasive role in Totality and

Infinity~is

heavily drawn upon in Levinas' formal thematization of
skepticism and the saying of the otherwise than being in
Otherwise than Being.
Early in Otherwise than Being Levinas addresses, in
language nearly identical to his announcement of the
prefatory word (or fore-word), the "methodological problem"
(AE 8/0B 7) of a pre-original saying "put forth in the
foreword [le propos

~

l'avant-propos]" (AE 6/0B 5), or said

otherwise, of "a forward preceding languages (avant-propos
des langues]" (AE 6/0B 5).
The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must
also be unsaid in order thus to extract the otherwise
than being from the said in which it already comes to
signify but a being otherwise (AE 8/0B 7).
The unsaying of the said is cast by Levinas in terms of
conveying and betraying.
We have been seeking the otherwise than being from the
beginning, and as soon as it is conveyed before us it is
betrayed in the said that dominates the saying which
states it. A methodological problem arises here,
whether the pre-original element of saying (the
anarchical, the non-original, as we designate it) can be
led to betray itself by showing itself in a theme (if an
an-archeology is possible), and whether this betrayal
can be reduced; whether one can at the same time know
and free the known of the marks which thematization
leaves on it by subordinating it to ontology.
Everything shows itself at the price of this betrayal,
even the unsayable. In this betrayal the indiscretion
with regard to the unsayable, which is probably the very
task of philosophy, becomes possible (AE 8/0B 7).
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Levinas rhetorically asks whether this betrayal, in which
everything is inevitably conveyed, can be

reduced~that

is,

whether the betrayal can be clandestinely caught in the act
or listened in upon, so to speak.

The betrayal can be

reduced, Levinas insists, if one is attentive to the
ambiguous trace of "the pre-original element of saying" (AE
a/OB 7) inscribed in the said, inscribed in particular
betrayals of (read as a double genitive) the history of
philosophy.
Saying, on the one hand, is the way the otherwise than
being is said, the way the reduction of the betrayal is
produced.

But this is not "the pre-original element of

saying."

It is, rather, that element of saying which is

merely a particular form of the said, specifically, the way
something (including the pre-original element of language)
is said.
Saying, on the other hand, is the pre-original, anarchical or excessive element of language that exceeds
language.

It is that which is "otherwise than being."

But

as excessive it inevitably gets reinscribed in the said.

It

is however, as was noted in the previous paragraph,
reinscribed in a particular way.

Saying, as the excessive

element of language that exceeds language, leaves a trace of
itself in an "ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking" (AE
9/0B 7), "in the form of ambiguity, of diachronic
expression" (AE 56/0B 44).
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Saying, on the one hand, is the trace of saying on the
other hand.
Saying, on the one hand, that is, the reduction of a
betrayal,
is produced [~ produit] out of time or in two times
without entering into either of them, as an endless
critique, or skepticism, which in a spiralling movement
makes possible the boldness of philosophy, destroying
the conjunction into which its saying and its said
continually enter (AE 57/0B 44).
This passage echoes the reading of Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations undertaken in the previous sections
of this

chapter~specifically,

the production of two

irreducible times, the chronological and the logical order
(Tel 25/TaI 54), and the spiralling movement of doubt (Tel
65-66/TaI

93)~as

well as raise the question of the role of

skepticism in the production of Levinas' work.
Skepticism is introduced in Otherwise than Being
alongside Levinas' first formal thematization of the saying
and the said.

Here the necessity of unsaying the said, of

reducing the betrayal inevitable characteristic of any
attempt to convey the otherwise than being, is likened to
skepticism.

phi~hy,

Skepticism, at the dawn of
set forth and
betrayed the diachrony of this~~;;; conveying and
betraying. To conceive the otherwise than being
requires, perhaps, as much audacity as skepticism shows,
when it does not hesitate to affirm the impossibility of
statement while venturing to realize this impossibility
by the very statement of this impossibility. If, after
innumerable "irrefutable" refutations which logical
thought sets against it, skepticism has the gall to
return (and it always returns as philosophy's
·
illegitimate child), it is because in the contradiction
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which logic sees in it the "at the same time" of the
contradictories is missing, because a secret diachrony
commands this ambiguous or enigmatic way of speaking,
and because in general signification signifies beyond
synchrony, beyond essence (AE 9/0B 7).
But skepticism does not remain merely an aid to
understanding the language of Otherwise than Being, and
therefore something essentially external to the production
of the work.

On the contrary, the skeptical saying is bound

ever more closely to the saying of the otherwise than being.
It is as though the qualification "perhaps," so prominent in
skepticism's introduction at the beginning of the work, were
increasingly obscured throughout the production of Otherwise
than Being until finally, towards the end of the work,
Levinas writes:
170).

"Language is already skepticism" (AE 216/0B

That the skeptical saying becomes bound ever more

closely to the saying of the otherwise than being is
likewise evident in the following passage from the end of
the work.
If the pre-original reason of difference, nonindifference, responsibility, a fine risk, conserves its
signification, the couple skepticism and refutation of
skepticism has to make its appearance alongside of the
reason in representation, knowing, and deduction, served
by logic and synchronizing the successive (AE 213/0B
167).
Notice that the equivocal qualification "perhaps," so
prominent in skepticism's introduction at the beginning of
the work, is here replaced by the unequivocal and emphatic
phrase "has to."
That section at the end of Otherwise than Being
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entitled "Skepticism and Reason"-which is the location of
the two passages from the previous paragraph that illustrate
the proximity of the skeptical saying and the saying of the
otherwise than being-is the location of the most extensive
treatment of skepticism in Otherwise than Being.
The periodic return of skepticism and of its refutation
signify a temporality in which the instants refuse
memory which recuperates and represents. Skepticism,
which traverses the rationality or logic of knowledge,
is a refusal to synchronize the implicit affirmation
contained in saying and the negation which this
affirmation states in the said. The contradiction is
visible to reflection, which refutes it, but skepticism
is insensitive to the refutation, as though the
affirmation and negation did not resound in the same
time. Skepticism then contests the thesis that between
the saying and the said the relationship that connects
in synchrony a condition with the conditioned is
repeated (AE 213/0B 167-168).
The skeptical statement is inevitably refutable when there
is a recognition-in a "second time" (AE 199/0B 156), that
is, in reflection or "after the event" (apres coup)-of the
condition of the statement that states the skeptical
signification.

But the skeptical saying, does not merely

allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its
enunciation.

It benefits from an ambiguity or enigma

devolving from the very production of a contradiction that
contests or negates it, that walls it up and domesticates
it.

It contests the thesis that the relationship between

the two times integral to the production of a contradiction
is merely a relationship of conditioned (the "first time")
and condition (the "second time"), taken as though they both
resounded in the same time.
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The truth of skepticism [i.e., the statement of "the
rupture, failure, impotence or impossibility of
discourse" (AE 214/0B 168)] is put on the same level as
the truths whose interruption and failure its discourse
states, as though the negation of the possibility of the
true were ranked in the order restored by this negation,
as though every difference were incontestably reabsorbed
into the same order. But to contest the possibility of
truth is precisely to contest this uniqueness of order
and level (AE 213-214/0B 168).
The production of the contradiction that contests the
skeptical statement is compromised because it presupposes
precisely what the skeptical statement calls into
question-the uniqueness of order and level.

The "at the

same time" of the two times of the contradiction-which for
traditional logic re-establishes the priority of the "second
time," the condition of the enunciation, by reabsorbing the
"first time" into the "second time 1110- i s precisely what the
skeptical statement calls into question.

Here there is, in

a sense, an inversion of order with regard to the priority
of the two times integral to the production of a
contradiction.

With the compromise, skepticism returns,

that is, the "first time" re-establishes its priority over
the "second time."

This compromise is, however, only

momentary, since the skeptical statement is again vulnerable
to refutation.

1

°For Hegel, the "at the same time" of the
contradictories is the appearance of a new shape on
consciousness. The nothingness of negation, that is, the
nothingness of the "first time," is, according to the logic
of Aµfhebung, not consumed. It is conserved in (and
elevated into) the new shape of consciousness which Blanchot
characterizes as a "unity of contraries" (SL 30).
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This perpetual alternation between the production of a
contradiction and the compromise of a contradiction (which
is the return of the signification contradicted),
articulates the two inextricable moments of the production
of a trace of saying.

It articulates the production of a

trace of that which has never been present, never appeared.
This trace does not belong to the assembling of essence.
Philosophy underestimates the extent of the negation in
this "not appearing," which exceeds the logical scope of
negation and affirmation. It is the trace of a
relationship with illeity that no unity of apperception
grasps (AE 214/0B 168).
Philosophy underestimates the extent of the negation in this
"not appearing" because the trace is neither merely the
negation of appearance, the "not appearing" of that which
exceeds language (as in the production of a contradiction
that negates or refutes the skeptical saying) nor merely the
"appearing" of that which exceeds language (as in the
compromise of the contradiction).

Each of these moments is

merely one of two inextricable moments necessary for the
production of a trace.
Rather than its signification being merely refuted,
reabsorbed, or consumed, that which exceeds language
"conserves its signification" (AE 213/0B 167) in the
production of a trace.

It "conserves its signif ication"-at

least momentarily-in the production of a trace, in the
perpetual alternation characteristic of "the couple
skepticism and refutation of skepticism" (AE 213/0B 167).
This perpetual alternation or "spiralling movement"
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(AE 57/0B 44) echoes one aspect of Levinas' reading of
At the

Descartes' Meditations in Totality and Infinity.

beginning of that section of Totality and Infinity entitled
"Truth Presupposes Justice" Levinas points out that taking
the coqito as the "first certitude"-which is characteristic
of the first movement-constitutes "an arbitrary halt not
justified of itself" (Tel 65/TaI 92-93).

For in the cogito

the thinking subject
ends up at the affirmation of an evidence that is not a
final or initial affirmation, for it can be cast into
doubt in its turn. The truth of the second negation,
then, is affirmed at a still deeper level-but, once
again, one not impervious to negation. This is not
purely and simply a Sisyphean labor, since the distance
traversed each time is not the same; it is a movement of
descent toward an ever more profound abyss which we
elsewhere have called there i.§. [il ya], beyond
affirmation and negation (Tel 65-66/TaI 93).
It is as if the certitude of the coqito-which is
characteristic of the first movement-were "not yet," as if
every attempt to actualize it were interrupted in the very
attempt.
Another aspect of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations in Totality and Infinity is echoed in another
formal thematization of the saying of the otherwise than
being-a thematization closely bound to Levinas'
thematization of the skeptical saying.

That section of

Otherwise than Being entitled "From the Saying to the Said,
or the Wisdom of Desire" addresses the way the saying of the
otherwise than being shows itself in the said.

One

particular paragraph of this section calls for close
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attention.

It begins:

"That the ontological form of the

said could not alter the signification of the beyond being
which shows itself in this said devolves from the very
contestation of this signification." (AE 198/0B 156).

That

the conveying of the signification of the beyond being is
not a complete betrayal of this signification, that the
inevitable betrayal inherent in the conveying of the
signification of the beyond can be reduced, devolves from
the very production of a contradiction that is the
contestation of this signification.

Following upon this

provisional statement Levinas rhetorically asks two
provisional questions that will eventually call for a rereading:
How would the contestation of the pretension beyond
being have meaning if this pretension were not heard?
Is there a negation in which the sense of which the
negation is a negation is not conserved (AE 198/0B 156)?
The significance of all three of these provisional sentences
can only be determined within the context of a detailed
explanation of the production of a contradiction, including
of course, the contradiction that is the contestation of the
signification beyond being.
The contradiction which the signification of the beyond
being~which evidently is not~should compromise is
inoperative without a second time, without reflection on
the condition of the statement that states this
signification. In this reflection, that is, only after
the event [apres £QYp], contradiction appears: it does
not break out between two simultaneous statements, but
between a statement and its conditions, as though they
were in the same time (AE 198-199/0B 156).
The signification of the beyond being should, according to
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Levinas, compromise the very contradiction that contests it.
That this signification actually contests the very
contradicti9n that contests it devolves from the production
of this contradiction.

The production of a contradiction,

which refutes the signification of the beyond being and
reabsorbs it into the said, requires two

times~the

statement of the beyond being and the reflection on the
condition of the statement that states this signification.
contradiction appears only in this reflection, that is, only
after the event, when the two times are taken as though they
were in the same time.

The signification of the beyond

being is, therefore, evidently not beyond being when, in
reflection, it is discovered that the subject is the
condition of the enunciation.

With this delimitation of the

production of a contradiction one gets a hint of the
significance of the first rhetorical question provisionally
asked at the beginning of the paragraph:

"How would the

contestation of the pretension beyond being have meaning if
this pretension were not heard?"

The contradiction that is

the contestation of the signification beyond being could not
be produced, and therefore would not be effective as a
contestation of this signification, if one moment of its
production did not include the pretension of the
signification beyond being.

still more, however, needs to

be said on how this signification is heard without it being
completely betrayed.

Can there be a betrayal, as the second
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rhetorical question asks, in which the sense of which the
betrayal is a betrayal is not completely conserved?

That

is, can the betrayal be reduced?
This delimitation of the production of a contradiction
also raises the question of the proximity of the
signification of the beyond being (or otherwise than being)
and the skeptical saying.

The contradiction that is the

contestation of the skeptical saying is, like the
contradiction that is the contestation of the saying of the
beyond being, produced in two times-"the implicit
affirmation contained in saying [i.e., the condition of the
statement of the skeptical saying (AE 213/0B 168)] and the
negation which this affirmation states in the said" (AE
213/0B 167).

The contradiction, which refutes the skeptical

saying, is only "visible to reflection" which takes these
two times as though they resounded in the same time.
But the saying of the beyond being, like the skeptical
saying, does not allow itself to be walled up in the
conditions of its enunciation.

It likewise benefits from an

ambiguity or enigma devolving from the very production of a
contradiction that contests or negates it, that walls it up
and domesticates it.
The way in which the saying of the beyond being does
not allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its
enunciation echoes one aspect of Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations.
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The statement of the beyond being, of the name of God,
does not allow itself to be walled up in the conditions
of its enunciation. It benefits from an ambiguity or an
enigma, which is not the effect of an inattention, a
relaxation of thought, but of an extreme proximity of
the neighbor, where the Infinite comes to pass. The
Infinite does not enter into a theme like a being to be
given in it, and thus belie its beyond being. Its
transcendence, an exteriority, more exterior, more other
than any exteriority of being, does not come to pass
save through the subject that confesses or contests it.
Here there is an inversion of order: the revelation is
made by him that receives it, by the inspired subject
whose inspiration, alterity in the same, is the
subjectivity or psyche of the subject (AE 199/0B 156).
The statement of the beyond being is inevitably refutable.
The subject that merely confesses the infinite
recognizes-in a "second time," that is, in reflection or
"after the event" (apris coup)-that it is the condition of
the confession.

It recognizes the statement of the beyond

being as self-contradictory.

Having recognized itself as

the condition of the confession, it recognizes itself as the
contestation of the confession. Descartes alludes to this
contestation in the Meditations.

Early in the second

Meditation, following the first Meditation's pathway of
doubt and immediately preceding the discovery of the cogito
as the absolutely originary condition of certitude,
Descartes writes:
Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I
know that there is not something else which does not
allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there
not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me
['···puts into my mind' (French version)] the thoughts
I am now having? But why do I think this, since I
myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts (M
16)?
Or,. said in the language of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
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Meditations in Totality and Infinity, the "second time"
integral to the production of a contradiction, that is, the
reflection on the condition of the "first time"-that is,
the pretentious statement or confession of the beyond being
characteristic of what Levinas calls the "logical" order-is
recognized as the chronological order.
While the confession of the infinite by the subject
inevitably contests the infinite, Levinas insists that the
infinite does not come to pass, does not leave a trace of
itself, save through the subject that confesses it or that
contests it by recognizing itself as the condition of the
enunciation.

Or, said in the language of Levinas' reading

of Descartes' Meditations in Totality and Infinity, the
infinite does not come to pass, does not leave a trace of
itself, save through the chronological order that takes the
coqito as the cause of the infinite.

But this inevitable

refutation or contestation is obviously only ha.l.f of the
story necessary for the infinite to come to pass, for the
production of a trace of the infinite.

Were it the whole

story, the recognition of the contradiction would merely
alter the signification of the beyond being, would merely
domesticate the infinite by walling it up in the condition
on its enunciation, thereby conceding that the last word
belongs to logical, rational philosophical discourse.
The other half of the story, devolving from the first
half of the story, involves the infinite's resistance to
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being walled up in the condition of its enunciation.
Levinas is perhaps a bit too unequivocal when he writes:
the statement of the beyond being, of the name of God, does
not allow itself to be walled up.

Given the first half of

the story, Levinas would perhaps be more accurate writing:
the statement of the beyond being, of the name of God, does
not merely allow itself to be walled up.

It does not merely

allow itself to be walled up in the condition of its
enunciation because it benefits from an ambiguity or enigma
with respect to the condition of the enunciation.

That is,

the condition of the enunciation is not, as it may appear on
initial reflection, merely the subject.

The subject

recognizes-again, in a "second time," that is, in
reflection or "after the event" (apres coup)-that the
condition of its confession is the infinite.

or, again said

in the language of Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations in Totality and Infinity, there is the discovery
of the "logical" order that subtends the evidence of the
cogito, that takes the infinite as the cause of the cogito.
The "second time" integral to the production of a
contradiction, that is, the reflection on the condition of
the "first time" that is the statement or confession of the
beyond being, is recognized as the "logical" order rather
than the chronological order.

Here there is an inversion of

order with respect to the condition of the enunciation, an
inversion of the two times integral to the production of a
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contradiction.
receives it.

The revelation is made by him or her that
The confession or contestation of the infinite

is made by him or her that is always already inspired by the
infinite, by the inspired subject whose inspiration,
alterity in the same, infinite within the finite, is the
subjectivity or psyche of the subject.
The infinite can .Qnly come to pass, can .Qnly leave a
trace of itself, in the irresolvably ambiguous or enigmatic
"double condition" of its enunciation produced by a "double
reading."

The "double reading" of Descartes' Meditations

does not allow the two times integral to the production of a
contradiction to merely be thought "as though they were in
the same time" (AE 199/0B 156).

This "double reading"

compromises the mere synchronization of the two times, it
compromises the mere reabsorption of the "logical" order
into the chronological order because it necessarily yet
impossibly thinks the equiprimordiality of the chronological
order that articulates the cogito as the condition of the
enunciation, that is, as the condition of the infinite and
the "logical" order that articulates the infinite as the
condition of the enunciation (because it articulates the
infinite as the condition of the cogito).
The logically absurd inversion of the two times
integral to the production of a contradiction does not, as
Levinas writes in his reading of Descartes' Meditations in
Totality and Infinity, "indicate an illusion" (Te! 25/TaI
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It "is not," as he writes in Otherwise than Being,

"the effect of an inattention, a relaxation of thought, but
of an extreme proximity of the neighbor, where the infinite
comes to pass" (AE 199/0B

156)~that

is, it is the trace of

the infinite, of the otherwise than being, of the beyond
being.
The significance of the three provisional sentences
that opened the paragraph in question can now be determined.
The paragraph began:

"That the ontological form of the said

could not alter the signification of the beyond being which
shows itself in the said devolves from the very contestation
of this signification" (AE 198/0B 156).

That the conveying

of the signification of the beyond being is not a complete
betrayal of this signification, that the inevitable betrayal
inherent in conveying of the signification can be reduced,
devolves from the very production of a contradiction that is
the contestation of this signification.

The two times

integral to the production of a contradiction are prevented
by the "double reading" from merely being thought "as though
they were in the same time" (AE 199/0B 156).

There is,

rather, a perpetual alternation between the production of
the contradiction (when, according to the chronological
order, the cogito is recognized as the condition of the
enunciation of the signification of the beyond being) gng
the compromise of the contradiction, that is, the return of
the signification of the beyond being (when, according to
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the "logical" order, the infinite is recognized as the
condition of the enunciation).
refutable, contestable,

The infinite is inevitably

contradictory~but

it returns.

second provisional sentence rhetorically asks:

The

"How would

the contestation of the pretension beyond being have meaning
if this pretension were not heard" {AE 198/0B 156)?

The

contradiction that is the contestation of the pretension
beyond being could not be produced without two times, one of
which is the "logical" order, the pretension beyond being,
that is inevitably refutable but that returns as one moment
of the perpetual alternation between the production of the
contradiction and the compromise of the contradiction (which
is the return of the return of the signification
contradicted).

The pretension is heard (at least

momentarily) because it is one moment of the perpetual
alternation.
asks:

The third provisional sentence rhetorically

"Is there a negation in which the sense of which the

negation is a negation is not conserved" {AE 198/0B 156)?
The answer:

yes, when the two times integral to the

production of a contradiction are prevented by a "double
reading" from merely being thought "as though they were in
the same time" (AE 199/0B 156), when there is a perpetual
alternation between the production of a contradiction and
the compromise of the contradiction.

The negation is not

conserved (at least completely) because it is merely one
moment of the perpetual alternation.
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The second and third provisional sentences, presented
in the form of rhetorical questions, serve to articulate
characteristics of the two inextricable moments of the
production of a trace of the saying of the beyond being.
This trace, as has already been pointed out, is produced by
a necessary yet impossible "double reading," by a perpetual
alternation between the production of a contradiction and
the compromise of the contradiction (which is the return of
the signification contradicted) neither of which can be
extricated or abstracted from the other.

With the trace,

therefore, the signification of the beyond being, the
pretension beyond being, is conserved, it is heard (at least
momentarily) and, at the same time, the negation is not
conserved (at least completely), because
moments of a perpetual alternation.

both~

merely as

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE, NIHILISM, AND DEAD TIME
The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks
from death and keeps itself untouched by
devastation, but rather the life that endures
it and maintains itself in it.
-Hegel
"[L]iterature begins," Blanchot writes in "Literature
and the Right to Death," "at the moment when literature
becomes a question. " 1

What is "literature" insofar as

Blanchot writes that it begins at the moment it becomes a
question?

Perhaps one should begin, however, not with the

term "literature," but with the term "question" since it
seems, from the very beginning, to render this
phrase-"literature begins at the moment when literature
becomes a question"-questionable.

That is, would not the

moment when literature becomes a question, becomes
questionable, presage the end of literature rather than its
beginning?

I would suggest that one begin with this

ambiguous and questionable "question."

Maurice Blanchot, "la litterature et le droit ! la
mort," in La Part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 293,
hereafter cited in the text as LDM. / "Literature and the
Right to Death," in The Gaze of Orpheus, trans. Lydia Davis
(Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, 1981), 21,
hereafter cited in the text as LRD.
1
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This question-"the 'question' that seeks to pose
itself in literature, the 'question' that is its essence"
(LDM 311/LRD 41)-is posed to language
become literature.

l2Y language that has

This question l i the "irreducible double

meaning (un double sens irr6ductible]" (LDM 330/LRD 61) of
death as possibility and death as impossibility, that is,
death as an absolute alterity that infinitely approaches (or
withdraws), the "is not yet" or "dead time."

"Literature,"

Blanchot writes in the concluding sentence of the essay, "is
the form this double meaning has chosen in which to show
itself behind the meaning and value of words, and the
question it asks is the question asked by literature" (LDM
331/LRD 62). This question is what Blanchot, in The Space of
Literature, calls "double death [la double mort]. 11
I will limit my remarks on "Literature and the Right
to Death" to a reading of two of what Blanchot calls a
writer's temptations.

One temptation-"revolution" or

"revolutionary action"-marks the first instance of
Blanchot's irreducibly ambiguous reading of the following
passage from the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit:
"[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures (death]
and maintains itself in it" (PS 19).

Literature .begins at

the moment when it becomes a question, that is, at the
moment when an initial reading of this line, which reads
death as possibility, turns into a reading of this line
which reads death as impossibility.

Death, as this turning
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itself, leaves a trace of itself, I would suggest, in the
production or performance of an interminable step/not beyond
(.1§.

~

returns.

au-dela), an eternal step beyond that eternally
This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary

action" will raise the question of the proximity of this
temptation and Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of
nihilism in the work of Nietzsche.

Nihilism is another

temptation of a writer named by Blanchot in "Literature and
the Right to Death."

A reading that raises the question of

the proximity of "revolution" and nihilism will, therefore,
raise several questions:

What is the relationship of

nihilism (or scepticism), named as a writer's temptation by
Blanchot in "Literature and the Right to Death," and the
nihilism of Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche in
L'entretien infini?

What is the relationship of Blanchot's

reading of Hegel in "Literature and the Right to Death" and
his reading of Nietzsche in L'entretien infini?

Is the

nihilism of Blanchot's reading of the work of Nietzsche
inscribed in his reading of Hegel's Pbenomenology of Spirit?

In the first part of "Literature and the Right to
Death"-that part which culminates in a reading of
"revolution" or "revolutionary action" as one of a writer's
temptations-Blanchot reads the experience of the writer
alongside the experience of natural consciousness in Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit.

Or more precisely, he re-writes
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the experience of natural consciousness as an experience of
a writer.

For example, Blanchet describes work--citing an

interpretation offered by Koj&ve in his Introduction A la
lecture de Hegel CLecons sur La Ph,nom,noloqie de
l'Espritl~as

the realization of a plan through a process of

transformation.

It is a production that effectuates the

appearance of something. 2

Blanchet uses the example of

making a stove in order to get warm.
For example, my project might be to get warm. As long
as this project is only a desire, I can turn it over
every possible way and still it will not make me warm.
But now I build a stove: the stove transforms the empty
ideal which was my desire into something real; it
affirms the presence in the world of something which was
not there before, and in so doing, denies something
which was there before; before, I had in front of me
stones and cast iron; now I no longer have either stones
or cast iron, but instead the product of the
transformation of these elements~that is, their denial
and destruction~by work. Because of this object, the
world is now different. All the more different because
this stove will allow me to make other objects, which
will in turn deny the former condition of the world and
prepare its future. These objects, which I have
produced by changing the state of things, will in turn
change me. The idea of heat is nothing, but actual heat
will make my life a different kind of life, and every
new thing I am able to do from now on because of this
heat will also make me someone different. Thus is
history formed, say Hegel and Marx~by work which
realizes being in denying it, and reveals it at the end
of the negation (LDM 304-305/LRD 33).
Reading this interpretation of Hegel alongside the
experience of a writer Blanchet writes:

"If we see work as

the force of history, the force that transforms man while it
transforms the world, then a writer's activity must be
2

See chapter I of this dissertation for a description
of production in Levinas' work.
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recognized as the highest form of work" (LDM 304/LRD 33).
For a writer not only "produces [a] work by transforming
natural and human realities," he or she does it "to an
outstanding degree" (LDM 305/LRD 34) insofar as his or her
destructive act of transformation is limitless.
can write anything.
the writer.

The writer

Everything is instantly accessible to

Even an enslaved writer, given only a few

moments of freedom in which to write, can instantly give
himself or herself a world of freedom.

But, as Blanchot

cautions, one is called to examine the work of the writer
more closely.
Insofar as he immediately give himself the freedom he
does not have, he is neglecting the actual conditions
for his emancipation, he is neglecting to do the real
thing that must be done so that the abstract idea of
freedom can be realized. His negation is global. It
not only negates his situation as a man who has been
walled into prison but bypasses time that will open
holes in these walls; it negates the negation of time,
it negates the negation of limits. This is why this
negation negates nothing, in the end, why the work in
which it is realized is not a truly negative,
destructive act of transformation, but rather the
realization of the inability to negate anything, the
refusal to take part in the world; it transforms the
freedom which would have to be embodied in things in the
process of time into an ideal above time, empty and
inaccessible (LDM 306/LRD 35).
Blanchot uses a host of terms in this passage and throughout
"Literature and the Right to Death" that can, with certain
qualifications, be read as synonymous with one another:
negation, transformation, realization, and production.

This

passage describes how all of these terms, which on a first
reading can be read in a Hegelian register, find themselves,
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upon closer examination or a second reading, to be at a
certain distance from that Hegelian register.

At decisive

moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit these terms are
discovered to be at a certain distance from that work, 3 are
interrupted, or said otherwise, are weakened.

For example,

in the passage just cited, Blanchot describes "the
realization of the inability to negate [or realize]
anything."

This interruption or weakening of negation,

transformation, realization, and production, is
concomitantly the ruination of action.
The truth is that he ruins action, not because he deals
with what is unreal but because he makes all of reality
available to us. Unreality begins with the whole. The
realm of the imaginary is not a strange region situated
beyond the world, it is the world itself, but the world
as entire, manifold, the world as a whole. That is why
it is not in the world, because it is the world, grasped
and realized in its entirety by the global negation of
all the individual realities contained in it, by their
disqualification, their absence, by the realization of
that absence itself, which is how literary creation
begins, for when literary creation goes back over each
thing and each being, it cherishes the illusion that it
is creating them, because now it is seeing and naming
them from the starting point of everything, from the
starting point of the absence of everything, that is,
from nothing (LDM 307/LRD 36).
Literature, like every other activity in the world,
presupposes the "movement of comprehension," the "movement
of negation."

But literature endeavors to realize or

produce (that is, effectuate the appearance of) this very

3

For a different reading of this "distance," which is
read throughout this dissertation as the interval of the "is
not yet" or "dead time," see Levinas' Totality and Infinity
(for example Tel 25, 140, 184-185/TaI 54, 166, 209-210).
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"movement" itself.

Blanchet articulates this endeavor in

various ways and in various locations throughout "Literature
and the Right to Death."

For example:

literature is

"tempted [ ••• ] to try to attain negation in itself and to
make everything of nothing" (LDM 314/LRD 44).

Or,

literature's "only interest in a thing is in the meaning of
the thing, its absence, and it would like to attain4 this
absence absolutely in itself and for itself, to grasp in its
entirety the infinite movement of comprehension" (LDM
315/LRD 44).

Or, "[l]iterature is not content to accept

only the fragmentary, successive results of this movement of
negation:

it wants to grasp the movement itself and it

wants to comprehend the results in their totality" (LDM
319/LRD 48-49).

Literature endeavors to step into that

which is the very condition of any step.

This endeavor is

tragic because the power of negation, death, is the blind
spot of language.
Negation cannot be created out of anything but the
reality of what it is negating; language derives its
value and its pride from the fact that it is the
achievement of this negation; but in the beginning, what
was lost? The torment of language is what it lacks
because of the necessity that it be the lack of
precisely this. It cannot even name it.

4At

the risk of expanding the list to the point of
meaninglessness, I would suggest that the term "attainment"
can likewise (again, with certain qualifications) be read as
synonymous with negation, transformation, realization, and
production.
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Whoever sees God dies. 5 In speech what dies is
what gives life to speech; speech is the life of that
death, it is "the life that endures death and maintains
itself in it." What wonderful power. But something was
there and is no longer there. Something has
disappeared. How can I recover it, how can I turn
around and look at what exists before, if all my power
consists of making it into what exists after? The
language of literature is a search for this moment which
precedes literature (LDM 316/LRD 45-46).
5See

also Maurice Blanchot, L'6criture du d6sastre,
(Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 42 /The Writing of the Disaster,
trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1986) I 23 •
I cannot welcome the Other, not even with an acceptance
that would be infinite. such is the new and difficult
feature of the plot. The other, as neighbor, is the
relation that I cannot sustain, and whose approach is
death itself, the mortal proximity (he who sees God
dies: for "dying" is one manner of seeing the
invisible, of saying the ineffable. Dying is the
indiscretion wherein God, become somehow and necessarily
a god without truth, surrenders to passivity).
In both cases, see Exodus 33:18-23.
Moses said, "I pray thee, show me thy glory." And he
said, "I will make all my goodness pass before you, and
will proclaim before you my name 'The LORD'; and I will
be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show
mercy on whom I will show mercy. But," he said, "you
cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live."
And the LORD said, "Behold, there is a place by me
where you shall stand upon the rock; and while my glory
passes by I will put you in a cleft of the rock, and I
will cover you with my hand until I have passed by; then
I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back; but
my face shall not be seen" (Revised Standard Version).
It is interesting to note that Levinas refers to this
passage from the Bible in his early articulations of the
logic of the "trace." See "Meaning and Sense" and "The
Trace of the Other." It is also interesting to note that a
few lines after Blanchot writes "Whoever sees God dies" (and
within the same paragraph) he uses the term "trace:"
I say ~ flower! But in the absence where I mention it,
through the oblivion to which I relegate the image it
gives me, in the depths of this heavy word, itself
looming up like an unknown thing, I passionately summon
the darkness of this flower, I summon this perfume that
passes through me though I do not breathe it, this dust
that impregnates me though I do not see it, this-color
which is a trace and not light (LDM 316/LRD 46).
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Literature realizes, in its tragic endeavor "to become the
revelation of what revelation destroys" (LDM 317/LRD 47),
that its "step beyond" is inevitably "not beyond."

In a

passage that perhaps recalls Heidegger's remarks on the term
"own" (eigen), Blanchet writes that literature "learns that
it cannot go beyond itself towards its own end" (LDM 318/LRD
47), towards its ownmost possibility-the "movement of
negation" itself.

One can step beyond "stepping" into the

very possibility of "stepping" itself only by stepping, that
is, the step beyond inevitably re-inscribes one in
"stepping."

This tragic step, this step/not beyond (1.§. pas

au-delA), is the formal articulation, according to Blanchet,
of those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit
when work or production is discovered to be at a certain
distance from the Phenomenology of Spirit.
One of those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of
Spirit is, according to Blanchet, the Revolution.
"Revolution" or "revolutionary action" is likewise what
Blanchet calls one of a writer's temptations.

A writer's

temptations are those decisive moments in the Phenomenology
of Spirit, those "decisive moments in history" (LDM 309/LRD
38, emphasis added), which seem (at least on a first
reading) to describe the very process of literary creation,
the destructive act of transformation that is a step into
the next stage of the dialectical progression.
decisive moments are wrought with ambiguity.

But these
For example,
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"revolution."

In the writer, Blanchot writes, "negation

[ ••. ]wishes to realize itself" (LDM 308/LRD 38).

Blanchot

continues:
It is at this point that he encounters those decisive
moments in history when everything seems put in
question, when law, faith, the State, the world above,
the world of the past~everything sinks effortlessly,
without work, into nothingness. The man knows he has
not stepped out of history, but history is now the void,
the void in the process of realization; it is absolute
freedom which has become an event. Such periods are
given the name Revolution. At this moment, freedom
aspires to be realized in the immediate form of
everything is possible, everything can be done. A
fabulous moment~and not one who has experienced it can
completely recover from it, since he has experienced
history as his own history and his own freedom as
universal freedom. These moments are, in fact, fabulous
moments: in them, fable speaks; in them, the speech of
fable becomes action. That the writer should be tempted
by them is completely appropriate. Revolutionary action
is in every respect analogous to action as embodied in
literature: the passage from nothing to everything, the
affirmation of the absolute as event and of every event
as absolute (LDM 309/LRD 38).
Here again there is the ruination of action.
People cease to be individuals working at specific
tasks, acting here and only now: each person is
universal freedom, and universal freedom knows nothing
about elsewhere or tomorrow, or work or a work
accomplished. At such times there is nothing left for
anyone to do, because everything has been done (LDM
309/LRD 38).
Concomitant with this ruination of action is the negation of
the particular reality of the individual.

The fabulous

moment in history when the writer experiences his or her
"own freedom as universal freedom" (LDM 309/LRD 38, emphasis
added) ushers in the Reign of Terror, for the decision to
allow the universality of freedom to assert itself
completely in him or her negates the particular reality of
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his or her life (LDM 310/LRD 39).
This is the meaning of the Reign of Terror. Every
citizen has a right to death, so to speak: death is not
a sentence passed on him, it is his most essential
right; he is not suppressed as a guilty person~he needs
death so that he can proclaim himself a citizen and it
is in the disappearance of death that freedom causes him
to be born. Where this is concerned, the French
Revolution has a clearer meaning than any other
revolution. Death in the Reign of Terror is not simply
a way of punishing seditionaries; rather, since it
becomes the unavoidable, in some sense the desired lot
of everyone, it appears as the very operation of freedom
in free men (LDM 309-310/LRD 39).
At this decisive moment, Blanchot introduces, for the first
time in his work, the distinction between death as
possibility and death as impossibility.
Death as an event no longer has any importance. During
the Reign of Terror individuals die and it means
nothing. In the famous words of Hegel, "It is thus the
coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more
significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or
swallowing a mouthful of water." Why? Isn't death the
achievement of freedom~that is, the riches moment of
meaning? But it is also only the empty point in that
freedom, a manifestation of the fact that such a freedom
is still abstract, ideal (literary), that it is only
poverty and platitude. Each person dies, but everyone
is alive, and that really also means everyone is dead.
But "is dead" is the positive side of freedom which has
become the world: here, being is revealed as absolute.
"Dying," on the other hand, is pure insignificance, an
event without concrete reality, one which has lost all
value as a personal and interior drama, because there is
no longer any interior. It is the moment when I die
signifies to me as I die a banality which there is no
way to take into consideration: in the liberated world
and in these moments when freedom is an absolute
apparition, dying is unimportant and death has no depth.
The Reign of Terror and revolution~not war~have taught
us this (LDM 310/LRD 39-40).
At this decisive moment in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in
history, death as possibility, as the "richest moment; of
meaning," is discovered to be at a certain distance from the
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Ebenomenology of Spirit,

.f.l:Qm

history.

It is discovered to

be interrupted, or said otherwise, to be weakened--death as
impossibility.

It is at this decisive moment in history

that a reading of the following passage from the Preface to
the Phenomenology of Spirit becomes irreducibly ambiguous:
"[T]he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the life that endures [death)
and maintains itself in it."
Literature contemplates itself in revolution, it finds
its justification in revolution, and if it has been
called the Reign of Terror, this is because its ideal is
indeed that moment when "life endures death and
maintains itself in it" in order to gain from death the
possibility of speaking and the truth of speech. This
is the "question" that seeks to pose itself in
literature, the "question" that is its essence (LDM
311/LRD 41).
Literature begins at the moment when it becomes a question,
that is, at the moment when an initial reading of this line,
which reads death as possibility, turns into a reading of
this line which reads death as impossibility.

Death, as

this turning itself, leaves a trace of itself, I would
suggest, in the production or performance of an interminable
step/not beyond (le pas au-dela), an eternal step beyond
that eternally returns.
Literature is the very production or performance of
the ambiguous step/not beyond.

What "appears" in this

production or performance of a step/not beyond is an
irreducible ambiguity of being and nothingness (LDM 327,
331/LRD 58, 62)

Literature is the very production or

performance of a trace of that which withdraws from ·c or,,
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said otherwise, which infinity approaches) revelation-the
"is not yet" or "dead time."

This reading of "revolution" or "revolutionary action"
raises the question of the proximity of this temptation and
Blanchot's reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the
work of Nietzsche.

It is important to note that nihilism is

another temptation of a writer named by Blanchot in
"Literature and the Right to Death."
As we know, a writer's main temptations are called
stoicism, scepticism, and the unhappy consciousness.
These are all ways of thinking that a writer adopts for
reasons he believes he has thought out carefully, but
which only literature has thought out in him. [ ••• ] A
nihilist, because he does not simply negate this and
that by methodical work which slowly transforms each
thing: he negates everything at once, and he is obliged
to negate everything, since he only deals with
everything (LDM 308/LRD 37).
Recall that "revolution" is a decisive moment in history
when everything is called into question.

"At this moment,"

Blanchot writes, "freedom aspires to be realized in the
immediate form of everything is possible, everything can be
done" (LDM 309/LRD 38).

Nihilism is likewise a decisive

event in history.
Nihilism is an event achieved in history, and yet it is
like a shedding off of history, a moulting period, when
history changes its direction and is indicated by a
negative trait: that values no longer have value by
themselves. There is also a positive trait: for the
first time, the horizon is infinitely opened to
knowledge-"All is permitted." When the authority of
old values is collapsed, this new authorization means
that it is permitted to know all, there is no longer a
limit to man's activity. "We have a still undiscovered
country before us, the boundaries of which no one has
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seen, a beyond to all countries and corners of the ideal
known hitherto, a world so over-rich in the beautiful,
the strange, the questionable, the frightful ••• 116
Blanchot description of the achieving of this achievement,
the realization of this extreme point or extreme form of
nihilism, which corresponds to the achieving of science, is
not unlike his description in "Literature and the Right to
Death" of the destructive act of transformation, of the
power of work which "realizes being in denying it, and
reveals it at the end of the negation" (LDM 305/LRD 33) .
(A]ll modern humanism, the work of science, and
planetary development have as their object a
dissatisfaction with what is, and hence the desire to
transform being itself, to deny it in order to derive
its power, and to make this power to deny the infinite
movement of human mastery (EI 225/NN 126).
But this passage, which describes the realization of the
extreme point or extreme form of nihilism, only tells half
of the story.

It will be necessary to return to this

passage and situate it within its proper context.

Nietzsche writes the production of a step/not beyond
into the very structure of On the Genealogy of Morals.

The

6Maurice Blanchot, L'entretien infini (Paris:
Gallimard, 1969), 218-219, hereafter cited in the text as
EI. / "The Limits of Experience: Nihilism," trans. John
Leavey, in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary styles of
Interpretation, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell, 1977),
122, hereafter cited in the text as NN. The quotation at
the end of this passage is from Friedrich Nietzsche, Die
frohliche Wissenschaft, in Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe,
ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1973), sec. 382. /The Gay Science, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), sec. 382.

72
genealogical progression through the three essays seemingly
culminates in an overcoming of ressentiment, bad conscience,
and the ascetic ideal.
All great things bring about their own destruction
through an act of self-overcoming [Selbstaufhebung]:
thus the law of life will have it, the law of the
necessity7 of "self-overcoming [Selbstilberwindung]" in
the nature of life--the lawgiver himself eventually
receives the call: "patere legein, guam ~ tulisti
[submit to the law you yourself proposed]." 8
This necessary overcoming, this Aufhebung, is a "becoming
conscious."

It is the will to truth becoming conscious of

itself.
And here again I touch on my problem, on our problem, my
unknown friends (for as yet I know of no friends): what
meaning would our whole being possess if it were not
this, that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of
itself as A problem (GdM 428/GoM 161)?
Def erring for a moment the question of why this "becoming
conscious" is problematic, this passage provokes a question:
as what does the will to truth become conscious of itself?
Nietzsche answers this question in the final dramatically
climactic lines of the text:
we can no longer conceal from ourselves what is
expressed by all that willing which has taken its
direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the
7 "Necessity"

is highlighted in the complete critical
edition of Nietzsche's work. This emphasis is not reflected
in the English translation.
8Friedrich

Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine
Streitschrift, in Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed.
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1968), vol.VI, pt.2, 428, hereafter cited in the
text as GdR / On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 161,
hereafter cited in the text as GoM.
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human, and even more of the animal, and more still of
the material, this horror of the senses, of reason
itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing
to get away from appearance, change, becoming, death,
wishing, from longing itself~all this means~let us
dare to grasp it~~ ~ .t.Q nothingness, an aversion to
life, a rebellion against the most fundamental
presuppositions of life: but it is and remains a will!
.•• And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the
beginning: man would rather will nothingness than not
will (GdM 430/GoM 162-163).~
The will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a will to
nothingness.

But why would this "becoming conscious" be

problematic?

Why would it call the will to truth into

question (GdM 419/GoM 153) rather than being merely the
revelation of the most extreme form of nihilism, that
extreme point where nihilism comes to an end in the
conscious willing of nothingness, that is, the revelation of
a moment in history when history is revealed in its truth?
The will to truth becoming conscious of itself as a will to
nothingness is problematic because the "step beyond," which
reveals a concealed or unconscious evaluation as the truth
of history, repeats the evaluative move characteristic of
nihilism thereby reinscribing the "step beyond" nihilism
into the "not beyond."

The genealogist becomes inextricably

implicated in the move of the ascetic priest.

The

genealogist, therefore, produces or performs an interminable
step/not beyond, an eternal step beyond that eternally
returns.
Although the eternal return remains merely implicit in
the structure of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
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explicitly draws a connection between the eternal return and
nihilism in one of the notes of what was to be The Will to
Eower:

Attempt at a Revaluation of All

Values~a

text that

Nietzsche refers to as a "work in progress" (GdM 427/GoM
160) in the final pages of On the Genealogy of Morals.
Let us think this thought in its most terrible
form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet
recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness:
"the eternal recurrence."
This is the most extreme form of nihilism: the
nothing (the "meaningless"), eternally! 9
This passage tells one that the extreme form of nihilism is
not merely that extreme point where nihilism comes to an end
in the conscious willing of nothingness.

The extreme form

of nihilism is precisely where the possibility of coming to
an end turns into the impossibility of coming to an end.
Until now we thought Nihilism was tied to nothingness.
How rash that was: Nihilism is tied to being. Nihilism
is the impossibility of coming to an end and finding an
outcome in this end. It tells of the impotence of
nothingness, the false renown of its victories; it tells
us that when we think nothingness, we are still thinking
being. Nothing ends; all begins again, the other is
still the same, midnight is only a covered-over noon,
and the highest noon is the abyss of light from which we
can never escape (EI 224/NN 226).
This weakening of

negation~which

is also experienced at

those decisive moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in
history, when negation is discovered to be at a certain

9Friedrich

Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente, in
Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and
Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974),
vol.VIII, pt.1, 217 / The Will to Power: Attempt at a
Revaluation of All Values, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J.
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 35-36.
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distance .fl:Qm the Phenomenology of Spirit, t!:mn
history~will

have profound consequences.

Returning to a

passage cited earlier:
[I]f, indeed, we want to admit that all modern humanism,
the work of science, and planetary development have as
their object a dissatisfaction with what is, and hence
the desire to transform being itself, to deny it in
order to derive its power, and to make this power to
deny the infinite movement of human mastery~then it
will appear that this kind of negative weakness, and the
way that nothingness is undeniably unmasked as being,
lay waste at one stroke to our attempts to dominate the
earth and to free ourselves from nature by giving it a
meaning~i.e., be denaturalizing or perverting it (EI
225/NN 126).
The extreme form of nihilism (the turning itself of
possibility into impossibility) leaves a trace of itself in
the production of the necessary yet impossible step beyond
nihilism.

It leaves a trace of itself in the production of

an interminable step/not beyond, an eternal step beyond that
eternally returns.
This production is likewise traced in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra.

Zarathustra prophesies the overman as the

overcoming of the nihilistic evaluations of man.

This

overcoming is, as I described earlier, formally repeated in
the very structure of On the Genealogy of Morals.

The

overman, one could say, is the will to truth having become
conscious of

itself~that

is, the overman is the one who

consciously wills nothingness.
[I]t his essential trait, the will, that would make the
Overman the very form of Nihilism, rigorous and
auster~for, according to Nietzsche's clear statement,
"The will loves even more to will nothingness than not
to will" [see Gdm 430/GoM 163]. The Overman is the one
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in whom nothingness makes itself be willed and who, free
for death, maintains this pure essence of will in
willing nothingness. That would be Nihilism itself (EI
222/NN 124).
That would be the extreme point or extreme form of nihilism.
But in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as in On the Genealogy of
Morals, this step beyond is equivocal.

Immediately

following his announcement of the eternal return in "On the
vision and the Riddle," Zarathustra encounters a young
shepherd gagging on a heavy black snake.

In "The

convalescent" Zarathustra's remarks are reminiscent of this
encounter:
"The great disgust with man-::thi.§. choked me and had
crawled into my throat; and what the soothsayer said:
'All is the same, nothing is worth while, knowledge
chokes.' A long twilight limped before me, a sadness,
weary to death, drunken with death [eine todesmilde,
todestrunkene Traurigkeit], speaking with a yawning
mouth. 10 'Eternally recurs the man of whom you are
weary, the small man.' 11
Zarathustra's disgust arises, Blanchot writes, from his
understanding that
he will never definitively go beyond man's inadequacies,
or that he will only be able to do this, paradoxically,
by willing his return [retour]. But what does this
return [retour) mean? It affirms that the extreme point
of Nihilism is precisely where it is reversed [se
renverse], that Nihilism is reversal itself [!.@
retournement m~me): it is the affirmation that, in
1

°Here, perhaps, is Zarathustra's "experience" of death
as the impossibility of dying.
11

Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein
Buch filr Alle und Keinen, in Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), vol.VI, pt.1, 270 /Thus
Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1966), 219.
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passing from the DQ to the Y§..1., refutes Nihilism--even
though it does nothing other than affirm it, at which
point Nihilism is extended to all possible
affirmations. 12 From this we conclude that Nihilism
would be identical with the will to overcome Nihilism
absolutely (EI 225/NN 126) • 13
The extreme point of nihilism is, I would suggest, the
moment when death as possibility turns into death as
impossibility.

It is, as that which exceeds the System,

that which interrupts the step of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a
moment that does not appear in itself, but that merely
leaves a trace of itself.

It leaves a trace of itself in

the production of the going-over or transition (Uberqang)
becoming, at the same time, a going-under or downgoing
(Untergang), that is, it leaves a trace of itself in the
production of an interminable step/not beyond, an eternal
step beyond that eternally returns.

The extreme point of

nihilism, as reversal itself (as turning itself), leaves a
trace of itself in the production or performance of a
reversal, a return.

The excessive nothingness of death could be
characterized, I would suggest, by what Blanchot in The
Space of Literature calls "the absence of time [l'absence de
temps]" (SL 30-1).

Like the excessive nothingness of death,

12

Including the affirmation of the overman:
nothingness.
13

The last sentence of this passage is included in the
French text as a footnote.
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it not only interrupts the step of the Hegelian Aufhebunq,
it also leaves a trace of itself in the production of an
interminable step/not beyond that is (not) itself subject to
the logic of the dialectic.
The time of time's absence is not dialectical. In this
time what appears is the fact that nothing appears.
What appears is the being deep within being's absence,
which is when there is nothing and which, as soon as
there is something, is no longer. For it is as if there
were not beings except through the loss of being, when
being lacks. The reversal [Le renversement] which, in
time's absence, points us constantly back to the
presence of absence~but to this presence as absence, to
absence as its own affirmation (an affirmation in which
nothing is affirmed, in which nothing never ceases to
affirm itself with the exhausting insistence of the
indefinite)~this movement is not dialectical.
Contradictions do not exclude each other in it; nor are
they reconciled. Only time itself, during which
negation becomes our power, permits the "unity of
contraries." In time's absence what is new renews
nothing; what is present is not contemporary; what is
present presents nothing, but represents itself and
belongs henceforth and always to return [retour) (EL 2223 /SL 30).
This time of time's absence is a "dead time" (J.m temps
mort).
In the region we are trying to approach, here has
collapsed into nowhere, but nowhere is nonetheless here,
and this empty, dead time [le temps mort] is a real time
in which death is present~in which death happens but
doesn't stop happening, as if, by happening, it rendered
sterile the time in which it could happen. The dead
present is the impossibility of making any presence
real~an impossibility which is present, which is there
as the present's double, the shadow of the present which
the present bears and hides in itself. When I am alone,
I am not alone, but, in this present, I am already
returning to myself in the form of Someone. Someone is
there, where I am alone. The fact of being alone is my
belonging to this dead time [ce temps mort) which is not
my time, or yours, or the time we share in common, but
Someone's time. Someone is what is still present when
there is no one. Where I am alone, I am not there; no
one is there, but the impersonal is: the outside, as
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that which prevents, precedes, and dissolves the
possibility of any personal relation. Someone is the
faceless third person, the They of which everybody and
anybody is part, but who is part of it? Never anyone in
particular, never you and I. Nobody is part of the
They. "They" belongs to a region which cannot be
brought to light, not because it hides some secret alien
to any revelation or even because it is radically
obscure, but because it transforms everything which has
access to it, even light, into anonymous, impersonal
being, the Nontrue, the Nonreal yet always there. The
They is, in this respect, what appears up very close
when someone dies (EL 23-24/SL 31).
"Dead time" marks a productionlessness, 14 it marks what
Blanchot calls

d~soeuvrement.

It marks those decisive

moments in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in history, when
production and work are discovered to be at a certain
distance from the Phenomenology of Spirit, from history.

It

marks those decisive moments when death as possibility turns
into death as impossibility, when the following passage from
the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit becomes
irreducibly ambiguous:

"[T)he life of Spirit is [ ••• ] the

life that endures [death] and maintains itself in it" (PS
19) • 1S

14

See chapter I of this dissertation for a description
of productionlessness in Levinas' work.
The reading undertaken in this chapter~which merely
raises the question of the proximity of Blanchot's reading
in "Literature and the Right to Death" of "revolution" or
"revolutionary action" in the work of Hegel to Blanchot's
reading in L'entretien infini of nihilism in the work of
Nietzsch~need to be supplemented with a reading of
Blanchot's Le pas au-dela. This work explicitly addresses
the question of the relationship of Hegel and Nietzsche.
15

CHAPTER 3
DEAD TIME:

"A Fine Risk"

How the adversity of pain is ambiguous!
-Levinas
Learn .tQ think ~ RA.in·
-Blanchet
Totality and Infinity calls for being read in a
multiplicity of ways.

Alphonso Lingis, the principle

translator of Levinas into English, suggests that Totality
and Infinity is "structured, classically, as a phenomenology
in different strata, related as founding and founded" (OB
xv).

Granted, the structure, and often the vocabulary, of

Totality and Infinity lends itself to such a reading.

But

such a reading risks domesticating the interruptions of
Totality and Infinity.

It risks the possibility of Totality

and Infinity being too easily read and appropriated by, for
example, ethics or theology.

Furthermore, such a reading

can only be undertaken if one does not heed Totality and
Infinity's extratextual prefatory word.
The word by way of pref ace which seeks to break through
the screen stretched between the author and the reader
by the book itself [ ••• ] belongs to the very essence of
language, which consists in continually undoing its
phrase by the forward or the exegesis, in unsaying the
said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what
has already been ill understood in the inevitable
ceremonial in which the said delights (Te! XVIII/Ta!
80
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30).

But this once only prefatory word (or fore-word) which, in
most cases, has to do all of the work of unsaying what is
merely said in Totality and Infinity, obviously leaves the
work vulnerable to be too easily read and appropriated.

It

was suggested in chapter I of this dissertation, however,
that Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is a notable
exception to the lack of an intratextual production of what
is announced extratextually by the prefatory word (or foreword).

It was also suggested that this reading is perhaps

not merely an anticipation of what Levinas will later
formalize and write into the very production of Otherwise
than Being, but moreover, that which teaches him the way to
produce a work that responds to its own productionlessness.
With this in mind it may perhaps be instructive to remain
attentive to the way this reading plays both a decisive and
a pervasive role, on innumerable levels, in the very
structure of Totality and Infinity.
In Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations "dead
time" or the interval of the "is not yet" names the rapport
sans rapport of the cogito and the infinite as well as the
rapport sans rapport of the cogito and the evil genius or il
Y....A·

The reading of "dead time" in Levinas' reading of

Descartes' Meditations undertaken in chapter I of this
dissertation requires, however, a deformalization or
concretization.

This is undertaken especially in sections
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II and III of Totality and Infinity where, I would suggest,
"dead time" gets renamed at each successive stratum.

The

following passage from Derrida's "Violence and Metaphysics:
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" is, with
certain qualifications, a provisional characterization of
the structure of Totality and Infinity.
In Totality and Infinity the thematic development is
neither purely descriptive nor purely deductive. It
proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a
beach: return and repetition, always, of the same wave
against the same shore, in which, however, as each
return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews
and enriches itself • 1
A reading of Totality and Infinity which begins with "dead
time" will call into question a simple linear reading of
sections II and III of Totality and Infinity and raise the
question of the proximity of Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being.

"Dead time" also names the "site" of

a certain "relationship" of the infinite and the il y a.
The interval of death, therefore, perhaps names what in
Otherwise than Being is referred to as "a fine risk."

Readings of Totality and Infinity frequently focus on
the first thirty-three pages of Section III ("Exteriority
and the Face"), taking the face as their point of departure.
I would suggest that one begin with the body which, as will

1

Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of· Chicago
Press, 1978), 312 n.7.
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become apparent in a moment, is not merely a "site" from
which one can unproblematically "begin" anything.
specifically, I would suggest that one begin with the
equivocality of the lived body and the physical body,
appearing in its most primordial form (Te! 212/TaI 235) in
the postponement of death in a mortal will, in the interval
of the "is not yet" or "dead time."
This equivocation is first outlined in the first two
parts of section II.B.-"Representation and Constitution"
and "Enjoyment and Nourishment."

The equivocation outlined

here will not merely be left behind but re-described
throughout not only section II, but also sections III and
IV.

Levinas begins the first two parts of section II by
describing the movement proper to objectifying
intentionality, and by establishing the proximity of the
movement to what he, in other contexts, calls the first
movement of Descartes' Meditations.

He begins,

specifically, by directing the readers attention to the
privilege of representation that appeared with the first
exposition of intentionality as a philosophical thesis.
"The thesis that every intentionality is either a
representation or founded on a representation dominates the
Logische Untersuchungen and returns as an obsession in all
of Husserl's subsequent work" (TeI 95/TaI 122).

This

pervasive domination of representation leads, Levinas
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contends, to transcendental philosophy.
The Husserlian thesis of the primacy of the objectifying
act~in which was seen Husserl's excessive attachment to
theoretical consciousness, and which has served as a
pretext to accuse Husserl of intellectualism2 (as though
that were an accusation!)~leads to transcendental
philosophy, to the affirmation (so surprising after the
realist themes the idea of intentionality seemed to
approach) that the object of consciousness, while
distinct from consciousness, is as it were a product of
consciousness, being a "meaning" endowed by
consciousness, the result of Sinngebung (Tel 95-96/TaI
123).
Levinas contends that despite the fact that the object of
representation (noema), is, according to Husserlian
phenomenology, to be distinguished from the act of
representation (noesis), the object of
representation~insofar

as it is reduced to noemata that

remain correlative to the act of

2Levinas

representation~falls

under

is here alluding to himself as an interpreter
of Husserl. In Theorie de !'intuition dans la
phenomenologie de Husserl (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 141. /The
Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre
Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 94,
Levinas writes:
Let us indicate at once[ •.• ] that although intuition
appears as a very broad notion which makes no
presuppositions about the mode of existence of its
object, one should not forget that, for Husserl,
intuition is a theoretical act, and that inasmuch as
other acts can reach being they must, according to the
Logische Untersuchungen, be based on a representation.
[ •.• ] If Ideen modifies, with respect to the Logische
Untersuchungen, the thesis according to which
representation is the basis of all acts, it does not
modify it enough to forbid us to say that each position
of being (thesis) includes a representative thesis. We
must, therefore, observe first that, for Husserl, being
is correlative to theoretical intuitive life, to the
evidence of an objectifying act. This is why the
Husserlian concept of intuition is tainted with intellectualism and is possibly too narrow.
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the power of thought.

Here Levinas establishes the

proximity of this negative movement of the Husserlian epoche
characteristic of representation (Tel 98/TaI 125) to the
first movement of Descartes' Meditations.

This reduction to

noemata is, he writes,
a question of what in Cartesian terminology becomes the
clear and distinct idea. In clarity an object which is
first exterior ~ giyen that is, is delivered over to
him who encounters it as though it had been entirely
determined by him. In clarity the exterior being
presents itself as the work of the thought that receives
it. Intelligibility, characterized by clarity, is a
total adequation of the thinker with what is thought, in
the precise sense of a mastery exercised by the thinker
upon what is thought in which the object's resistance as
an exterior being vanishes. This mastery is total and
as thought creative; it is accomplished as a giving of
meaning: the object of representation is reducible to
noemata. The intelligible isprecisely what is entirely
reducible to noemata and all of whose relations with the
understanding reducible to those established by the
light. In the intelligibility of representation the
distinction between me and the object, between interior
and exterior, is effaced. Descartes's clear and
distinct idea manifests itself as true and as entirely
immanent to thought: entirely present, without anything
clandestine; its very novelty is without mystery.
Intelligibility and representation are equivalent
notions: an exteriority surrendering in clarity and
without immodesty its whole being to thought, that is,
totally present without in principle anything shocking
thought, without thought ever feeling itself to be
indiscreet. Clarity is the disappearance of what could
shock. Intelligibility, the very occurrence of
representation, is the possibility for the other to be
determined by the same without determining the same,
without introducing alterity into it; it is a free
exercise of the same. It is the disappearanc.e, within
the same, of the I opposed to the non-I (Tel 96-97/TaI
123-124).
There is then, according to Levinas, an essential
correlation of intelligibility and representation (Tel
99/TaI 127).
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But this description of representation in Husserlian
phenomenology is, like the description of the first movement
of Descartes' Meditations, "detached from the conditions of
its latent birth" (Tel 99/TaI 126).
Meditations the certitude of

In Descartes'

consciousness~which

is due to

the clarity and distinctness of the cogito--is subtended by
a second movement, by a "logical" order distinct from the
chronological order.

The clarity and distinctness of the

cogito it subtended by the discovery of the infinite.

With

this discovery of a condition for what was otherwise taken
in a first movement as indubitable of itself by itself,
there is an inversion of
condition of the

order~the

cause~that

effect becomes the

produces an irreducibly

enigmatic "double origin," that produces separation.

This

inversion of order that produces separation is likewise
operative in Levinas' description of representation and the
elements one enjoys.
Representation, like the first movement of Descartes'
Meditations, is "a necessary moment of the event of
separation" (Tel 95/TaI 122, emphasis added), but it is
merely one of two necessary moments.

Representation, like

the first movement of Descartes' Meditations, is taken as an
unconditioned condition.

It "consists in the possibility of

accounting for the object as though it were constituted by a
thought, as though it were a noema" (Tel 101/TaI 128).
possibility reduces the represented to the unconditioned

This
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instant of thought.

But the elements one enjoys subtend

this movement of representation.

In the enjoyment of the

elements
the process of constitution which comes into play
wherever there is representation is reversed. What I
live from is not in my life as the represented is within
representation in the eternity of the same or the
unconditioned present of cognition (Te! 101/TaI 128).
If one persists in using the language of representational
thinking, that is, if one insists on describing this
"phenomenon" in terms of constitution, one runs up against
an enigma.
If one could still speak of constitution here we would
have to say that the constituted, reduced to its
meaning, here overflows its meaning, becomes within [au
sein de) constitution the condition of the constituting,
or, more exactly, the nourishment of the constituting.
This overflowing of meaning can be fixed by the term
alimentation. The surplus over meaning is not a meaning
in its turn, simply thought as a condition~which would
be to reduce the aliment to a correlate represented.
The aliment conditions the very thought that would think
it as a condition. It is not that this conditioning is
only noticed after the event [apr~s coup): the
originality of the situation lies in that the
conditioning is produced in the midst of [se produit au
~ du] the relation between representing and
represented, constituting and constituted~a relation
which we find first in every case of consciousness (TeI
101/TaI 128).
That the constituted becomes within constitution the
condition of the constituting, that the aliment as condition
is produced in the midst of the relation between
constituting and constituted, is and remains, for ·
representational thinking, enigmatic.

The originality of

the situation lies in the necessary yet impossible

t~inking

together of both representation as condition and the aliment
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as condition.

It lies in the irreducible enigma of a

"double origin"-of an enigma which is the trace of that
which exceeds meaning, of a past that has never "traversed
the present of representation" (TeI 103/TaI 130), of a
future that is always yet to come.
Levinas situates this description of the production of
separation within the context of the event of dwelling
[l'evenement de demeurer].

The description of the event of

dwelling in section II.0.-"The owelling"-will, like the
description of separation first outlined in the first two
parts of section II.B., be informed by Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations.

Recalling the description of an

inversion of order in section II.B.2., "Enjoyment and
Nourishment," Levinas writes:
Representation is conditioned. Its transcendental
pretension is constantly belied by the life that is
already implanted in the being representation claims to
constitute. But representation claims to substitute
itself after the event [apr~s coup) for this life in
reality, so as to constitute this very reality.
Separation has to be able to account for this
constitutive conditioning accomplished [accompli] by
representation-though representation be produced after
the event (se produire apr~s coup] 3 (TeI 143/TaI 169).

3

It seems as though Levinas' use of the term
"production" here merely indicates that representation is
conditioned, that it is posterior to "life." The phrase
"after the fact" only refers to the alternation between the
two poles of a "double origin." Therefore, when Levinas
writes "representation is produced after the event" he is
ref erring to only one pole of the "double
origin"-representation understood as comprehension-which
can then, again "after the event," be called into question
by the other pole-"life," the elements one enjoys (which
are articulated by the critical essence of representation).
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Any account of the event of separation, Levinas writes, has
to be able to account for or accommodate the constitutive
conditioning accomplished or produced by representation.

It

has to be able to account for or accommodate
representation's accomplishment or production of an
inversion of order, its accomplishment or production of
being both constitutive, that is, condition, and
conditioned.

Separation has to be able to account for or

accommodate representation's constituting, which moves on
straight ahead, and its calling itself into question when it
recognizes that what it constitutes is the condition of its
constituting.

That is, any account of the event of

separation has to be able to account for or accommodate the
distinction Levinas makes between knowledge or theory
understood as comprehension and the critical essence of
knowing which, in its tracing back to a condition of
comprehension, calls comprehension into question.
The theoretical, being after the event [apres QQYR],
being essentially memory, is to be sure not creative;
but its critical essence~its retrogressive movement~is
no wise a possibility of enjoyment and labor. 4 It
evinces a new energy, oriented upstream, countercurrent, which the impassiveness of contemplation
expresses only superficially (TeI 143-144/TaI 169).
The "relationship," or more precisely, the rapport sans

4

It is not entirely clear what Levinas means when he
writes that the critical essence of the theoretical is not
to be confounded with any possibility of enjoyment and
labor. Perhaps he is reading enjoyment as freedom (TeI
59/TaI 87), which is .:th§n called into question by the
critical essence of knowing.
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rapport, of these two inversely oriented aspects of thought
is, I suggested in chapter II, formerly articulated by the
two movements of Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations.
These two distinct movements, the reader will recall,
characterize the very meaning of separation (Tel 19/TaI 48).
The event of separation is, therefore, able to account for
or accommodate the ambiguity of representation as condition
and conditioned in that it is produced by representation's
accomplishment of this inversion of order.

The event of

separation both accounts for and is accounted for by
representation's accomplishment of this inversion of order.
There is a reciprocity here that calls into question
Levinas' use of the language of causality.
question:

what accounts for what?

It raises the

This reciprocity is

reflected in the next paragraph of the text where Levinas
writes that the ambiguity of representation as condition and
conditioned-which is articulated by the inversely oriented
movements of comprehension and critique-:QQ.th "results from"
and produces separation.
That representation is conditioned by life, but that
this conditioning could be reversed after the event
[apres coup]-that idealism is an eternal
temptation-results from the very event of separation,
which must not at any moment be interpreted as an
abstract cleavage in space. The fact of the after-theevent [l'apres-coup] does show that the possibility of
constitutive representation does not restore to abstract
eternity or to the instant the privilege of measuring
all things; it shows, on the contrary, that the
production [la production] of separation is bound to
time, and even that the articulation of separation in
time is produced [.ii\ produit] thus in itself and-not
only secondarily, for us (Tel 144/TaI 169).
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It is important to note that the reversal or inversion of
the order of the elements one enjoys and representation is
operative in both directions, though Levinas explicitly
outlines only one direction in this passage.

That is,

representation as conditioned by the elements can be
reversed after the event, but it is likewise the case that

.

representation as constitutive of the elements can be
reversed after the event. 5

The fact of the after-the-event

does show, therefore, that constitutive representation is
merely a possibility.

It is merely

.Qn@

possibility among

the two possibilities of a "double origin," since it
perpetually alternates with the elements one enjoys
understood as a condition, it perpetually alternates with
itself as conditioned.

As merely one pole of a perpetually

alternating double origin constitutive representation does
not, therefore, "restore to abstract eternity or to the
instant the privilege of measuring all things" (TeI 144/TaI
169).

This restoration is interrupted, perpetually.

The

fact of the after-the-event shows, moreover, that the
production of separation is bound to time, it is bound to

5This

is attested to not only in the first two parts of
section II.B. ("Representation and Constitution" and
"Enjoyment and Nourishment"), but also in the opening
sentence of the next paragraph in the text:
The possibility of a representation that is constitutive
but already rests on the enjoyment of a real completely
constituted indicates the radical character of the
uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home, where
the I, while steeped in the elements, takes up its
position before a Nature (TeI 144/TaI 169).
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the perpetual recognition, after the fact (apris QQYD), of
the condition of what in a first movement is taken to be a
condition.

It is again important to note that the

production or performance of this inversion of order is
operative, as was stated above, in both directions,
perpetually.

That the production of separation is bound to

time recalls Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations.
Drawing upon a passage in Totality and Infinity referring
specifically to Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations,
but equally applicable to the rapport sans rapport of the I
of representation and the elements one enjoys, one could
write:

The ambiguity of what conditions what, revealing the

I of representation and the elements one enjoys in turn
without merging them, revealing them as two distinct moments
of evidence mutually founding one another, characterizes the
very meaning of separation.

The separation of the I is thus

affirmed to be non-contingent, non-provisional.

The

distance between me and the elements, radical and necessary,
is produced in being itself (TeI 19/TaI 48).

"Even the

articulation of separation in time," Levinas continues, "is
produced thus in itself and not only secondarily, for us"
(TeI 144/TaI 169).

It is not as though separation existed

before it was articulated in time.

Separation in itself is

produced only in the event of articulation, only in the
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event of producing or performing an inversion of order. 6
What l i produced "secondarily, for us," that is, what can be
reflected upon (Tel 10, 25/Tal 40, 54) or known (Tel 144/Tal
170), is an ambiguous or enigmatic "double origin."

What l i

produced "secondarily, for us" is not the appearance of
something (as is usually the case in the effectuation of
production), but rather the equivocal trace of what
withdraws from appearance-a separated being as "not yet"
and an absolute exteriority as "not yet."

This production

obviously calls into question the designation "in itself,"
for separation can be something "in itself" only in being
produced as an irreducibly enigmatic or ambiguous "double
origin," that is, only in not being something "in itself."
The next paragraph of the text explicitly situates
this description of the event of separation within the
context of the event of dwelling.
The possibility of a representation that is constitutive
but already rests on the enjoyment of a real completely
constituted indicates the radical character of the
uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home, where
the l, while steeped in the elements, takes up its
position before a Nature. The elements in and from
which l live are also that to which l am opposed. The
feat of having limited a part of this world and having
closed it off, having access to the elements l enjoy by
way of the door and the window, realizes
extraterritoriality and the sovereignty of thought,
6

This articulation of separation, which is synonymous
with the production of separation, is different from an
articulation of separation that takes place after
production, that is, after the progression through the two
movements (eg. the description of the cogito as "not yet,"
the "posteriority of the anterior," etc., see esp. Tel
25/Tal 54).
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anterior to the world to which it is posterior.
Anterior posteriorly: separation is not thus "known";
it is thus produced[~ produit] (Tel 144/Tal 169-170).
Levinas draws upon his reading of Descartes' Meditations
when he writes that extraterritoriality and the sovereignty
of representational thinking, the feat of being disengaged
from the world of the elements, is "anterior to the world to
which it is posterior" (Tel 144/Tal 170).

The effectuation

of an incessant inversion of order that is the production of
a "double origin" is dwelling.

Dwelling is both the

disengagement of representation gng the engagement of being
steeped in the elements one enjoys, neither merely the
disengagement of representation

nm:. the engagement of being

steeped in the elements one enjoys.

The productionless

production of separation or dwelling is marked or named by
"dead time," the interval of the "is not yet."

That is, the

effectuation of the perpetual alternation characteristic of
separation or dwelling articulates the "not yet" of
disengagement and the "not yet" of engagement.
Dwelling or separation is a "way of being" articulated
by the body.

"A being has detached itself from the world

from which it still nourishes itself! [ .•• ] There is here an
ambiguity of which the body is the very articulation" (Tel
89/Tal 116).

The body is the accomplishment

(l'accomplissement, Tel 101, 102/Tal 128, 129) or production
of the irreducibly enigmatic "double origin" of the
disengagement of representation and the engagement of being
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steeped in the elements one enjoys.
The body naked and indigent identifies the center of the
world it perceives, but conditioned by its own
representation of the world, it is thereby as it were
torn up from the center from which it proceeded, as
water gushing forth from rock washes away that rock.
[ ••• ]The body naked and indigent is the very reverting,
irreducible to a thought, of representation into life,
of the subjectivity that represents into life which is
sustained by these representations and lives Qi. .tnmn;
its indigence-its needs-affirm "exteriority" as nonconstituted, prior to all affirmation (TeI 100/TaI 127).
The body is the effectuation of a perpetual inversion of
order.
The body is a permanent contestation of the prerogative
attributed to consciousness of "giving meaning" to each
thing; it lives as this contestation. The world I live
in is not simply the counterpart or the contemporary of
thought and its constitutive freedom, but a conditioning
and an antecedence. The world I constitute nourishes me
and bathes me. It is aliment and "medium" ["milieu").
The intentionality aiming at the exterior changes
direction in the course of its very aim by becoming
interior to the exteriority it constitutes, somehow
comes from the point to which it goes, recognizing
itself past in its future, lives from what it thinks
(TeI 102/TaI 129).
This incessant inversion of order that is the production of
an irreducibly enigmatic "double origin" of representation
and the elements one enjoys formally parallels, I would
suggest, Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations. 7
7

It is interesting to note that despite the fact that
Levinas establishes the proximity of Husserlian
representation and the Cartesian clear and distinct idea
(TeI 96-97/TaI 123-124), Levinas recognizes the superiority
of Cartesian philosophy over Husserlian phenomenology
insofar as Descartes puts limits on noematization.
The body indigent and naked is [the) very changing of
sense. This is the profound insight Descartes had when
he refused to sense data the status of clear and
distinct ideas, ascribed them to the body, and relegated
them to the useful. This is his superiority over
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That the body's concrete articulation of the
production of separation or dwelling formally parallels
Levinas' reading of Descartes' Meditations is further
substantiated in section II.D.5., "Labor, the Body,
consciousness," where Levinas thematizes two aspects of the
body.

These two aspects of the

physical

body~articulate

body~lived

body and

two movements not formally unlike

the two movements of Descartes' Meditations.
Life is a body, not only lived body [corps propre],
where its self-sufficiency emerges, but a cross-roads of
physical forces, body-effect. In its deep-seated fear
life attests this ever possible inversion of the bodymaster into body-slave, of health into sickness. .1'.Q be
g ~is on the one hand to stand [se tenir], to be
master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on
the earth [se tenir IDll: terre], to be in the other
[l'autre], and thus to be encumbered by one's body (Tel
138/TaI 164).
This distinction parallels, I would suggest, the two
movements integral to the production of separation or
dwelling~the

independence of the I of representation and

the dependence upon the elements.

Earlier in Totality and

Infinity Levinas describes dwelling in terms of "standing."
Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se
tenir], not as the famous serpent grasping itself by
biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth
exterior to it, holds itself up [se tient] and can. The
"at home" [Le "~ soi"] is not a container but a site
where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other
[autre], I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it,
free (Tel 7/TaI 37).
"Standing," taken in abstraction or "detached from the

Husserlian phenomenology which puts no limit on
noematization (Tel 102-103/TaI 129-130).
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conditions of its latent birth" (TeI 99/TaI 126),
articulates representational thinking.

But "standing" is

always already a "standing there," a standing on the earth,
a being steeped in the elemental.

Standing there, that is,

"standing" not taken in abstraction, articulates "the
radical character of the uprootedness of him who is
recollected in a home" (TeI 144/TaI 169), for it articulates
both the independence of the I of representation and the
dependence upon the elements, neither merely one nor the
other.

As an articulation of the "not yet" of the I of

representation and the "not yet" of the elemental, it is
otherwise than merely "thinking."

Hence, Levinas writes:

Standing there (~ tenir] is precisely different from
"thinking." The bit of earth that supports me is not
only my object; it supports my experience of objects.
Well-trampled places do not resist me but support me.
The relation with my site in this "stance" ["tenue"]
precedes thought and labor. The body, position, the
fact of standing (se tenir]~patterns of the primary
relation with myself, of my coincidence with
myself~nowise resemble idealist representation (TeI
111/TaI 138).
Levinas is perhaps a bit too unequivocal when in this
passage, he writes that the body, the fact of

standing~both

of which are characterized by the same irreducible
equivocality~nowise

resemble idealist representation, for

"standing" (not taken in abstraction) is, as I suggested
above, an articulation of both the independence of the I of
representation and the dependence upon the elements, neither
merely one nor the other.

Therefore, rather than completely

discounting idealist representation, it must be taken as one
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moment (albeit, a moment vulnerable to an ever possible
inversion) of the equivocation characteristic of the body,
the fact of standing.

Levinas himself seems to indicate

this in the passage just cited when he writes:

"The bit of

earth that supports me is nQt QD.ly my object; it supports my
experience of objects" {Tel 111/TaI 138, emphasis added).
By conceding that the earth is not only an object of
idealist representation he concedes, at least implicitly,
that idealist representation plays some role in "standing."
Another indication of this equivocality characteristic of
"standing" is evident in the passage cited at the beginning
of this paragraph:

"To be A body is on the one hand to

stand, to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to
stand on the earth, to be in the other" {Tel 138/TaI 164).
Here Levinas seems to make a distinction between "standing,"
detached from its concrete conditions (which articulates the
independence of the I of representation), and "standing on
the earth, in the other" (which articulates the dependence
upon the elements).

That the two movements integral to the

production of separation or

dwelling~the

independence of

the I of representation and the dependence upon the
elements~parallel

the distinction between the lived body

and physical body is established in the following passage:
To be at home with oneself in something other than
oneself, to be oneself while living from something other
than oneself, to live from ..• , is concretized in
corporeal existence. "Incarnate thought" is not
initially produced [~ produit] as a thought that acts
on the world, but as a separated existence which affirms
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its independence in the happy dependence of need. It is
not that this equivocation amounts to two successive
points of view on separation; their simultaneity
constitutes the body. To neither of the aspects which
reveal themselves in turn does the last word belong (TeI
139/TaI 164-165).
This passage not only re-articulates "the radical character
of the uprootedness of him who is recollected in a home"
(TeI 144/TaI 169), it is also reminiscent of Levinas'
description of the "double origin" of the cogito and the
infinite in Descartes' Meditations.

In the passage just

cited Levinas writes the following about the two aspects of
the body:

"To neither of the aspects which reveal

themselves in turn (se r6velent tour ! tour] does the last
word belong" (TeI 139/TaI 165).

This is remarkably similar

in form and vocabulary to the following passage:

"The

ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence, revealing the I and
God in turn [r6v6lant, .tmu: ! tour] without merging them,
revealing them as two distinct moments of evidence mutually
founding one another, characterizes the very meaning of
separation" (Tel 19/TaI 48).
body~lived

body and physical

The two aspects of the
body~articulate

two movements

not unlike the two movements of Descartes' Meditations.
This irreducible ambiguity of the

body~which

articulates the "not yet" of the lived body and the "not
yet" of the physical body, "a sector of an elemental
reality" (TeI 140/TaI
consciousness.

165)~is,

according to Levinas,

The description of consciousness as

"disincarnation" in the following passage is not unlike the
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description of dwelling as "uprootedness" (Tel 144/TaI 169).
"Consciousness does not fall into a body-it is not
incarnated; it is disincarnation-or, more exactly, a
postponing of the corporeity of the body" (Tel 140/TaI 165166), the "not yet" of the physical body, the "not yet" of
complete dependence upon the elements.

To describe

conscious as postponement is-as is the case in Levinas'
description of the coqito in Descartes' Meditations as "not
yet" or "not all at once" (Tel 25/TaI 54)-to describe it as
always already in "relation" to the other.

Consciousness,

therefore, is produced in the effectuation of a "double
origin."

It is produced concretely, in the event of

dwelling or separation.
To be conscious is to be in relation with what .ili, but
as though the present of what is were not yet [n'•tait
pas encore] entirely accomplished and only constituted
the future of a recollected being. To be conscious is
precisely to have time-not to exceed the present time
in the project that anticipates the future, but to have
a distance with regard to the present itself, to be
related to the element in which one is settled as to
what is not yet (n'est pas encore] there. All the
freedom of inhabitation depends on the time that, for
the inhabitant, still always remains (Tel 140/TaI 166).
It is perhaps misleading of Levinas to call the ambiguity of
the body-that is, the event of dwelling or
separation-consciousness, since this term carries so much
sedimented philosophical baggage that threatens to still the
ambiguity Levinas is attempting to articulate.
Leaving aside the analyses of section II of Totality
and Infinity for a moment, it is interesting and important
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to note that in section III of Totality and Infinity Levinas
joins this description of consciousness-that is, as
perpetual postponement, as "not yet"-to the relationship of
language, specifically to the role language as rapport sans
rapport plays in objectification.
Objectification is produced [se produit] in the very
work of language, where the subject is detached from the
things possessed as though it hovered over its own
existence, as though it were detached from it, as though
the existence it exists had not yet [ne ••. 6tait pas
encore] completely reached it. This distance is more
radical than every distance in the world. The subject
must find itself "at a distance" [<<! distance>>] from
its own being, even with regard to that taking distance
that is inherent in the home, by which it is still in
being. 8 For negation remains within the totality, even
when it bears upon the totality of the world. In order
that objective distance be hollowed out, it is necessary
that while in being the subject be not yet in being [~
soit pas encore], that in a certain sense it be not yet
[ne soit pA§ encore] born-that it not be in nature. If
the subject capable of objectivity is not yet [n'est pas
encore] completely, this "not yet" [<<pas encore>>],
this state of potency relative to act, does not denote a
less than being, but denotes time. Consciousness of the
object-thematization-rests on distance with regard to
oneself, which can only be time; or, if one prefers, it
rests on self-consciousness, if we recognize the
"distance from self to self" in self-consciousness to be
"time." However, time can designate a "not yet" [<<pas
encore>>] that nevertheless would not be a "lesser
being"-it can remain distant both from being and from
death-only as the inexhaustible future of infinity,
that is, as what is produced (se produit] in the very
relationship of language (Tel 184-185/TaI 209-210). 9
8

It seems that Levinas is here using the term "home" in
a more traditional sense, rather than in the technical sense
that he develops in that section of Totality and Infinity
entitled "The Dwelling," where, as I suggested above, he
describes the event of dwelling or separation as a concrete
articulation of the interval of the "is not yet."
9

The phrases "at a distance" and "is not yet" refer,
among other things, to Levinas' reading of Descartes;
Meditations (see esp. Tel 25/TaI 54). In fact, Levinas'
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Language-like consciousness, insofar as it "is not
yet"-is, as I pointed out in chapter I of this
dissertation, the rapport sans rapport of the subject and
the il y a, and the rapport sans rapport of the subject and
the infinite.
The irreducible ambiguity of the body-returning again
to the analyses of section II of Totality and
Infinity-articulates "dead time."

It articulates the

interval of the "is not yet" that marks consciousness, that
marks the event of dwelling or separation.

This interval,

marking the rapport sans rapport of the I of representation
and the elemental can be characterized as enjoyment.
Sensibility establishes a relation with a pure quality
without support, with the element. Sensibility is
enjoyment. The sensitive being, the body, concretizes
this way .Q.f being, which consists in finding a condition
in what, in other respects, can appear as an object of
thought, as simply constituted (Tel 109/TaI 136).
But the interval of the "is not yet," marking the rapport
sans rapport of the I of representation and the elemental,
can gt. the

~

time be characterized as menace and

insecurity.
The distance with regard to the element to which the I
is given over menaces [menace] it in its dwelling only
in the future (Tel 140/TaI 166).
The dwelling, overcoming the insecurity [l'insecurite]
of life, is a perpetual postponement [perpetual
ajournement] of the expiratiop in which life risks
foundering. The consciousness of death is the
reading of Descartes' Meditations plays a significant role
in the paragraphs immediately following the paragraph within
which this passage is located.
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consciousness of the perpetual postponement
[l'ajournement perp~tual] of death, in the essential
ignorance of its date. Enjoyment as the body that
labors maintains itself in this primary postponement
[ajournement premier], that which opens the very
dimension of time (Tel 139/Tal 165).
This menace or insecurity maintains itself, like enjoyment,
in the primary postponement of death, that is, in "dead
time," in the interval of the "is not yet."

It is important

to keep in mind, therefore, that the descriptions of the
rapport sans rapport or "double origin" operative in section
II of Totality and Infinity address the "relationship" of
the I of representation and the elements, rather than the
"relationship" of representation and enjoyment (as the text
sometimes leads one to think), since enjoyment, I would
suggest, is only one perspective on the "relationship" of
representation and the elements, the other.
The perfidious elemental-which "gives itself while
escaping," which "on the one hand offers itself and
contents, but which already withdraws, losing itself in the
nowhere"-"opens up an abyss within [dans] enjoyment" (Tel
115/Tal 141).

Levinas joins this description of the

elemental with his description of the il y a, the "there
is," that he had himself offered in Existence and Existents
and in Time and the Other.
The nothingness of the future ensures separation:
the element we enjoy issues in the nothingness which
separates. The element I inhabit is at the frontier of
a night. What the side of the element that is turned
toward me conceals is not a "something" susceptible of
being revealed, but an ever-new depth of absence, an
existence without existent, the impersonal par
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excellence. This way of existing without revealing
itself, outside of being and the world, must be called
mythical. The nocturnal prolongation of the element is
the reign of the mythical gods. Enjoyment is without
security. But this future does not take on the
character of a Geworfenheit, for insecurity menaces
[l'insecurite menace) an enjoyment already happy in the
element, rendered sensitive to disquietude only by this
happiness.
We have described this nocturnal dimension of the
future under the title there is [il ya). The element
extends into the there is [il ya). Enjoyment, as
interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of
the earth (Tel 116/TaI 142).
The irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive being,
articulates a rapport sans rapport-marked by "dead time,"
the interval of the "is not yet"-of the I of representation
and the elements that can be characterized as either
enjoyment or menace and insecurity.
But this ambiguous characterization of the interval of
the "is not yet" is multiplied by the fact that this same
interval-an interval that is articulated, as I suggested
above, by the event of dwelling or separation-likewise
marks the rapport sans rapport of the I of representation
and the Other.
But the transcendence of the face is not enacted
outside of the world, as though the economy by which
separation is produced [se produit] remained beneath a
sort of beatific contemplation of the Other [d'Autrui)
(which would thereby turn into the idolatry that brews
in all contemplation). The "vision" of the face as face
is a certain mode of [une certaine fa9on de) sojourning
in a home, or-to speak in a less singular fashion-a
certain form of [une certaine forme de) economic life.
No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted
outside of economy; no face can be approached with empty
hands and closed home. Recollection in a home open to
the Other [Autrui)-hospitality-is the concrete and
initial fact of human recollection and separation; it
coincides [coYncide) with the Desire for the Other
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[d'Autrui] absolutely transcendent. The chosen home is
the very opposite of a root. It indicates a
disengagement, a wandering [errance] which has made it
possible, which is not a less with respect to
installation, but the surplus of the relationship with
the Other [Autrui], metaphysics {Tel 147/TaI 172).
This rapport sans rapport of the I of representation and the
other is characterized by Levinas as "ethics."
Here, as in several other places in Totality and
Infinity, one can locate a certain interruption of the
text-an interruption of a simple step beyond section II
("Interiority and Economy") into section III ("Exteriority
and the Face").

It is an interruption that is gathered

around "dead time," around the interval of the "is not yet."
The irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive being, the
separated being (these are all synonymous), articulates a
rapport sans rapport with the "other" that can be
characterized as enjoyment, menace/insecurity, or "ethics."
Despite Levinas' attempts in Totality and Infinity to
establish and maintain a distinction between the other as il
y__g and the Other as infinite, there is slippage.

"Dead

time"-which marks a rapport sans rapport with the
"other"-is a "risk."

The slipperiness of the distinction

between the other as il y a and the Other as infinite is a
risk that is run in the opening of the interval of the "is
not yet."
The future of the element as insecurity [insecurite] is
lived concretely as the mythical divinity of the
element. Faceless gods, impersonal gods to whom one
does not speak, mark the nothingness that bounds the
egoism of enjoyment in the midst of [au sein de] of its
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familiarity with the element. But it is thus that
enjoyment accomplishes separation. The separated being
must run the risk [courir le risque] of the paganism
which evinces its separation and in which this
separation is accomplished, until the moment that the
death of these gods will lead it back to atheism and to
true transcendence (Tel 115-116/TaI 142).
The disturbing consequences of this "risk" are often
overlooked in a too easy reading of Totality and Infinity,
that is, a reading that would subordinate the il y a to a
linear reading, a reading that would merely step beyond the
il ya into "ethics," that would, for example, merely step
beyond section II of Totality and Infinity into section III.
In Otherwise than Being Levinas writes this "risk" (and its
disturbing consequences) into the very structure of the
work.
In saying suffering signifies in the form of giving,
even if the price of signification is that the subject
run the risk [court le risgue] of suffering without
reason. If the subject did not run this risk [ne
courait pas ce risgue], pain would lose its very
painfulness. Signification, as one-for-the-other in
passivity, where the other is not assumed by the one,
presupposes the possibility of pure non-sense invading
and threatening signification. Without this folly at
the confines of reason, the one would take hold of
itself, and, in the heart of its passion, recommence
essence. How the adversity of pain is ambiguous! The
for-the-other (or sense) turns into by-the-other [Le
pour-l'autre (ou le sens) va jusgu'au par-l'autre], into
suffering by a thorn burning the flesh, but for nothing.
It is only in this way that the for-the-other, the
passivity more passive still than any passivity, the
emphasis of sense, is kept from being for-oneself (AE
64-65/0B 50).
This ambiguity of the for-the-other (sense) and the by-theother

(non-sense)~which

are, respectively, I would suggest,

analogous to the "relationships" that in Totality and
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Infinity are characterized as "ethics" and
menace/insecurity-suggests that one cannot simply step
beyond the il y a into "ethics."

This not only calls into

question a too easy reading of Totality and Infinity, it
likewise raises the question of the proximity of Totality
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being.

A closer reading of

otherwise than Being will be necessary in the future.

It is

now necessary, however, to return to Totality and Infinity.
The ambiguity of the other as il y a and the Other as
infinite-an ambiguity gathered around "dead time" and
articulated by the irreducibly ambiguous body, the sensitive
being-is reiterated in that part of section III of Totality
and Infinity entitled "The Ethical Relation and Time."

In

"The Ethical Relation and Time" the "other"-insofar as its
rapport sans rapport with the subject can be characterized
as menace and insecurity-is, I would suggest, expanded in
section III of Totality and Infinity to encompass not only
the elemental (as is the case in section II) but also the
faceless other "encountered" in war and commerce.

It is

also important to note that in this part of Totality and
Infinity the interval of the "is not yet," which marks the
rapport sans rapport of the subject and the "other," is not
only characterized as menace and insecurity (as well as
enjoyment and "ethics"), but also as violence.

"Violence

bears upon only a being both graspable and escaping every
hold" (TeI 198/TaI 223).

It is, as I described above, the
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body that concretely articulates this ambiguity.

Here-as

in that part of section II entitled "Labor, the Body,
consciousness"-Levinas describes the body in terms of a
series of irreducible distinctions such as lived
body/physical body, body-master/body-slave, and
health/sickness.
The body exceeds the categories of a thing, but does not
coincide with the role of "lived body" ["corps propre")
which I dispose of in my voluntary action and by which I
can. The ambiguity of corporeal resistance which turns
into a means and from means turns into a resistance does
not account for its ontological hmbris. The body in its
very activity, in its for itself, 0 inverts into a thing
to be treated as a thing. 11 This is what we express
concretely in saying that it abides between health and
sickness. Through it one not only fails to recognize,
one can mistreat the "for itself" of the person; one
does not only offend him, one coerces him.
"I am
anything you like," says Sganarelle, under the blows.
One does not adopt successively and independently the
biological point of view on it and the "point of view"
which from the interior maintains it as a lived body;
the originality of the body consists of the coinciding
of two points of view. This is the paradox and the
essence of time itself proceeding unto death, where the
will is affected as a thing by the things-by the point
of steel or by the chemistry of the tissues (due to a
murderer or to the impotency of the doctors)-but gives
itself a reprieve and postpones the contact by the
against-death of postponement. The will essentially
violable harbors treason in its own essence.
It is not
only offendable in its dignity-which would confirm its
inviolable character-but is susceptible of being
coerced and enslaved as a will, becoming a servile soul
(Te! 205/TaI 229) .
In the following passage, Levinas gathers together the three
w"For itself" here refers to the lived body, the bodymaster, health.
11

"Thing" here refers to the physical body, the bodyslave, sickness.
It refers to the body as "a sector of an
elemental reality" (Te! 140/TaI 165). It does not refer to
the body as a represented thing.
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characterizations of the interval of the "is not yet"
{enjoyment, menace/insecurity/violence, and "ethics"), while
at the same time noting the "risk" that they each can drift
into the other:
The corporeity of the will must be understood on the
basis of this ambiguity of voluntary power, exposing
itself to the others [autres] in [dans] its centripetal
movement of egoism. 12 The body is its ontological
regime, and not an object. The body, where expression
can dawn forth and where the egoism of the will becomes
discourse and primal opposition, at the same time [en
meme temps] conveys the entry of the I into the
calculations of the Other [autrui] {Tel 206/TaI 229230) .
"Dead time"-articulated by the irreducibly ambiguous
body-is a "risk."

The body, as the "site" of the rapport

sans rapport with the "other," is the "site" of enjoyment,
exposure to menace/insecurity/violence, and the "ethical"
relation.

Or, said in the language of Otherwise than Being,

the body is, I would suggest, the "site" of enjoyment, the
by-the-other (or non-sense), and the for-the-other (or
sense).
This irreducible ambiguity of the body is founded in
mortality.
It is in mortality that the interaction of the psychic
and the physical appears in its primordial form. The
interaction of the physical and the psychic, when
approached from the psychic, posited as for itself or as
causa sui, and from the physical, posited as unfolding
in function of the "other," gives rise to a problem due
to the abstraction to which the terms in relation are
reduced. Mortality is the concrete and primary
phenomenon. It forbids the positing of a for itself
12

The "centripetal movement of egoism" refers to enjoyment
(see Tel 91, 116/TaI 118, 143).
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that would not be already delivered over to the Other
and consequently be a thing. The for itself,
essentially mortal, does not only represent things to
itself, but is subject to them (Tel 212/TaI 235).
The equivocality of the lived body and the physical body,
the psychic and the physical, appears in its most primordial
form in the postponement of death in a mortal will, in the
interval of the "is not yet" or "dead time."

Levinas also addresses the question of the proximity
of menace/insecurity/violence and "ethics" in an essay
entitled "Transcendence and Evil."

The essay is ostensibly

a reading of Philippe Nemo's Job et l'exces du Mal.
divides his reading into three moments:

Levinas

evil as excess,

evil as intention, and evil as the hatred of evil.

I will

concentrate primarily on the third moment where the question
of evil's proximity to good is raised.
Levinas sums up the third and last moment-evil as the
hatred of evil-as follows:
[E]vil strikes me in my horror of evil, and thus
reveals-or is already-my association with the Good.
The excess of evil by which it is a surplus in the world
is also our impossibility of accepting it. The
experience of evil would then be also our waiting on the
good-the love of God. 13
This "movement leading from the 'horror of evil' to the

13

Emmanuel Levinas, "Transcendence et mal, " in De dieu
qui vient a l'idee (Paris: Vrin, 1982), 203, hereafter cited
in the text as TM. / "Transcendence and Evil," trans.
Alphonso Lingis, in Emmanuel Levinas: Collected
Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987),
183, hereafter cited in the text as TE.
·
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discovery of the Good[ •.. ] completes in a theophany the
transcendence opened in the totality of the world by the
concrete 'content' of evil" (TM 204/TE 184).

In this

reversal or inversion of evil and of the horror of evil into
an expectation of the Good "there can[ .•• ] be no question,"
Levinas thinks, "of a passage from Evil to the Good through
the attraction of contraries" for "that would make but one
more theodicy" (TM 203/TE 183).

In "Useless Suffering"

Levinas describes what he means by theodicy.
Western humanity has [ ... ] sought for the meaning of
this scandal [i.e., useless suffering] by invoking the
proper sense of a metaphysical order, an ethics, which
is invisible in the immediate lessons of moral
consciousness. This is a kingdom of transcendent ends,
willed by a benevolent wisdom, by the absolute goodness
of a God who is in some way defined by his super-natural
goodness; or a widespread, invisible goodness in Nature
and History, where it would command the paths which are,
to be sure, painful, but which lead to the Good. Pain
is henceforth meaningful, subordinated in one way or
another to the metaphysical finality envisaged by faith
or by a belief in progress. These beliefs are
presupposed by theodicy! such is the grand idea
necessary to the inner peace of souls in our distressed
world. It is called upon to make sufferings here below
comprehensible. These will make sense by reference to
an original fault or to the congenital f initude of human
being. The evil which fills the earth would be
explained in a 'plan of the whole'; it would be called
upon to atone for a sin, or it would announce, to the
ontologically limited consciousness, compensation or
recompense at the end of time. These supra-sensible
perspectives are invoked in order to envisage in a
suffering which is essentially gratuitous and absurd,
and apparently arbitrary, a signification and an
order. I 4

14

Emmanuel Levinas, "Useless Suffering" trans. Richard
Cohen, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other,
ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge,
1988) ' 160-161.
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Levinas acknowledges that Nemo himself is likewise sensitive
to this problem when he rhetorically asks:

"Does not the

philosophical contribution of all this Biblical exegesis
consist in making it possible to go as it were beyond the
reciprocal appeal of terms that negate one another, beyond
dialectics" (TM 203/TE 183, emphasis added)?

This is made

possible not only because evil, as Nemo delimited it in the
first two moments of the book, is not any kind of negation,
but also because Nemo is sensitive to the Nietzsche's
warning against the spirit of ressentiment, that is, a good
that would signify only a repayment for evil or a vengeance.
With this in mind Nemo describes the expectation of the Good
as a thought that would think more than it thinks.

The

soul, torn up from the world and awakened to itself by evil,
the soul beyond satisfaction and recompense, "expects an
awaited that infinitely surpasses expectancy" (TM 204/TE
183-184).

But despite Levinas' praise for this "very

profound" formulation that makes it possible to go beyond
the reciprocal appeal of contrary terms that negate one
another, beyond dialectics, he rhetorically asks:

"Does

[the movement leading from the 'horror of evil' to the
discovery of the Good in Nemo's book] not lead to but the
opposite of evil, and to a goodness of simple pleasure,
however great it be" (TM 204/TE 184)?

That is, does i t

not lead, however superlative or excessive the good may be,
to a goodness that merely compensates for the evil, to a
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play of good and evil.
The notion of "play" designates, for Nemo, the
relation of the soul with God.

"Play" cannot however,

according to Levinas, be deduced from the disproportion
between expectation and the expected, i.e., the
disproportion between God and the thought that thinks God.
Moreover if play is deduced from the disproportion between
God and the thought that thinks God then one risks,
according to Levinas, reinscribing this "very profound"
formulation within a theodicy where the expectation of the
Good would be reduced to the dialectical play of good and
evil (understood as contraries) "in which the whollyotherness of God (would no longer be expected but rather]
would become visible" (TM 203/TE 183).

To illustrate this

point Levinas cites the following passage from Job et
l'exces du Mal:

"The excess of beatitude alone will answer

to the excess of evil" (TM 204/TE 184).

Levinas suggests

that Nemo uses two different senses of "excess" in this
passage in order to maintain the privileged signification of
evil around which his whole book is constructed.
The excess of evil does not mean an excessive evil,
whereas the excess of beatitude remains a superlative
notion.
For if it were necessary to already see in
beatitude, as such, an excess, evil would not have the
privileged signification about which Nemo's whole book
is constructed (TM 204/TE 184, emphasis added).
But according to Levinas, there is always already also an
excess of good as well as an excess of evil.
This prompts Levinas to propose, in the form of a
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rhetorical question, an alternative understanding of the
movement leading from the "horror of evil" to the discovery
of the Good that does not lead to the opposite of evil, to a
goodness of simple pleasure.
Does not the Good that is awaited in this "awaiting
which aims at infinitely more than this awaited"
maintain a relationship less remote with the evil which
suggests it, while differing from it with a difference
more different than opposition (TM 204-205/TE 184,
emphasis added)?
The relationship that the Good maintains with evil is
therefore, according to Levinas, less remote and at the same
time more different than a relationship of mere opposition.
And while both Nemo and Levinas recognize a disproportion
between expectation and the expected, Levinas has certain
reservations about designating it with the notion of "play."
He will choose instead to designate it with the notions of
command and prescription.
Levinas hints at this alternative designation of the
disproportionate relationship between expectation and the
expected when he raises "the problem of the relationship
between the suffering of the self and the suffering which a
self can experience over the suffering of the other man" (TM
205/TE

184)~a

problem which never appears on the foreground

of Nemo's commentary on the book of Job. 15

Is there not a

question of this problematical relationship, Levinas asks,

15

This passage parallels the inversion from the fear of
death into the fear of committing murder delimited by
Levinas in Totality and Infinity.
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in the "Where were you when I founded the earth?" of Job
38:4?
This passage, at the beginning of the discourse
attributed to God, "reminds Job of his absence at the hour
of creation" (TM 205/TE 184).
this absence?

But how are we to understand

This passage has commonly been understood as

an almost satirical retort to the impudence of Job--Where
were you? 16

But, Levinas rhetorically asks, does this

passage "only set forth a theodicy in which the economy of a
harmonious and wisely arranged whole harbors evil only for a
look limited to a part of this whole" (TM 205/TE 184, my
emphasis)?

That is, does the suffering of the self as a

self exposed to evil merely take hope in and await the
ultimate good (understood as the contrary of evil) that lies
beyond its limited look?

Rather than the traditional

reading of this passage-"Where were you?"-Levinas reads
"Where were you?" and asks:
Might one not understand in this "Where were you?" a
denunciation of being wanting, which can have meaning
only if the humanity of man is fraternally solidary with
creation, that is, is responsible for what was neither
one's self nor one's work, and if this solidarity and
this responsibility for everything and for all, which
cannot occur without pain, is the spirit itself (TM
205/TE 184)?
This reading, which sets forth a theophany rather than a
16

In fact, according to Levinas' reading of Nemo' s
interpretation of Job, this is how Nemo would read this
passage (despite the exceptional relationship he sets up
between the soul and evil). Therefore, according to
Levinas, in this instance, Nemo and the tradition are
agreed.
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theodicy, denounces a look limited to a part of a harmonious
and wisely arranged whole.

It even denounces a look that

is, according to Levinas, delimited by Nemo--a look that,
having been torn out of the world by evil, merely waits on
the opposite of evil, the goodness of simple pleasure.

The

theophany set forth in this reading differs, therefore, from
the theophany that Levinas believes Nemo sets f orth~a
theophany that risks being reduced to "one more theodicy"
(TM 203/TE 183), to a mere "play" of contraries within a
totalized economy.
The "suffering of the self" as a self exposed to evil
always already involves or is equiprimordial with "the
suffering which a self can experience over the suffering of
the other man."

In fact, according to Levinas, a "suffering

of the self" that is not equiprimordial with the "suffering
which a self can experience over the suffering of the other
man" never truly "expects an awaited that infinitely
surpasses expectancy," never truly expects a good that would
not signify a repayment for evil or a vengeance, a good
beyond recompense.
The pain of the transgressive responsibility brought
out in Levinas' reading circumvents a reading of the good
inherent in the Nietzschean idea of ressentiment.

It marks

the "relationship" of "the suffering of the self and the
suffering which a self can experience over the suffering of
the other man."
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Levinas elaborates on this disturbing affliction
called pain in a passage that constitutes, I believe, the
denouement of his reading of Nemo's Job et

l'exc~s

du Mal.

That in the evil that pursues me the evil suffered by
the other man afflicts me, that it touches me, as though
(comme si] from the first the other was calling to me,
putting into question my resting on myself and my
conatus essendi, as though (comme si] before lamenting
over my evil here below, I had to answer for the
other~is not this a breakthrough of the Good in the
"intention" of which I am in my woe so exclusively aimed
at (TM 206/TE 185)?
The phrase "as though" (comme si] plays a key role in
Levinas' reading of Descartes Meditations.
thinking in two times.

It articulates a

Specifically, with respect to

Levinas reading of Descartes' Meditations, it articulates
the undecidability or equiprimordiality of the cogito and
the infinite.
In the passage in question the "as though" (comme si]
articulates Levinas' reading of Job 38:4, that is, the
undecidability or equiprimordiality of the suffering of the
self and the suffering which a self can experience over the
suffering of the other man, both of which are likewise
characterized by ambiguous double origins.

The "as though,"

therefore, articulates a "relationship" of good and evil
that is simultaneously "less remote" and "more different"
than a relationship of opposition.

It is "as though" the

double origin characteristic of the relationship between the
soul and evil were the double origin characteristic of the
relationship between the soul and good.
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Earlier in the essay Levinas delimited the exteriority
or transcendence in evil using language strikingly similar
to the language he uses in his reading of Descartes'
Meditations to describe the ambiguous "relationship" of the
cogito and the evil genius/il y a.
In its malignancy as evil, evil is an excess. While the
notion of excess evokes first the quantitative idea of
intensity, of a degree surpassing measure, evil is an
excess in its very quiddity. This notion is very
important: evil is not an excess because suffering can
be terrible, and go beyond the endurable. The break
with the normal and the normative, with order, with
synthesis, with the world, already constitutes its
qualitative essence. Suffering qua suffering is but a
concrete and quasi-sensible manifestation of the nonintegratable, the non-justifiable. The "quality" of
evil is this very non-integratability, if we can use
such a term; this concrete quality is defined by this
abstract notion. Evil is not only the non-integratable;
it is also the non-integratability of the nonintegratable (TM 197-198/TE 180).
Evil, like the idea of the infinite, exceeds the very
thought that would think it.

In fact, Levinas uses the term

"transcendence"-a term otherwise reserved for the
infinite-in his description of evil.
In the appearing of evil, in its original phenomenality,
in its quality, is announced a modality, a manner: not
finding a place, the refusal of all accommodation
with ••. , a counter-nature, a monstrosity, what is
disturbing and foreign of itself. And in this sense
transcendence (TM 198/TE 180)!
Evil is only insofar as it exceeds every thought that thinks
it.

Evil tears one out of the world as unique and ex-

ceptional-as a soul (TM 201/TE 182).

The ex- in ex-

ceptional testifies to the ex-cess of evil that overflows
the very thought that would think it.

It testifies, that
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is, to the incompleteness of soul in its completeness.

For

by virtue of chronological time the soul-by thinking that
which exceeds thought-"is not yet."
With this in mind, one is in a position to see how the
"as though" articulates in the passage in question, a
"relationship" of 1) the double origin characteristic of the
"relationship" of the soul and evil, and 2) the double
origin characteristic of the "relationship" of the soul and
good, that is simultaneously "less remote" and "more
different" than a relationship of opposition.

When Levinas

writes ...
That in the evil that pursues me the evil suffered by
the other man affects me, that it touches me, as though
[comme si] from the first the other was calling to me,
putting into question my resting one myself and my
conatus essendi, as though [comme si] before lamenting
over my evil here below, I had to answer for the
other-is not this a breakthrough of the Good in the
"intention" of which I am in my woe so exclusively aimed
at (TM 206/TE 185)?
... one reads, I would suggest, the following:

That in the

evil that infinitely approaches me-that in the ex-ceptional
relationship of myself and the evil that ex-ceeds my
thinking of it-the evil suffered by the other man afflicts
me, that it touches me, as though from the first the "other"
that calls to me, that puts my resting on myself and my
conatus essendi into question were the personal other that
faces me rather than the anonymous faceless other of evil,
as though before lamenting over my evil here below I had to
answer for the "other."

The personal "other" that faces me
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and the anonymous faceless "other" of evil maintain-by way
of the "as though"-a relationship simultaneously "less
remote" and "more different" than a relationship of
opposition.

CHAPTER 4
OTHERWISE THAN JUSTICE AND DEAD TIME
Signification signifies in justice, but also, more
ancient than itself and than the equality implied
by it, justice passes by justice in my responsibility
for the other, in my inequality with respect to him
for whom I am a hostage.
-Levinas
"All that exists is just and unjust
and equally justified in both."
That is your world! A world indeed!-Nietzsche
By turning itself into an inability to reveal
anything, literature is attempting to become
the revelation of what revelation destroys.
This is a tragic endeavor.
-Blanchet
Death is, on the one hand, the very possibility of
grasping the possible, the power of assumption.

Death is,

on the other hand, an absolute alterity that approaches
without ever being assumable.

It "is not yet."

Death, as

approach, as postponement, is called "dead time."

Earlier I

suggested that a reading of Levinas that is not attentive to
"dead time"-which is marked by or leaves a trace of itself
in the performance or production of a "double origin"-risks
domesticating the interruptions located within his work.
risks the possibility of being too easily read and
appropriated.

For example, a close reading of justice and
121

It
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responsibility in the work of Levinas-that is, the step
beyond justice into responsibility- reveals that Levinas'
idea of responsibility cannot be easily appropriated by
ethics or politics.

Responsibility exceeds the order of

measure and reason.

It merely leaves an enigmatic or

ambiguous trace of itself in this order of just boundaries.
Levinas' reading of responsibility moves at the limit of the
ethical language of justice.
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound in
The Birth of Tragedy likewise moves at the limit of the
ethical language of justice.

Reading justice in Nietzsche

alongside justice in Levinas will, I would suggest,
raise-seemingly despite Levinas' intentions-the question
of the proximity of Nietzsche and Levinas.

This is a

question that would not even be considered in a too easy
reading of Levinas that sometimes seeks to appropriate his
work for a post-Nietzschean ethics or politics.

Earlier I suggested that the ambiguity of the other as
il y a and the other as infinite is gathered around "dead
time," that is, death understood as an absolute alterity
that infinitely approaches.

This is evident even within

that section of Totality and Infinity explicitly concerned
with death-"The Will and Death."

In that section Levinas

writes:
Death threatens me from beyond. This unknown that
frightens, the silence of the infinite spaces that
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terrify, comes from the other, and this alterity,
precisely as absolute, strikes me in an evil design or
in a judgment of justice (Te! 210/TaI 234).
"Evil design" refers, I would suggest, to the rapport sans
rapport of the subject and the other as il y a, which is
characterized by Levinas as menace/insecurity/violence.
"Judgment of justice" refers, I would suggest, to the
rapport sans rapport of the subject and the other as
infinite, which is characterized by Levinas as "ethics."
While chapter 3 of this dissertation pointed out that
"dead time" can concretely be characterized as enjoyment,
menace/insecurity/violence, or "ethics," the reading
undertaken in that chapter concentrated primarily on the
first two alternatives.

Still more needs to be said,

however, about the third alternative-"ethics," that is, the
rapport sans rapport characterized by a "judgment of
justice."

What does Levinas mean by "ethics" or "judgment

of justice"?

And what prevents these familiar and

traditional ideas from being too easily read and
appropriated?
In that part of Totality and Infinity entitled "The
Truth of the Will" Levinas makes a distinction between this
"judgment of justice" and the "judgment of history."

His

remarks on this distinction can best be understood when read
alongside the distinction he makes between comprehension and
critique, which is instantiated in his reading of Descartes'
Meditations.

Briefly, the "judgment of history" is "a
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verdict set forth impersonally and implacably out of
universal principles" (Tel 222/TaI 244), particularly, the
universal principle of justice.

This judgment, set forth in

the visible (Tel 220/TaI 243), is of the order of the
comprehension.

The "judgment of justice," set forth by the

invisible, is articulated by the order of critique.

It is,

therefore, not so much a judgment inspired by a universal
principle of justice as it is an indictment of justice, of
the order of comprehension.

There is a shift of the

genitive from subjective genitive (read:

the judgment

pronounced .Qy justice) to objective genitive (read:
judgment pronounced upon justice).

the

This judgment, coming

from the absolute alterity of the other (Tel 210/TaI 234),
is often referred to by Levinas as a "judgment of God," that
is, a judgment pronounced by the infinite.
The judgment of justice, coming from the absolute
alterity of the other, indicts my arbitrary freedom (Tel
222/TaI 245), it calls the arbitrary dogmatism of
comprehensions' free exercise into question (Tel 13/TaI 43).
That is, it effects a critical movement, a discovery of a
condition for what is otherwise taken to be unconditioned, a
justification of comprehensions' freedom (Tel 58-59/TaI 86)
which consists in recognizing in the other a right over the
unconditioned egoism of comprehension (Tel 10/TaI 40), in
recognizing one's own injustice.

But in this inversion of

the movement of comprehension characteristic of critique, in
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this justification of freedom, this recognition of the
other, this attempt to be just, one becomes, paradoxically,
more unjust.

Levinas writes:

The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual
immensity, but g responsibility increasing in the
measure that it is assumed; duties become greater in the
measure that they are accomplished. The better I
accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I
am just the more guilty I am (Tel 222/TaI 244).
The attempt to be just, that is, the recognition of the
other as the condition of what is otherwise taken to be
unconditioned, is inevitably reinscribed back into the order
of comprehension.

One is inevitably guilty of the arbitrary

dogmatism of comprehension's free exercise, of its nonrecognition of the other.

This move is, in turn, again

vulnerable to the judgment of justice, that is, to the
critical movement's justification of comprehension's
freedom.

There is an incessant "step beyond" that is

incessantly "not beyond."
guilty or unjust I am.

The more I am just the more

There is here the performance or

production of a perpetual alternation characteristic of
Levinas' formal thematizations of skepticism and the saying
of the otherwise than being in Otherwise than Being, both of
which, as was suggested in chapter I of this dissertation,
heavily draw upon Levinas' reading of Descartes'
Meditations.

This perpetual alternation between two poles

of a "double origin" is a trace of that which exceeds the
universal principle justice governing the "judgment of
history."
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The judgment of justice that indicts my arbitrary
freedom does not, therefore, simply "seal my [as well as the
other's) pure and simple entry into the universal order"
(Te! 222/TaI 245), that is, an order impersonally and
implacably governed by a universal principle of justice, as
is the case in the "judgment of history."

There is, rather,

a shift, as I suggested earlier, in the way one reads the
genitive in "judgment of justice"-a shift from subjective
genitive (read:

the judgment pronounced .Qy justice) to

objective genitive (read:
justice).

the judgment pronounced upon

In the name of justice, insofar as it is

understood as a universal principle, one is summoned to step
beyond justice.

In the justification of the arbitrary

dogmatism of comprehension's free exercise, in the
recognition of the other, that is, in the inversion of order
characteristic of the movement of critique, there is the
production or performance of a trace of that which exceed
justice.
In reality, justice does not include me in the
equilibrium of its universality; justice summons me to
go beyond the straight line of justice, and henceforth
nothing can mark the end of this march; behind the
straight line of the law the land of goodness extends
infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources
of a singular presence. I am therefore necessary for
justice, 1 as responsible beyond every limit fixed by an
1

The term "justice" here seems to indicate that which
exceeds justice understood as a universal principle. The
term undergoes slippage in this passage insofar as it
summons me to go beyond justice understood as a universal
principle. It is, therefore, somewhat confusing to use the
term "justice" to name that which exceeds it. Levinas

127
objective law. The I is a privilege and an election.
The sole possibility in being of going beyond the
straight line of the law, that is, of finding a place
lying beyond the universal, is to be I (Tel 223/TaI
245) .
The interminability of the march beyond the universality of
objective law, of the step beyond justice, refers to the
perpetual alternation outlined in the previous paragraph.
It refers to the perpetual alternation between the
singularity of the "I" and the other that incessantly calls
the "I" into question.

The singularity of the "I" is

necessary for the production or performance of a trace of
that which exceeds the objective law, the universal
principle of justice.

The "I" which effects this production

is, therefore, the sole possibility of the invisible
manifesting itself in being.
The invisible must manifest itself if history is to lose
its right to the last word, necessarily unjust for the
subjectivity, inevitable cruel. But the manifestation
of the invisible can not mean the passage of the
invisible to the status of the visible; it does not lead
back to evidence. It is produced (se produit] in the
goodness reserved to subjectivity, which thus is subject
not simply to the truth of judgment, but to the source
of this truth. The truth of the invisible is
ontologically produced (se produit] by the subjectivity
which states it. For the invisible is not the
"provisionally invisible," nor what remains invisible
for a superficial and rapid glance, and which a more
attentive and scrupulous investigation would render
visible, nor what remains unexpressed as hidden
movements of the soul, nor what, gratuitously and
lazily, is affirmed to be a mystery (Tel 221/TaI 243).
should perhaps reserve the term "responsibility" to name
this "relationship" with excess. This distinction between
justice and responsibility, merely alluded to in Totality
and Infinity, is decisively drawn, as will become apparent
in a moment, in Otherwise than Being.
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The truth of the invisible is produced by the subjectivity
that effects the production, by the "I" that is called into
question, by the "I" that, for example, proceeds through the
two movements of Descartes' Meditations effecting the
production of a "double origin," that is, a trace of the
invisible in the visible. 2

The invisible manifests itself

only as an irreducible ambiguity or enigma, only as the
performance of a perpetual alternation that perpetually
interrupts the visible.

This performance or production of a

perpetual alternation that perpetually interrupts the
visible, interrupts any firm position from which one could
make ethical or political evaluations (of, for example,
justice or injustice), while, at the same time, not
absolving one of the necessity (not to say, the
inevitability) of making such evaluations.

The distinction between justice and that which exceeds
it (responsibility), merely alluded to in Totality and
Infinity, is decisively drawn in Otherwise than Being.
Recall that in the name of justice, insofar as it is
understood as a universal principle, one is summoned to step
beyond justice, or, to be more precise, one produces or
performs a trace of that which exceeds justice.

That which

exceeds justice, the invisible, manifests itself only as an
2

See chapter 1 of this dissertation for a description
of production and the role it plays in Levinas' reading of
Descartes' Meditations.

129
irreducible ambiguity or enigma, only as the performance of
a perpetual alternation that perpetually interrupts the
visible, the order of justice-an order which stills this
perpetual alternation, fixes this irreducible ambiguity or
enigma of the I and the other under a universal principle.
In that part of Otherwise than Being entitled "From the
Saying to the Said, or the Wisdom of Desire" Levinas is
likewise concerned-as the title suggests, albeit in the
terms "said" and "saying"-with the rapport sans rapport of
the order of justice and the responsibility that exceeds the
order of justice but nonetheless leaves a trace of itself in
its interruption of this order.

For example, Levinas

writes:
Signification signifies in justice, but also, more
ancient than itself and than the equality implied by it,
justice passes by justice in my responsibility for the
other, in my inequality with respect to him for whom I
am a hostage {AE 201/0B 158).
On the one hand, signification, the one-for-the-other of
responsibility, signifies or leaves a trace of itself in the
said, in the order of justice.

on the other hand, justice

passes by justice, that is, in the name of justice one is
summoned to step beyond justice, or, to be more precise, one
produces or performs a trace of that which exceeds justice.
Responsibility signifies or leaves a trace of itself in the
order of justice; the order of justice, as the site of this
trace of responsibility, signifies responsibility.
This reciprocity is again echoed in the final
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sentences of that part of Otherwise than Being entitled
"Sense and the There Is."

Here it is set within the context

of philosophy's role in both conveying and (inevitably)
betraying or thematizing the saying of the otherwise than
being, the absolute one-for-the-other of responsibility, and
its recognition of this conveying and betraying as an
incessant alternation that is the trace of that which
exceeds thematization, that is, its reduction of this
conveying and (inevitable) betraying to difference (see
"separation" in Totality and Infinity) .
Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference
and reducing the thematized to difference. It brings
equity into the abnegation of the one for the other,
justice into responsibility. Philosophy, in its very
diachrony, is the consciousness of the breakup of
consciousness. In an alternating movement, like that
which leads from skepticism to the refutation that
reduces it to ashes, and from its ashes to its rebirth,
philosophy justifies and criticizes the laws of being
and of the city, and finds again the signification that
consists in detaching from the absolute one-for-theother both the one and the other (AE 210/0B 165).
The last sentence of this passage draws a parallel between
the alternating movement of skepticism and refutation of
skepticism and the step/not beyond justice that I described
in previous

paragraphs~a

step/not beyond that is the

performance or production of a trace of that which exceeds
justice, the absolute one-for-the-other of responsibility.
In the passage "philosophy justifies and criticizes the laws
of being and the city" the terms "justify" and "criticize"
are synonyms that parallel the "step beyond" characteristic
of skepticism (abstracted, momentarily, from the other pole
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of the alternating movement, that is, the refutation of
skepticism).

They refer to what in Totality and Infinity is

called the movement of

critique~the

inversion or calling

into question of the movement of thematization, the
discovery of a condition for what is otherwise taken to be
unconditioned, the justification of the movement of
comprehension (Te! 58-59/TaI 86).

The passage "philosophy

[ ... ] finds again the signification that consists in
detaching from the absolute one-for-the-other both the one
and the other" parallels the "not beyond" characteristic of
the refutation of skepticism, the recognition of the
contradiction, the thematization of the difference between
the one and the other which ensures their coexistence or
contemporaneousness.

This alternating movement can help to

clarify the first sentence of the passage cited above:
"Philosophy serves justice by thematizing the difference and
reducing the thematized to difference."

"Thematizing the

difference" is the inevitable betrayal of the conveying of
the other, which ensures the coexistence of the different
terms.

Recall that conveying and betraying (that is, the

reflection, "after the event," on the statement that conveys
the other) are the two times integral to the production of a
contradiction.

"Reducing the thematized to difference" is

the recognition of this conveying and betraying (at least in
the cases of skepticism and the saying of the otherwise than
being) as a trace of that which exceeds thematization, that
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is, as the performance or production of an incessant
alternation of conveying and betraying, rather than merely
the "arbitrary halt" at the betrayal or refutation of the
signification.

This is the case if one reads reduction as

the inverse of production.

I would suggest that reduction

is the recognition, and therefore the re-performance or reproduction after the fact, of the performance of an
incessant alternation between conveying and betraying, of
the production of a trace of that which exceeds reason.

In the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," which accompanies
the 1886 edition of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes:
"[T]he whole book knows only an artistic meaning and cryptomeaning behind all events. 113

Nietzsche introduces this

provocative statement by referring to both the preface to
the book and the book itself.
Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art,
and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical
activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive
sentence is repeated several times, that the existence
of the world is justified [gerechtfertigt] only as an
aesthetic phenomenon (GT 11/BT 22).
This suggestive sentence, repeated on two occasions in the

3

Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragodie. Oder:
Griechenthum und Pessimismus, in Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), vol.III, pt.1, 11,
hereafter cited in the text as GT / The Birth of Tragedy.
Or: Hellenism and Pessimism, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, 1967), 22, hereafter cited in the text
as BT.
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book itself , 4 immediately calls one's attention to the
curious juxtaposition of "the existence of the world" and
"aesthetic phenomenon."

A hasty reading of this sentence

may in fact completely overlook Nietzsche's choice of the
word "justified."
Before hastily moving to the curious juxtaposition of "the
existence of the world" and "aesthetic phenomenon"-as if
each term of this juxtaposition were beyond question-one
should ask the following questions:

Why does Nietzsche call

attention to the word "justified" by emphasizing it?

What

is the significance of "justification" or "justice" for
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy?

How does this

signification affect the way one reads the sentence in
question?

And why does Nietzsche use a word so blatantly

loaded with "moral" overtones when, in the preceding
sentence, he writes that "art, and not morality, is
presented [in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner) as
the truly metaphysical activity of man"?
The most significant treatment of "justice" in The
4

This sentence appears in section 5 ("[I)t is only as
an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are
eternally justified [gerechtfertigt]," GT 43/BT 52) and in
section 24 ("[E]xistence and the world seem justified
[gerechtfertigt) only as an aesthetic phenomenon," GT 148/BT
141). It is not immediately clear what Nietzsche intended
by altering the text from "existence and the world" in the
book to "existence of the world" in the "Attempt at SelfCriticism" (unless, of course, it was merely an oversight) .
In section 24 Nietzsche also writes: "Quite generally,
only music, placed beside the world, can give us an idea of
what is meant by the justification [Rechtfertigung) Of the
world as an aesthetic phenomenon" (GT 148/BT 141).
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Birth of Tragedy occurs in the context of Nietzsche's
reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. 5

This reading

moves, on innumerable levels, at the margin of justice, at
the limit of justification.

Like Prometheus, Nietzsche's

reading does not merely transgress the limit, the Apollinian
just boundary between just and unjust.

It moves at the

margin of justice, at the limit of justification.

The

limit, the just boundary, functions, but as it functions, it
is interrupted.

Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound begins:

"This is the

world's limit that we have come to; this is the Scythian
country, an untrodden desolation. 116

This line not only

locates the drama geographically at the "world's limit," it
also alludes to the location of the movement of the
Prometheus

myth~justice's

limit.

In the Greek world justice (dike) was understood in
terms of limits or boundaries.

One was justified and the

established order was maintained if one observed the

5 It

is interesting to note that the figure of the
unbound Prometheus adorns the title page of the original
1872 edition of The Birth of Tragedy.
6Aeschylus,

Prometheus Desmotes, in Septem ouae
Supersunt Tragoediae, ed. Denys Page (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1972), 287-329, lines 1-2 /Prometheus
Bound, trans. David Grene, in The Complete Greek Tragedies,
ed. David Grene and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1959), vol.1, 303-351, lines 1-2,
hereafter cited in the text as PB followed by the line
number.
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measures or limits fixed by Apollo, "the god of
individuation and of just boundaries" (GT 67/BT 72).
Nietzsche writes:
Apollo, as ethical deity, exacts measure of his
disciples, and, to be able to maintain it, he requires
self-knowledge. And so, side by side with the aesthetic
necessity for beauty, there occur the demands "know
thyself" and "nothing in excess"; consequently
overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly
hostile demons of the non-Apollinian sphere, hence as
characteristics of the pre-Apollinian age~that of the
Titans; and of the extra-Apollinian world~that of the
barbarians (GT 36/BT 46). 7
These limits demanded by the Delphic god Apollo, and the
concomitant understanding of justice, play a key role in
Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound.
The movement in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound at the
limit or margin of justice is most manifest in the way
Prometheus exceeds this limit.

Prometheus' titanic love for

human beings defied the Delphic admonition "nothing in
excess."

On one occasion the Chorus says:

"Your mind was

yours, not his [Zeus'], and at its bidding you regarded
mortal men too high [sebei thnatous agan], Prometheus" (PB
543-4).
7The

Regard or reverence is properly said of a human

demands "nothing in excess" and "know thyself" are
well represented in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. Allusions
to the demand "nothing in excess" appear in line 72 ("I am
forced to do this; do not keep urging me [meden ... agan].")
and in line 327 ("Now I will go and try if I can free you:
do you be quiet, do not talk so much [med,agan
labrostomei]. 11 ) . An allusion to the demand "know thyself"
appears in line 309 ("Yes, I see, Prometheus, and I want,
indeed I do, to advise you for the best, for all your
cleverness. Know yourself [gign6ske sauton] and reform your
ways to new ways, for new is he that rules among the·
Gods.") .
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being's worship of the gods.

Prometheus' regard for human

beings not only inverts the natural order, it is excessive.
on another occasion Prometheus laments:

"You see me a

wretched God in chains, the enemy of Zeus, hated of all the
Gods that enter Zeus' palace hall, because of my excessive
love [ten lian philoteta] for Man" (PB 119-23). 8
Another motif by which the movement at the limit or
margin of justice is most manifest in Prometheus Bound is
transgression.

Prometheus' theft of fire is a sin, an

error, a transgression (hamartia).

In the opening lines of

the drama Might reminds Hephaestus of the sin that brought
them to the high craggy rocks at the world's limit.
[I]t was your flower, the brightness of fire that
devises all, that he stole and gave to mortal men; this
is the sin [hamartias] for which he must pay the Gods
the penalty [dounai diken] 9~that he may learn to endure
and like the sovereignty of Zeus and quit his man-loving
disposition" (PB 7-11).
Cognate verbal forms of hamartia appear throughout the
tragedy.

For example, Hermes describes Prometheus in the

following manner:

"You, subtle-spirit, you bitterly

8

0ther examples of excess as a motif to characterize
Prometheus appear in line 180 ("You are free of tongue, too
free [agan g'eleutherostomeis]."), and in lines 318-9 ("This
is what you pay, Prometheus, for that tongue of yours which
talked so high and haughty [tes agan hypsegorou glosses].").
9

Dike, in this line and in line 614 ("O spirit that has
appeared as a common blessing to all men, unhappy
Prometheus, why are you being punished [tou diken pascheis
tade]?"), means specifically "punishment" or "penalty," but
by using this word Aeschylus also implies that Prometheus'
punishment is a result of dike and was thus caused by a
transgression of dike. See Michael Gagarin, ~schylean Drama
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 208 n.49.
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overbitter, you that sinned [examartonta] against the
immortals, giving honor to the creatures of a day, you thief
of fire" {PB 944-7).
Prometheus:

On one occasion, the Chorus says to

"Shame it were for one so wise to fall in error

[examartanein]" {PB 1039).
asks:

On another occasion, the Chorus

"Do you not see how you have erred [hemartes]" {PB

259-60)?
have said:

Prometheus replies:

"I have known all that you

I knew, I knew when I transgressed [hekon hekon

hemarton] nor will deny it.

In helping man I brought my

troubles on me" (PB 265-7). 10
The smith Hephaestus, a sympathizer, connects these
motifs of excess and transgression with justice (dike).
Such is the reward you reap of your man-loving
disposition.
For you, a God, feared not the anger of
the Gods, but gave honors to mortals beyond what was
just [pera dikes]. Wherefore you shall mount guard on
this unlovely rock, upright, sleepless, not bending the
knee (PB 28-32).
Prometheus gave beyond what was just, in excess of what was
justified.

He transgressed the limit of justice, and

therefore was punished.

The "content and soul" of Aeschylus' interpretation of
the Prometheus myth is, according to Nietzsche, the
affiliation the titanic artist feels with the audacity of
10

Another cognate verbal form of hamartia is spoken by
Io:
"Son of Kronos, what fault, what fault [hamartousan]
did you find in me that you should yoke me to a harness of
misery like this, that you should torture me so to madness
driven in fear of the gadfly" {PB 576-81). See also PB 112,
563, 620.
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the transgressive move of the Titan Prometheus.
In himself the Titanic artist found the defiant faith
that he had the ability to create men and at least
destroy Olympian gods, by means of his superior wisdom
which, to be sure, he had to atone for with eternal
suffering. The splendid "ability" of the great genius
for which even eternal suffering is a slight price, the
stern pride of the artist~that is the content and soul
of Aeschylus' poem (GT 64/BT 70).
Aeschylus' transgressive creation is characterized by what
Nietzsche calls "the profoundly Aeschylean demand for
iustice [Gerechtigkeit]" (GT 64/BT 70).
The immeasurable suffering of the bold "individual" on
the one hand and the divine predicament and intimation
of a twilight of the gods on the other, the way the
power of these two worlds of suffering compels a
reconciliation, a metaphysical union~all this recalls
in the strongest possible manner the center and main
axiom of the Aeschylean view of the world which
envisages Moira enthroned above gods and men as eternal
justice [ewige Gerechtigkeit] (GT 64/BT 70).
In the name of "the profoundly Aeschylean demand for
justice"

Aeschylus audaciously places not only the world of

the titanic individual (the Titan Prometheus, as well as the
titanic Greek artist), but also the divine Olympian world on
the scales of his justice.

This "demand for justice"

compels a reconciliation, a metaphysical union, of these two
worlds in the name of an "eternal justice."
But insofar as Aeschylus' interpretation is taken
merely as a defiant creation (that has to be atoned for with
suffering) characterized by a profound "demand for justice"
that compels reconciliation, it does not penetrate into the
abysmal depth of the myth's terror.
But Aeschylus' interpretation of the myth does not
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exhaust the astounding depth of its terror. Rather the
artist's delight in what becomes, the cheerfulness of
artistic creation that defies all misfortune, is merely
a bright image of clouds and sky [ein lichtes Wolkenund Himmelsbild] mirrored in a black lake of sadness {GT
64/BT 70).
In a passage that specifically applies to Sophocles'
interpretation of the Oedipus myth, but that is equally
applicable to Aeschylus' interpretation of the Prometheus
myth, Nietzsche writes:
If this explanation does justice to the poet one may yet
ask whether it exhausts the contents of the myth~and
then it becomes evident that the poet's whole conception
is nothing but precisely that bright image [Lichtbild]
which healing nature projects before us after a glance
into the abyss {GT 62/BT 68).
In another passage that specifically applies to the
Sophoclean hero, but that is equally applicable to the
Aeschylean hero, Nietzsche writes:
But suppose we disregard the character of the hero as it
comes to the surface, visibly~after all, it is in the
last analysis nothing but a bright image [Lichtbild]
projected on a dark wall, which means appearance through
and through; suppose we penetrate into the myth that
projects itself in these lucid reflections: then we
suddenly experience a phenomenon that is just the
opposite of a familiar optical phenomenon {GT 61/BT 67).
Nietzsche's reading of Prometheus Bound penetrates into the
myth.

It penetrates into Aeschylus' interpretation of the

myth insofar as this interpretation is taken merely as a
defiant creation (that has to be atoned for with suffering)
characterized by a profound "demand for justice" that
compels a reconciliation.

That is, it penetrates into

Aeschylus' interpretation of the myth insofar as this
interpretation remains attentive only to the transgression
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of the limit of justice drawn by Apollo, and not to the
movement at the margin of justice.

By attending to the

tragedy's transformation into an inability to reveal
anything, Nietzsche is attending to the tragedy's attempt to
become the revelation of what revelation destroys.

This is,

as Blanchet points out, a tragic endeavor.

The presupposition of the Prometheus myth produces,
according to Nietzsche, a painful and irresolvable
contradiction, rather than a reconciliation.
The presupposition of the Prometheus myth is to be found
in the extravagant value which a naive humanity attached
to fire as the true palladium of every ascending
culture. But that man should freely dispose of fire
without receiving it as a present from heaven, either as
a lightning bolt or as the warming rays of the sun,
struck these reflective primitive men as sacrilege, as a
robbery of divine nature (GT 65/BT 70-1).
Thus, Nietzsche continues, "the very first philosophical
problem"-the acquisition of fire-"immediately produces a
painful and irresolvable contradiction [einen peinlichen
unlosbaren Widerspruch] between man and god" (GT 65/BT 71),
between a human world and a divine world.
The best and highest possession mankind can acquire is
obtained by sacrilege and must be paid for with
consequences that involve the whole flood of sufferings
and sorrows with which the offended divinities have to
afflict the nobly aspiring race of men (GT 65/BT 71).
With this "sublime view of active sin [die erhabene Ansicht
von der activen Stinde]" as the characteristically Promethean
virtue, "the ethical basis for pessimistic tragedy has been
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found:

the justification [Rechtfertiqunq] 11 of human evil,

meaning both human guilt and the human suffering it entails"
(GT 65/BT 71).
The painful and irresolvable contradiction at the heart
of the world reveals itself, to a reader who is not inclined
to interpret away the misfortune, as
a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and a
human one, in which each, taken as an individual, has
right [Recht] on its side, but nevertheless has to
suffer for its individuation, being merely a single one
beside another (GT 66/BT 71).
For example, the clash between Prometheus and Zeus is (as is
the case in most Aeschylean conflicts) a matter of right or
dike on both sides.

The dike on Zeus' side results from

Prometheus' theft of fire, which, as was pointed out above,
even Prometheus admits was a transgression (PB 265-7).
Prometheus' theft, as the smith Hephaestus points out, went
"beyond what was just [pera dikes]" (PB 30).

Prometheus

must consequently pay the penalty (diken) for his
transgression (PB 9 and 614) . 12

Prometheus does not deny

that some penalty is justified, but he and his sympathizers
do protest the severity of the punishment.

At the end of

the tragedy Prometheus even accuses Zeus of acting without
dike:

"In a single word, I am the enemy of all the Gods

that gave me ill for good [ekdikos]" (PB 976) and "O Holy
11

The word "justification" is emphasized in the complete
critical edition of Nietzsche's work. The English
translation does not reflect this emphasis.
12

See note 9 .
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mother mine, o Sky that circling brings the light to all,
you see me, how I suffer, how unjustly [ekdika)" (PB
1093) . 13

In addition, Prometheus' theft of fire is (from

the side of Titan Prometheus, as well as the titanically
striving human being) justifiable as an act of compassion
and generosity.
Each side, therefore, taken as an individual, claims
the support of dike, each claims to have right on its side.
Focusing for a moment on the titanic individual (the Titan
Prometheus, as well as the titanically striving human being)
it becomes apparent that
[i)n the heroic effort of the individual to attain
universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of
individuation and to become the one world-being, he
suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction
[Urwiderspruch] that is concealed in things, which means
that he commits sacrilege and suffers (GT 66/BT 71).
In transgressing the limit of individuality (the just
boundary, that the ethical deity Apollo determines, between
a human world and a divine world), the titanic individual
does not merely transgress the limit.

The titanic

individual simultaneously suffers the painful and
irresolvable contradiction that the acquisition of fire is
both just and unjust, neither merely just nor unjust.

That

is, the titanic individual simultaneously interrupts the
very limit between just and unjust that would determine the
transgression.

13

The titanic individual (the Titan

See Gagarin,

~schylean

Drama, 134.

143

Prometheus, as well as the titanically striving human being)
moves, therefore, at the margin of justice.

This movement

is revealed by a "double reading" that articulates the
performance or production of the painful and irresolvable
contradiction at the heart of the world.

This "double

reading" articulates the necessity of thinking together what
is impossible to think together-the limit or just boundary
determined by the ethical deity Apollo and the simultaneous
transgression and interruption of this limit.
Aeschylus' interpretation of the Prometheus
myth-insofar as it is taken as a defiant creation (that has
to be atoned for with suffering) characterized by a profound
"demand for justice" that compels reconciliation-does not
exhaust, as Nietzsche points out, the astounding depth of
its terror.

Nietzsche's reading penetrates into the myth.

The equivocal "double reading" of the myth that articulates
the performance or production of the painful and
irresolvable contradiction at the heart of the world is the
necessary and inevitable effect of a penetration into the
myth, of "a glance into the inside and terrors of nature"
(GT 61/BT 67).

It is a trace of the myth's abysmal terror.

Nietzsche concludes his reading of Aeschylus'
Prometheus Bound by identifying the equivocal "double
reading" of the myth with the Apollinian and Dionysian
duality.

"Whoever understands [the) innermost kernei of the
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Prometheus story-namely, the necessity of sacrilege imposed
upon the titanically striving individual 14-must also
immediately [zugleich) feel how un-Apollinian this
pessimistic notion is" (GT 66/BT 72), that is, how
Dionysian, or otherwise than ethical, 15 this ethical basis
for pessimistic tragedy is.
Nietzsche goes on to clarify this equivocal "dual
nature" of Aeschylus' Prometheus-an equivocality that
highlights the interruptive character of Nietzsche's earlier
declaration that with the "sublime view of active sin" as
the characteristically Promethean virtue, "the ethical basis
for pessimistic tragedy has been found:

the justification

of human evil, meaning both human guilt and the human
suffering it entails" (GT 65/BT 71) .

The ethical deity

Apollo, Nietzsche reminds us, "wants to grant repose to
individual beings precisely by drawing boundaries between
them and by again and again calling these to mind as the
most sacred laws of the world, with his demands for selfknowledge and measure" (GT 66/BT 72) .

But this Apollinian

14

The titanic individual striving for "[t]he best and
highest possession mankind can acquire" necessarily commits
sacrilege. "The necessity of sacrilege imposed upon the
titanically striving individual" arises from the "painful
and irresolvable contradiction between man and god" (GT
65/BT 71), the "primordial contradiction that is concealed
in things" (GT 66/BT 71).
15

The Dionysian is not, strictly speaking, un-Apollinian
or unethical for (as will become apparent below) it is not
merely opposed to the Apollinian. It is, therefore, more
appropriate to write "otherwise than Apollinian" and
"otherwise than ethical."
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demand for just boundaries is interrupted by the Dionysian.
Lest this Apollinian tendency congeal the form to
Egyptian rigidity and coldness, lest the effort to
prescribe to the individual wave its path and realm
might annul the motion of the whole lake, the high tide
of the Dionysian destroyed from time to time all those
little circles in which the one-sidedly Apollinian
"will" had sought to confine the Hellenic spirit. The
suddenly swelling Dionysian tide then takes the separate
little wave-mountains of individuals on its back, even
as Prometheus' brother, the Titan Atlas, does with the
earth. This Titanic impulse to become, as it were, the
Atlas for all individuals, carrying them on a broad
back, higher and higher, farther and farther, is what
the Promethean and the Dionysian have in common.
In this respect, the Prometheus of Aeschylus is a
Dionysian mask, while in the aforementioned profound
demand for justice [Gerechtigkeit]u Aeschylus reveals
to the thoughtful his 17 paternal descent from Apollo,
the god of individuation and of just boundaries
[Gerechtigkeitgrenzen]. So the dual nature of
Aeschylus' Prometheus, his nature which is at the same
time [zuqleich] Dionysian and Apollinian, might be
expressed thus in a conceptual formula:
"All that
exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both
[Alles Vorhandene ist qerecht und unqerecht und in
beidem gleich berechtiqt]."
That is your world! A world indeed!-- (GT 66-7/BT
72)

This conceptual formula expresses Prometheus' movement at
the margin of justice.

The Aeschylean/Promethean "demand

for justice"-which reveals Aeschylus' and Prometheus'
paternal descent from the ethical deity Apollo-reveals an
ethical basis for pessimistic tragedy that is, at the same
time, otherwise than Apollinian, and therefore, otherwise
than ethical.

It is more appropriate to write "otherwise

than Apollinian" and "otherwise than ethical" because the
16

Nietzsche is referring to "the profoundly Aeschylean
demand for justice" mentioned on GT 64/BT 70.
17

That is, both Aeschylus' and Prometheus'.
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Dionysian is not merely opposed to the Apollinian.
Dionysian-otherwise than the ethical deity

The

Apoll~is

both

ethical and unethical, neither merely ethical nor unethical.
Moreover, the Aeschylean/Promethean "demand for
justice"-which reveals Aeschylus' and Prometheus' paternal
descent from Apollo, "the god of individuation and of just
boundaries"-reveals a justification of human evil that is,
at the same time, otherwise than Apollinian, and therefore,
otherwise than g justification, because both sides have
right on their side, both sides are justified.

or, said

otherwise, the theft of fire is both just and unjust,
neither merely just nor unjust.

The Dionysian not only

transgresses the limit determined by the Apollinian, it
simultaneously interrupts the very limit that would
determine the transgression.

Aeschylus' and Prometheus'

Apollinian "demand for justice" according to a "first
reading" reveals, according to a "second reading," the
simultaneous transgression and interruption of justice.
That is, it reveals the Dionysian not only as that which is
unjust, but also as that which effects an irresolvable
undecidability of "unjust" and "just."

It "reveals" the

Dionysian, which exceeds the Apollinian "demand f.or
justice."

One could say the Dionysian is excess (Ubermass,

GT 37/BT 46) itself, were not the very operation of the
determination "itself" interrupted by the excess.
Dionysian can, therefore, be written only under

The
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erasure-:DJ11nysial[.

"Writing under erasure" is a gesture of

writing that articulates the withdrawal from revelation of
what is "revealed" according to a "second reading."

What

always already withdraws from revelation inevitably gets
reinscribed into the order of limits or just boundaries
determined by Apollo, but it leaves a trace of itself in the
necessary yet impossible "double reading" of the myth
expressed by Nietzsche's irresolvably contradictory
conceptual formula:

"All that exists is just and unjust and

equally justified in both."
A final note:
justify injustice.

The interruption of justice does not
It is not as if the Dionysian is merely

opposed to the Apollinian, as if it is merely the lack of
boundaries. Rather, it indicates that one's system of
justice (one's system of evaluations) does not make one
just.

The performance of the "double reading" transforms

justice into the impossibility of being just (or unjust).
It interrupts any firm position from which one could make
evaluations (of justice or injustice), while, at the same
time, not absolving one of the necessity (not to say, the
inevitability) of making such evaluations, and specifically,
of enacting Aeschylus' and Prometheus' Apollinian "demand
for justice."

With this reading of justice one can begin to read the
following suggestive sentence:

"The existence of the world
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is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon."

Nietzsche

calls attention to justice as if to suggest that one can
read the existence of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon
only if one reads it alongside the transformation of justice
effected in the text.

It is as if the transformation of

justice outlined above effects (or is effected by) a
transformation of art.

A detailed outline of this

transformation would exceed the scope of this essay, but one
can catch a glimpse of it in Nietzsche's reading of
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound where, as was pointed out above,
Nietzsche identifies the equivocal "double reading" of the
myth with the Apollinian and Dionysian

duality~the

two art

deities of the Greeks around whom the innumerable
transformations of art effected in The Birth of Tragedy are
gathered. 18

Nietzsche's reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound
attempts to

rethink~and,

concept of justice.

in a sense, to

liberate~the

Here, perhaps for the first time (to

refer to a phrase in Nietzsche's "Attempt at a SelfCriticism"), a pessimism "beyond good and evil," beyond just
and unjust, is suggested.

At the risk of moving far too

quickly, I would suggest that, perhaps, Levinas' idea of
justice is not unlike the just boundaries characteristic of
18

For a more detailed account of these transformations
see John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of
Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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the Apollinian order and that Levinas' idea of
responsibility is not unlike the excessive Dionysian, which
interrupts the just boundaries of the Apollinian order and
merely leaves an enigmatic or ambiguous trace of itself in
that order.

Perhaps.

CHAPTER 5
THE CLEARING AND DEAD TIME:
Re-reading Heidegger's Being and Time
In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,"
first published in 1966, Heidegger writes of his
attempt, undertaken again and again since 1930, to give
the questioning in Being and Time a more originary
[anfanglicher] form. This means: to submit the
beginning [Ansatz] of the question in Being and Time to
an immanent critique. 1
He indicates that through this undertaking "the name of the
task of Being and Time gets changed" (SD 61/TB 55).
into what is it changed?
with a question:

But

Heidegger answers this question

"Does the name for the task of thinking

then read instead of Being and Time:

clearing and presence

[Lichtung und Anwesenheit]" (SD 80/TB 73)?

The change here

is not, however, the result of an external critique
undertaken in the name of transcending Being and Time, but
rather the result, as Heidegger has already indicated, of an
immanent

critique~a

critique that is already in play in

Being and Time itself.
This immanent critique decisively turns, I would

1

Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tilbingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1969), 61, hereafter cited in the text as SD. /On
Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper &
Row, 1979), 55, hereafter cited in the text as TB.
150

151

suggest, upon the doubling of death--death as possibility
turning into death as impossibility.

Recall the

introduction of this dissertation which pointed out that
Levinas and Blanchot consistently read death in Being and
Time as merely possibility.

The doubling of death calls,

therefore, for re-reading these readings of Being and Time.
I would suggest that this

doubling~which

delimits the

project of fundamental ontology, that is, both limits it and
possible 2~not

makes it

only opens the space/time of the

clearing (Lichtung), but also raises the question of the
proximity of the clearing and the "dead time" (le temps
mort) of Levinas and Blanchot.

The existential analytic of Dasein, undertaken in the
name of fundamental ontology, is delimited by a series of
crucial

distinctions~ontic/ontological,

existentiell/existential, inauthentic/authentic, etc.

That

reading of Being and Time that has come to be known as the
"existential" reading reads these distinctions as
distinctions, that is, as two separate, distinguishable ways
of being.

This

reading~which,

I would suggest, inevitably

characterizes the "first reading" of a doubled re-reading of
Being and

Time~reads

the task of the existential analytic

and, therefore, fundamental ontology, as merely a step
2

See John Sallis, Delimitations~Phenomenology and the
End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1986) •
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beyond the first pole of each distinction into the second
pole.

The analysis of death that opens the second division

of Being and Time affirms, according to the "existential"
reading, the possibility of the existential analytic by
affirming the possibility of completing this step, that is,
by bringing to light Dasein's authentic potentiality-forBeing-a-whole.

"By pointing out that Dasein has an

authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the existential
analytic acquires assurance as to the constitution of
Dasein's primordial Being" (SZ 234/BT 277).

But this

reading-a reading that reads death merely as
possibility-repeats, as Levinas and Blanchot point out, the
most familiar and traditional of steps.
The question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-forBeing-a-whole is already anticipated in the opening section
of the first division.

Heidegger's "exposition of the task

of a preparatory analysis of Dasein" begins by sketching two
characteristics of Dasein-"the priority of 'existentia'
over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine
[die Jemeinigkeit]" (SZ 43/BT 68).

Heidegger qualifies his

choice of the term "existence" (Existenz) to designate
Dasein's comportment to its Being by pointing out that the
term "does not and cannot have the ontological significance
of the traditional term 'existentia'" (SZ 42/BT 67).

It

designates, rather, what Heidegger calls Dasein's
potentiality-for-Being (Seinkonnen).

Heidegger writes:
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That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an
issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost
[eigensten] possibility. In each case Dasein is its
possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just
as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something presentat-hand would (SZ 42/BT 68).
Weaving in the other characteristic of Dasein, mineness,
Heidegger introduces the issue of authenticity
(Eigentlichkeit).

The passage continues:

And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own
possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself
and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win
itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as
it is essentially something which can be authentic
[eigentliches]~that is, something of its own~can it
have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of
Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these
expressions have been chosen terminologically in a
strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any
Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness
[Jemeinigkeit] (SZ 42-43/BT 68).
The question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-awhole, anticipated in the opening of the first division and
"completed" in the opening chapters of the second division,
delimits the movement of the existential analytic.
In the analysis of "Being-in" the word clearing
(Lichtung) decisively comes into play with respect to the
question of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-awhole.

As essentially ex-isting, as "being-there," that is,

as the site (the "there," the "Da") where its own Being
(Sein) is disclosed, Dasein is itself the clearing
(Lichtung).
When we talk in an ontically figurative way of
the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other
than the existential-ontological structure of this
entity, that it is in such a way as to be its "there".
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To say that it is 'illuminated' ["erleuchtet"] means
that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared (qelichtet] in
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way
that it is itself the clearing [Lichtung]. Only for an
entity which is existentially cleared [gelichteten] in
this way does that which is present-at-hand become
accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its
very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it.
If it lacks its "there", it is not factically the entity
which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this
entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness
[Erschlossenheit] (SZ 133/BT 171).
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's way of Being lies
existentially, Heidegger writes, in one constituent of the
clearing~understanding

(Verstehen)

(SZ 143/BT 183).

The crux of Heidegger's analysis of understanding is
his precise characterization of this existentiale as
projection (Entwurf).

Drawing upon his earlier analysis of

the worldhood of the world, Heidegger writes:

"With equal

primordiality the understanding projects [entwirft] Dasein's
Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' [Worumwillen]
and upon significance [Bedeutsamkeit], as the worldhood of
its current world" (SZ 145/BT 185).

Proximally and for the

most part Dasein is projected upon significance, upon the
"relational totality" (SZ 87/BT 120) that structures a
world.

Recall that the world is structured by the Being of

the ready-to-hand (involvement), that is, by the manifold
context of assignments and references of an "in-order-to"
visible to circumspection (Umsicht).

From the world, Dasein

is, in turn, given back to itself, disclosed to itself.
Dasein can understand itself in terms of the possibilities
of an "in-order-to" that structure a world.

But this
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particular projection and subsequent disclosure does not let
possibilities be as possibilities.

Being out for something

concernfully, which characterizes Dasein's comportment to
the world, is not a comportment toward the possible as
possible.

In the analysis of death Heidegger writes:

"Being towards" a possibility-that is to say, towards
something possible-may signify "Being out for"
something possible, as in concerning ourselves with its
actualization. Such possibilities are constantly
encountered in the field of what is ready-to-hand and
present-at-hand-what is attainable, controllable,
practicable, and the like. In concernfully Being out
for something possible, there is a tendency to
annihilate the possibility of the possible by making it
available to us. But the concernful actualization of
equipment which is ready-to-hand (as in producing it,
getting it ready, readjusting it, and so on) is always
merely relative, since even that which has been
actualized is still characterized in terms of some
involvements-indeed this is precisely what
characterizes its Being. Even though actualized, it
remains, as actual, something possible for doing
something; it is characterized by an "in-order-to".
What our analysis is to make plain is simply how Being
out for something concernfully, comports itself towards
the possible: it does so not by the theoreticothematical consideration of the possible as possible,
and by having regard for its possibility as such, but
rather by looking circumspectively away
(umsichtiq ... wegsieht] from the possible and looking at
that for which it is possible [das Woftir-moglich) (SZ
261/BT 305).

Even though the concernful actualization of the ready-tohand is merely relative, insofar as it remains situated
within the referential totality of an "in-order-to," the
sense of the possible operative in the circumspection that
guides concern remains confined within the horizon of
actualization.

Being out for something concernfully,

comports itself toward the possible-that is, toward the
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ready-to-hand which is as being possible, which is only
insofar as it is situated within the referential totality of
an "in-order-to" 3-by looking circumspectively away from the
possible as such and by looking at that for which it is
possible, that is, at that for which it is the possible
actualization.

This looking-away from the possible to its

possible actualization is what Heidegger calls expecting
( Erwarten) .
Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away [ein
Wegsehen] from the possible to its possible
actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that
actualization [ein Warten auf diese]. Even in
expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a
foothold in the actual. It is for its actuality that
what is expected is expected. By the very nature of
expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual,
arising out of the actual and returning to it (SZ 262/BT
306).

Heidegger contrasts expecting, which essentially confines
possibility within the horizon of actuality, to anticipation
(Vorlaufen), which frees possibility, lets possibility be as
possibility.
The issue of anticipation is anticipated in the
analysis of understanding.

Recall that the understanding

not only projects Dasein upon significance, but also, and
with equal primordiality, upon its "for-the-sake-of-which."
The "for-the-sake-of-which," as the analysis of the
3

For example, the pencil is most properly the pencil
not as an object present-at-hand but when it is situated
within the referential totality of an "in-order-to," that
is, when it is used "in-order-to" write,. which is done "inorder-to" to finish the dissertation, which is done ''inorder-to11 ...
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worldhood of the world indicates, refers to that being,
Dasein, characterized essentially by its potentiality-forBeing (Seinkonnen).

It refers to that being which "grounds"

the "in-order-to" of significance (SZ 83-88/BT 114-22).
Therefore, not only is Dasein projected upon significance,
that is, upon the possibilities of an "in-order-to" that
structure a world, it is also projected upon possibilities
understood with respect to its potentiality-for-Being, that
is, its ownmost possibilities, possibilities as
possibilities.

From both of these possibilities Dasein is

given back to itself, disclosed to itself.
Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as
long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is,
Dasein always has understood itself, and always will
understand itself in terms of possibilities (SZ 145/BT
185).
Heidegger is perhaps a bit too unequivocal in the next
passage of the text which describes projection solely in
terms of projection upon possibilities as possibilities.

I

would suggest that Dasein's projection upon significance is
a projection that does not let possibilities be as
possibilities.
Furthermore, the character of understanding as
projection is such that the understanding does not grasp
thematically that upon which it projects~that is to
say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would
take away from what it projected its very character as a
possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents
which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing,
throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and
lets it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the
kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities
as possibilities (SZ 145/BT 185).
·
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Heidegger goes on to characterize the two-sided selfdisclosure that is correlative to its two-sided selfprojection~that

is, its projection upon the possibilities

of an "in-order-to" that structure a world and its
projection upon its ownmost

possibilities~in

terms of

authenticity and inauthenticity.
Understanding can devote itself primarily to the
disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can,
proximally and for the most part, understand itself in
terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself
primarily into the "for-the-sake-of-which"; that is,
Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either
authentic, arising out of one's own Self as such, or
inauthentic (SZ 146/BT 186).
These two forms of projective understanding are analogous to
what one might call authentic and inauthentic possibility.

The negative determination of possibility
characteristic of Heidegger's analysis of understanding is
positively supplemented in a relatively short passage from
that section of Being and Time entitled "Pre-sketch
[Vorzeichnung] of the existential-ontological structure of
death."

The analysis of death in Being and Time arises in

response to the question of whether or not the existential
analytic of Dasein undertaken in Division I is complete,
whether or not it has grasped Dasein as a whole.

But this

demand for the completion of the existential analytic seems
"manifestly inconsistent" (SZ 236/BT 279) with the analysis
of care which forms the structural whole of Dasein.

The

"primary item" in the structure of care is the "ahead-of-
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itself" {Sichvorweg), which obviously harkens back to the
potentiality-for-Being central to the analysis of
understanding {SZ 191-2/BT 236).
The 'ahead-of-itself' [>>Sichvorweg<<], as an item in
the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in
Dasein there is always something still outstanding
[aussteht], which, as a potentiality-for-Being
[Seinkonnen] for Dasein itself, has not yet become
'actual'. It is essential to the basic constitution of
Dasein that there is constantly something still to be
settled [eine standige Unabgeschlossenheit] {SZ 236/BT
279).
The inconsistency, therefore, is this:

as soon as Dasein is

wholly itself, Dasein is not.
[A]s soon as Dasein 'exists' in such a way that
absolutely nothing more is still outstanding in it, then
it has already for this very reason become "no-longerBeing-there" [Nicht-mehr-da-sein].
Its Being is
annihilated when what is still outstanding in its Being
has been liquidated {SZ 236/BT 280).
This inconsistency would preclude the possibility of
grasping Dasein as a whole save for Heidegger's
reservations:

the argument giving rise to the inconsistency

is not only merely formal, it also inadvertently posits
Dasein as something merely present-at-hand.

"Have we, in

our argument," Heidegger asks, "taken 'Being-not-yet' and
the 'ahead' in a sense that is genuinely existential" {SZ
237/BT 280)?
analysis, this

In fact, rather than simply precluding the
inconsistency~the

coincidence of being and

necessary yet impossible

nonbeing~forms,

as will become

apparent throughout the course of the analysis, the
essential element of the death analysis that calls for
thinking.
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Heidegger then establishes, within the context of an
analysis of the possibility of experiencing the death of
others, that death is not merely an event (Begebenheit).

In

the wake of the seeming inconsistency of Dasein itself
getting access to the phenomenon of death, this analysis
arises as an alternative means of getting access to the
phenomenon.

But Heidegger concludes that despite "the fact

that one Dasein can be represented [Vertretbarkeit] by
another" (SZ 239/BT 283), the possibility of representing
breaks down completely in the phenomenon of death.

"No one

can take the Other's dying away from him" (SZ 240/BT 284).
I am, with respect to the phenomenon of death,
unrepresentable.

This impossibility of substitution is due

to the mineness (Jemeiniqkeit) of death.
By its very essence, death is in every case mine
[meine], in so far as it 'is' at all. And indeed death
signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the
very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue.
In dying,
it is shown that mineness [Jemeinigkeit] and existence
are ontologically constitutive for death. Dying is not
an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood
existentially (SZ 240/BT 284).
With this passage Heidegger again returns to the
prescription~as

he did when he expressed reservations about

the "manifest inconsistency" between the demand for the
completion of the existential analytic and the analysis of
the structure of

care~that

death is a phenomenon to be

understood existentially.
In order to get a genuinely existential conception of
the phenomenon of death it is necessary, therefore, to
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determine the way that death belongs to existence.
According to the analysis of the structure of care, Dasein's
existence consists in its being always already "ahead of
itself."

Dasein always already projects ahead to what it

not yet is.

But, Heidegger asks, is this "not-yet" which

belongs to Dasein as long as it is, to be interpreted, as it
was previously, as still outstanding {Ausstand)
286)?

{SZ 242/BT

That which is still outstanding is, for example, the

remainder yet to be received in order to pay off or settle a
debt.

When the debt is paid off, that which is still

outstanding gets liquidated.

To be still outstanding means,

therefore, that what belongs together is not yet all
together.

Heidegger concludes that

"[~]ntities

for which

anything is still outstanding have the kind of Being of
something ready-to-hand" {SZ 242/BT 286-7).

But the lack-

of-togetherness that belongs to any such entities cannot
define the "not-yet" which belongs to Dasein with respect to
its possible death.

Here Heidegger again reiterates the

"manifest inconsistency" referred to earlier.
That Dasein should be together only when its "not-yet"
has been filled up is so far from the case that it is
precisely then that Dasein is no longer. Any Dasein
always exists in just such a manner that its "not-yet"
belongs to it {SZ 243/BT 287) .
Heidegger then addresses two examples of entities to which
one could presumable say the "not-yet" belongs, in order to
determine, at least in a negative way, Dasein's peculiar
"not-yet."

The not yet full moon is "not-yet" in the sense
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of "not-yet" perceptible.

But this "not-yet" pertains only

to the way one perceptually grasps that which is already
actual.

Dasein's "not-yet" is not, however, something

provisionally and occasionally inaccessible to perception.
It is not yet actual.

"Dasein must, itself, become-that is

to say, be-what it is not yet" (SZ 243/BT 287).

The "not-

yet" of the ripe fruit is, unlike the "not-yet" of the full
moon, a "not-yet" of becoming.

The fruit becomes ripe, and

that becoming ripe belongs to the being of the fruit.
"Correspondingly," Heidegger notes, "as long as Dasein is,
it too is already its "not-yet" (SZ 244/BT 288).

But when

·the fruit becomes ripe, it fulfills itself, it actualizes
its possibilities.

Dasein does not, however, fulfill its

possibilities with its death.

On the contrary, its death is

the moment when its possibilities are taken away.
Heidegger then distinguishes the senses of ending
characteristic of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand things
and the sense of ending characteristic of Dasein.
(J]ust as Dasein is already its "not-yet", and is its
"not-yet" constantly as long as it is, it is already its
end too. The "ending" which we have in view when we
speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-anend (Zu-Ende-sein], but a Being-towards-the-end (Sein
zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which
Dasein takes over as soon as it is.
"As soon as man
comes to life, he is at once old enough to die' (SZ
245/BT 289).
The "not-yet" of death, considered existentially, has,
therefore, the character of something towards which Dasein
comports itself.

Immediately preceding the passage that
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lies at the center of Heidegger's analysis of death,
Heidegger modifies this existential characterization of the
"not-yet."

Death, he writes, is something impending

(Bevorstand)

(SZ 250/BT 293-4).

The passage that lies at the center of Heidegger's
analysis of death can, for heuristic purposes, be divided
into five parts.

It begins:

Death is a possibility-of-Being [Seinsmoglichkeit] which
Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With
death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being [in seinem eigensten Seinkonnen]
(SZ 250/BT 294).
Death is a possibility that Dasein has always to take
over~that

is, a possibility upon which, using terminology

introduced in the analysis of understanding, Dasein must
project itself.

In fact, it is the only possibility upon

which Dasein has no choice but to project itself.
Projecting itself upon this possibility Dasein stands before
itself in its

potentiality-for-Being~that

is, it is given

back to itself, disclosed to itself, from that possibility.
This possibility, as the only possibility upon Dasein must
project itself, is Dasein's ownmost possibility.
The passage continues:
This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less
than Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Its death is the
possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there [die
Moglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-konnens]. If Dasein
stands before itself [seiner selbst sich bevorsteht] as
this possibility, it has been fully assigned [verwiesen]
to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [eigenstes·
Seinkonnen]. When it stands before itself in this way,
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all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone
(SZ 250/BT 294).
What is at issue for Dasein in its projection upon this
possibility, and its being disclosed to itself from this
possibility, is, as the analysis of anxiety shows, nothing
within-the-world but rather being-in-the-world as such.
What is at issue is Dasein's no-longer-being-able-to-bethere.

What is more, not only does this projection and

self-disclosure banish Dasein from present-at-hand and
ready-to-hand entities within-the-world, it exiles Dasein
fully, that is, it undoes the Dasein-with of others.

To

project upon this possibility and to be disclosed from
it~that

is, to stand before

to be in utter exile.

itself~is,

at the same time,

This possibility is non-relational.

The passage continues:
This ownmost non-relational [un-beztiglich] possibility
is at the same time the uttermost one [die ausserste].
As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip
[tiberholen] the possibility of death. Death is the
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein (SZ
250/BT 294).
This part of the passage follows almost directly from the
previous

parts~since

death is Dasein's ownmost, non-

relational possibility, it is the extreme possibility.
Death is that possibility that
limits and makes

delimits~that

possible~possibilities.

is, both

This possibility

is unsurpassable, not to be outstripped.
The passage continues by gathering together the three
determinations of death that have emerged:
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Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is
one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not
to be outstripped. As such, death is something
distinctively impending (SZ 250-1/BT 294).
The possibility of death is distinctive in that it is
otherwise than any impending possibility within-the-world.
The passage concludes by emphasizing that the
possibility of death is not only g mode of disclosedness,
but, in a certain sense, a privileged mode.
Its existential possibility is based on the fact that
Dasein is essentially disclosed [erschlossen] to itself,
and disclosed, indeed, as ahead-of-itself [Sich-vorweq].
This item in the structure of care has its most
primordial concretion in Being-towards-death (SZ 251/BT
294) .
The ahead-of-itself, one should note, is that moment in the
structure of care that corresponds to the analysis of
understanding.

Death, as the most originary concretion of

this structure,

delimits~that

possible~this

structure.

is, both limits and makes

This delimitation, moreover, is

the doubling of death upon which turns the re-reading of
Being and Time.
The first movement of this doubling is marked by
Dasein's return to itself.

Projection upon and disclosure

from this possibility serve to draw Dasein back from
dispersion to a certain unity with itself, to a certain
wholeness.

This

possibility~which

marks the condition of

the possibility of possibility--discloses Dasein in its
ownmost.
The second movement of this doubling effects an
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interruption of the first movement.

For that possibility

which discloses Dasein in its ownmost is, at the same time,
the possibility that banishes Dasein to utter exile, that
separates it not only from others and the world, but also
from itself.

This possibility marks, therefore, not only

the condition of the possibility of possibility, but at the
same time, the condition of the impossibility of
possibility.
impossibility.

Death as possibility turning into death as
One is here called to think together that

which is impossible to think together-Dasein is (being) and
is not (nonbeing), it is itself in being other, it is
ownmost and othermost, it is homecoming in exile. 4
In both "The Trace of the Other" and "Meaning and
Sense" Levinas implicitly casts Heidegger's philosophy as
one ultimately characterized by homecoming.

For example, in

a passage from "Meaning and Sense"-a passage whose context
obviously indicates that he is referring, among other
philosophers, to Heidegger-Levinas writes:

"Philosophy's

itinerary remains that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the
world was only a return to his native island-complacency in
the Same, an unrecognition of the other." 5

Levinas,

4

See John Sallis, "Mortality and Imagination:
Heidegger and the Proper Name of Man," in Echos: After
Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
5Emmanuel

Levinas, "La signification et le sens," in
Humanisme de l'autre homme (Montpellier: Fata Morgana,
1972), 40. /"Meaning and Sense," in Emmanuel Levinas:
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 91.
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however, wishes to oppose the story of Abraham to the myth
of Ulysses.

In "The Trace of the Other" he writes: "To the

myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the
story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet
unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his
son to the point of departure. " 6

Levinas' choice of the

word "oppose" is perhaps a bit too polemical since the
"relation" of homecoming to exile can never be one merely of
opposition.

In more careful formulations Levinas himself

speaks of a homecoming in exile that is not unlike the
reading of Heidegger's analysis of death offered in the
previous paragraphs.

For example, in the chapter entitled

"Substitution" from Otherwise Than Being Levinas writes:
If the return to self proper to cognition, the original
truth of being, consciousness, can be realized, it is
because a recurrence of ipseity has already been
produced [produite]. This is an inversion in the
process of essence, a withdrawing from the game that
being plays in consciousness. It is g withdrawal inoneself which is an exile in oneself, without a
foundation in anything else, a non-condition. This
withdrawal excludes all spontaneity, and is thus always
already effected, already past (AE 135/0B 106-107,
emphasis added).
These provisional remarks serve only to raise the question
of the proximity of Heidegger and Levinas.
death~which

6

The doubling of

gives rise to the call to necessarily yet

Emmanuel Levinas, "La trace de l'autre," in En
decouvrant !'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris:
Vrin, 1982), 191. /"The Trace of the Other," trans.
Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context: Literature
and Philosophy, ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986), 348.
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impossibly think together homecoming and exile-likewise
raises the question of the proximity of Heidegger and
Blanchet with respect to Blanchot's "double death."

It is

now necessary, however, to return for a moment to the
reading of Heidegger's death analysis.
The doubling of death is both the condition of the
possibility and the impossibility of fundamental ontology.
This doubling of death, on the one hand, effects the
possibility of fundamental ontology, it establishes the
distinctions (so crucial to the existential analytic) as
distinctions-ontic/ontological, existentiell/existential,
inauthentic/authentic, etc.

But, on the other hand, it is

ruinous of not only the possibility of fundamental ontology
(insofar as it is understood as merely a step from one term
of the distinction to another), but also, of the very
language of possibility itself.

The distinctions of the

existential analytic-which, according to the "existential"
reading, set the stage for the most familiar and traditional
of steps-can, therefore, no longer be understood as merely
distinctions.

One could perhaps say, as Levinas does in a

completely different context, that there is a rapport sans
rapport-a relation without relation-between the terms of
each distinction.

That is, the latter "term" of each

distinction infinitely approaches (or withdraws).

This doubling of death opens the space/time of the
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clearing (Lichtung).

But Levinas and Blanchot do not read

this doubling (at least in those places where Heidegger is
explicitly named).

I would suggest, however, that this

doubling of death not only opens the space/time of the
clearing, but also raises the question of the proximity of
this clearing and the "dead time" of Levinas and Blanchot. 7

7Having

suggested this, it is immediately necessary to
add a note of reservation. This re-reading of Heidegger's
Being and Time merely serves as a way to problematize a too
easy reading of the work of Levinas or Blanchot that would
proclaim that they have unambiguously stepped beyond the
work of Heidegger. It must be emphasized, however, that it
merely raises the question of the proximity of the work of
Heidegger and the work of Levinas and Blanchot. It does not
seek to synthesize them. Given time, it would be necessary
to supplement this reading with a reading that would remain
attentive to differences between the works of Heidegger,
Levinas, and Blanchot. For example, it would be necessary
to take into account (among a host of other works) Levinas'
Otherwise than Being and his essay "Mourir pour . . . " in
Heidegger. Questions ouvertes (Paris: Osiris, 1988), ·as well
as Blanchot's The Space of Literature.

AFTERWARD
This afterward serves to unsay what was said in the
dissertation, it serves as a corrective to what may have
been ill understood in the dissertation.
This dissertation is composed of five relatively selfcontained chapters gathered together only by the logic of
approach-the "is not yet" or "dead time."

The logic of

approach serves as a way to problematize a too easy reading
of the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and
Blanchot-a reading, for example, that proclaims that one of
these thinkers has unambiguously stepped beyond one of the
others.

It must be emphasized, however, that it merely

raises the question of the proximity of the work of
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchot.
seek to synthesize them.

It does not

Given time, it would be necessary

to supplement this reading with a reading that would remain
attentive to differences between the works of Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Levinas, and Blanchot.
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